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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation covers three topics of importance for international trade policy. It consists of 
three independent essays in the area of trade in biotechnology and regionalization of a disease 
outbreak.  
 
Essay one, through utilization of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), contributes to the 
literature by providing a global measurement on the effect that the expanding genetically 
modified (GM) pipeline has on international trade given the constraint of asynchronous 
regulations for a new GM event among countries. The model measures the effect of the GM 
global pipeline on international trade flows between countries, and the effect on trade flows 
between countries given the unintended presence of GM events in the export of non-GM crops. 
These measurements are achieved through the development of five simulations for the following 
agriculture goods: maize, soybeans, canola, wheat and rice. The simulation results indicate that 
asynchronicity does affect trade flows on a global level. However, society is better off overall 
with additional GM events on the market, even when asynchronicity is present and large, as the 
increase in trade flow is greater from the new GM events than the reduction in trade flow caused 
by asynchronicity. 
 
Essay two, through the application of a real options model, evaluates the investment risk for a 
biotechnology firm that aspires to enter a highly regulated European Union (EU) market for 
genetically modified products. The regulatory (political) risk is captured as uncertainty that can 
influence the optimal decision of the investment firm. The findings in this thesis indicate that the 
presence of political factors in the EU decision process for approving new GM varieties 
iii 
 
influences the exporter’s decision who wants to export a safe GM product into the EU market. 
As result exporter postpones their decision to enter the EU market into the future and reduces the 
level of sunk cost they are willing to invest to enter the market. However, continually postponing 
the investment into the future can lead to the investment never occurring. The final outcome is 
that the presence of political factors in the decision approval process slows the growth of the 
biotechnology industry and constrains the accessibility of this technology for developing 
countries.  
 
Essay three, through an application of a partial equilibrium model, analyses the regionalization 
concept accounting for the incentive for commercial and casual smuggling. The essay evaluates 
the model with the risk of being caught and the risk of not being caught. If there is no risk of 
being caught the incentive to smuggle will exist as long as the price minus the smuggling costs in 
the non-infected area exceeds that of the infected area. If we consider the risk of being caught 
and fined by the governing authorities, then the incentive to smuggle will depend on the 
probability of being caught. The higher the probability of being caught the lower the incentive 
for smuggling will be, given the losses in revenue in the non-infected market and the additional 
cost of being fined. Casual smuggling depends on the distance the consumer has to travel to the 
low priced region, the cost of transportation and the easiness of avoiding the authorities. Two 
policies were discussed in this essay: price support, and enforcement and punishment that were 
applied to commercial smuggling with and without risk, and to casual smuggling. Price support 
was evaluated as a more appropriate policy as it is difficult to estimate the appropriate level of 
enforcement and punishment under that type of policy that would bring smuggling to zero. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation investigates three topics in international trade policy. Each essay examines a 
different global issue in international trade through empirical measurement, economic modeling 
or policy analysis. In the last decade the application of biotechnology in agriculture has evolved 
as a global issue. The use of biotech in agriculture has produced a number of genetically 
modified products (GM) and it was estimated that commercially available GM events would 
reach 219 by the end of 2020 (Parisi et al., 2016). However, legislation regarding GM events is 
made at the individual country level and, therefore, can vary between countries and regions 
around the world. This fragmented approval process can disrupt trade flows as a result of what is 
termed “asynchronous approval”. “Asynchronous approval” of GM events creates challenges 
between exporting and importing countries given that international shipments of a particular GM 
or non-GM agricultural commodity may contain unauthorized material leading to costly trade 
disruptions. 
 
Two international trade trends: the expanding GM global pipeline for new events and; the 
difficulties of perfect segregation among GM and non-GM products in the global trade system 
form the basis of the research questions in the first essay. The research questions addressed in 
this essay measures the effect of the increasing GM global pipeline on international trade flows 
between countries and measures the effect on trade flows between countries given the 
unintended presence of GM events in the export of non-GM crops. This essay investigates, 
tabulates and measures these disruptions through the trade flows of key crops where modern 
agricultural technology is widely utilized: maize, soybeans and rapeseed.  
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The measurements were conducted through utilization of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP). The motivation behind the GTAP model is to provide an instrument that is able to 
capture the behavior of the economy and the changes for that economy when external shocks are 
applied, while remaining consistent with economic theory. Five simulations were developed with 
the GTAP program in order to answer research questions specified in Chapter 2. The simulation 
results indicate that asynchronicity does affect trade flows on a global level. However, society is 
better off overall with more GM events on the market, even when asynchronicity is present and 
large since the increase in trade flow is larger as a result of the new GM events than the 
reduction in the trade flow caused by asynchronicity. 
 
The second explores the biotechnology issue from an international trade point of view including 
the investment in technology. Application of a real options model evaluates the investment risk 
for a biotechnology firm that aspires to enter a highly regulated market for genetically modified 
products. The model developed in this essay is used to evaluate the additional risks arising from 
policy measures in the European Union (EU). More specifically, the theoretical model analyses 
the decision approval process of a GM event in the EU, the EU’s inconsistency with multilateral 
trade agreements and how this type of regulatory structure can be defined as political risk that 
can influence the investment decisions of firms intending to bring GM products to the EU 
market. The regulatory (political) risk is captured as uncertainty that can influence the optimal 
decision of the investment firm. Hence each additional step of the approval process for GM 
products gradually increases the uncertainty and postpones the investment decision into the 
future. However, the postponement of the investment and the increasing uncertainty causes the 
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investor’s acceptable level of irreversible costs to decrease. This leads to a situation where over 
time the level of investment may be reduced.  
 
Biotechnology is an important agricultural technology that can increase global food production 
in an environmentally sustainable manner. Thus, regulation inefficiencies, as in the EU where 
decision making is based on political factors and not scientific evidence, divert investment from 
the market and slow the growth of the biotechnology industry. Furthermore, it complicates the 
accessibility of this technology for developing countries which are most likely to benefit from 
the technology given the food security challenges they face.  
 
The concept of regionalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become of 
growing importance in international agricultural markets and if appropriately implemented can 
lead to significant economic and trade benefits. The concept of the regionalization means that if a 
disease outbreak occurs that can be controlled and localized to a specific area within the country, 
then constraints on international trade need only apply to products originating from the infected 
area, thereby allowing the uninfected area of the country or countries in question to continue 
exporting (Loppacher et al., 2006). Without regionalization, a disease outbreak in an exporting 
country allows importing countries to deny market access to all of a country’s products even if 
there are regions of the country that are disease free. However, a large number of countries have 
experienced difficulty in having their disease free region(s) recognized by importing countries.  
 
Essay three examines the concept of regionalization under the WTO and analyses the reasons 
why implementation of this facet of trade law has thus far failed. Price disparity between two 
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regions in an exporting country creates an incentive to smuggle and is one reason why the 
implementation of the regionalization concept has failed.  Through economic evaluation, essay 
three determines the appropriate mode to implement the regionalization concept. This research, 
through application of a partial equilibrium model, analyses the regionalization concept 
accounting for the incentive to smuggle. Finally, a policy is designed to remove the appeal of 
smuggling from the infected area to the non-infected area as a result of a disease outbreak.    
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CHAPTER 2 
The Impact of the Global Pipeline for New Genetically Modified Organisms 
on International Trade – A General Equilibrium Approach 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Modern biotechnology is the latest stage in the development of evolving plant breeding 
technologies; part of the “new information economy”. It involves the use of known genetically 
controlled traits combined with the technical ability to alter the expression of those traits, which 
provides enhancements to the biological organisms thereby reducing the constraints imposed by 
the natural environment (Gaisford et al., 2001).  
 
The use of biotechnology (biotech) in agriculture has produced a number of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and the products derived from them are known as genetically modified (GM) 
products. GM crops were first commercialised in 1996 in five countries, by 2015 the global area 
of GM crop cultivation had increased to over 179.7 million hectares in 28 countries (James, 
2015). Major GM crops under cultivation include soybean, maize, cotton, and rapeseed 
1
(canola) 
with global acreages of 92.1 million, 53.7 million, 24 million, and 8.6 million hectares 
respectively (James, 2015). The rapid adoption of GM technology is a result of the benefits 
bestowed upon producers through increased yields, reduced production costs leading to potential 
profit increases, and increasing the sustainability of agriculture through reduced chemical use 
                                                          
 
1
 As discussed in Smyth and Phillips (2015) there is a significant difference between canola and rapeseed. 
Canola applies GM technology in the production while rapeseed represents the non-GM varieties. In this 
essay, the term rapeseed is used because canola production is included under the rapeseed production 
dataset in the Global Analysis Trade Project (GTAP) program.    
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over the long run. It is these benefits that have produced billions of dollars of economic gain 
every year (Kalaitzandonakes, 2011).  
 
Before a GM product is authorized and commercialized, it must go through extensive detailed 
tests and regulatory scrutiny to ensure human, animal and environment safety (Konduru, 2008). 
However, legislation regarding GMO decisions is made at the individual country level and, 
therefore, can vary between countries and regions around the world. The main difference in 
GMO regulations among various countries is whether the decision making process is based on 
scientific risk assessment or whether science has an informative role  while other criteria play a 
more important role in the decision making process such as social-economic factors
2
. Further, 
countries that have not put in place GMO legislation have been known to ban imports, 
cultivation, and commercialization of GMOs. Banning GMOs creates considerable differences in 
the number of GM “events” that are authorized in various countries. Even when authorization is 
an available option, the length of the authorization period varies considerably among countries. 
Typically, without domestic authorization, imports of GM products cannot take place.  
 
Country specific legislation and regulatory processes create international trade difficulties from 
the point of view that a particular GM event may have completed the licensing process in some 
countries, be part way through the process in other countries, not yet submitted for approval in 
other countries, and lastly in others the regulatory approval will not be sought and, hence, 
granted because the process is perceived to be prohibitively expensive or the rates of approval 
perceived to be too low. This fragmented approval process can leave trade flows disrupted as the 
                                                          
 
2
 Described in Isaac, (2007) as the Social Rationality Approach in the Risk Analysis Framework. 
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result of what is termed “asynchronous approval”. “Asynchronous approval” of GM events 
creates problems between exporting and importing countries given that a particular GM or non-
GM agricultural commodity traded may contain unauthorized material leading to costly trade 
disruptions
3
 (Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). Unauthorized material in agricultural commodities is 
commonly referred to as “Low Level Presence” (LLP). Kalaitzandonakes (2011) defines LLP as 
the accidental presence of small amounts of biotechnology events that have undergone a full 
safety assessment and have received regulatory approve in one or more countries but are still 
unauthorized in others. The acceptable level of LLP is not harmonized among countries, thus 
countries have various LLP threshold levels
4
.  
 
Perfect segregation of approved GM events and conventional products from unapproved GM 
events is difficult in the global agriculture commodity trade system (Konduru, 2008). Thus, the 
private sector has had to make substantial investments to segregate GM products from non-GM 
to maintain market access (Phillips et al., 2006). However, Dayananda (2011) states that during 
seed production, cultivation, harvest, transport, or processing the opportunity for technically 
unavoidable presence of non-authorized GMOs in conventional or other GM food may occur 
within the exporting country. The parallel existence of GM and non-GM raise the issue of co-
mingling in the international trade of non-GM products (Kerr and Hobbs, 2012). According to 
Kerr and Hobbs (2012) the co-mingling of non-GM products can take two forms: 1) co-mingling 
of non-GM product shipments with unauthorized GM product belonging to the same crop group, 
                                                          
 
3
 Discussed in section 2.2.1 
4
 Under EU legislation there are two categories of unapproved GM events (Kerr and Hobbs, 2012).  The 
first refers to the LLP where the GM event has been approved in one or more countries but not in the 
importing country (Kerr and Hobbs, 2012). The second refers to the adventitious presence (AP) where the 
GM event has not been approved in any country (Kerr and Hobbs, 2012). 
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e.g. co-mingling of non-GM corn shipments with a GM corn event; 2) co-mingling of non-GM 
product shipments with unauthorized GM products belonging to a different group of products, 
e.g. co-mingling of non-GM corn shipments with a GM soya event
5
.  
 
While the problems created by asynchronous approvals have, until now, been seen as one-off 
events, the potential for a significant increase in co-mingling issues exists as the global pipeline 
for GM crops is expanding rapidly. Currently there are 49 GM events commercially available 
that are cultivated worldwide and this number was expected to rise to 96 GM events by 2020 
(Parisi et al., 2016). Firms engaged in exporting face increased risk from LLP and thus, the 
possibility of trade disruptions occurring more frequently. These two international trade trends: 
the growing GM global pipeline; and the difficulties of perfect segregation among GM and non-
GM products in the global trade system form the basis for the following research questions. The 
research questions addressed in this essay will be to measure the effect of the increasing GM 
global pipeline on international trade flows between specified countries; and measure the effect 
on trade flows between specified countries given the unintended presence of GM events in the 
export of non-GM crops.  
 
2.2 The GM Pipeline and Trade Consequences 
The wide acceptance of GM crops creates incentives for developers of GM products to invest in 
new GM varietal traits that perform better than the existing one, are more suitable for specific 
markets, and incorporate product quality characteristics that consumers demand. Currently, GM 
events are primarily developed by private firms located in the US, but a trend is evolving where 
                                                          
 
5
 The latter form of co-mingling is also known as cross-co-mingling   
9 
 
by novel GM events are developed by national technology providers, particularly in Asia and 
Latin America. These national Asian and Latin America developers will design GM events for 
domestic markets. Another progressing trend is the stacking of multiple GM traits in varietal 
crop development. These innovative GM events can already be found in the pipeline and will be 
in the process of commercialization in the coming years. Thus, the GM pipeline can be described 
as the global status of GM crops that are either currently in commercial use, authorized, in the 
regulatory process, or in the latter stage of development.  
 
The research of Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009a) offers the most complete overview of the 
global pipeline of GMOs through 2015. Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009a) grouped new GM 
events into a number of pipeline categories based on the current stage of development.  They use 
the following four pipeline categories:  
 Commercial crop: commercialized GM events currently marketed in at least one 
country worldwide. 
 Commercial pipeline: GM event authorized in at least one country but not yet 
commercialized. The commercialization depends only on the decision of the 
developer.  
 Regulatory pipeline: GM events already within the regulatory process for 
approval to be marketed in at least one country. 
 Advanced R&D pipeline: GM events in the last stage of development, such as 
large scale multi-location field trials to generate data for the authorization dossier. 
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According to Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2010), by the end of 2015 the number of individual 
GM events will have increased to 124 from 33 in 2008. Table 2.1 lists the worldwide GM events, 
by pipeline and crop type.   
 
Table 2. 1: GM events in the pipeline worldwide, by crop type 
Crop Commercial Commercial 
pipeline 
Regulatory 
pipeline 
Advanced 
development 
Total by 
2015 
Soybeans 1 2 4 10 17 
Maize 9 3 5 7 24 
Rapeseed 4 0 1 5 10 
Cotton 12 1 5 9 27 
Rice 0 1 4 10 15 
Potatoes 0 0 3 5 8 
Other crops 7 0 2 14 23 
All crops 33 7 24 61 124 
Source: Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2010) 
 
In Table 2.2, the traits category lists future novel crop composition traits (product quality) that 
will become available in the market. The targeted compounds for novel traits include the 
proportion of fatty acids, starch content, beta-carotene, and enzymes. Crops varieties that are 
resistant to viruses and tolerant to abiotic stress, caused by drought, high salinity, and soil acidity 
will become important features. Current dominant traits – those for insect resistance and 
herbicide tolerance – will continue to lead pipeline development (Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 
2010).    
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Table 2. 2: GM events in the pipeline worldwide, by trait category 
Trait Category Commercial Commercial 
pipeline 
Regulatory 
pipeline 
Advanced 
development 
Total by 
2015 
Insect resistance 21 2 11 25 59 
Herbicide tolerance 11 5 4 13 33 
Product quality 2 1 5 12 20 
Virus resistance 5 0 2 3 10 
Abiotic stress 
tolerance 
0 0 1 6 7 
Other 0 0 2 11 13 
  Source: Dunwell (2010) 
 
Currently private North American firms are the major developers of GM events, however in the 
coming years both public and private entities will participate in the development of new GM 
events, with more developers originating from regions in Asia, mainly China and India. New 
products from Asia will be developed for domestic consumption and not for export markets. This 
will increase the problems associated with asynchronous approval and unintended presence of 
GM events in the shipment of non-GM crops because wide ranging approval around the world 
will not be sought. Table 2.3 lists worldwide GM events in the pipeline by region of origin.    
 
Table 2. 3: GM events in the pipeline worldwide, by region of origin 
Developer 
country 
Commercial Commercial 
pipeline 
Regulatory 
pipeline 
Advanced 
development 
Total by 
2015 
United States 
and Europe 
24 7 10 26 67 
Asia 9 0 11 34 54 
Latin America 0 0 2 1 3 
Source: Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2010) 
 
Presently, soybean, maize, cotton, and rapeseed are the four major crops covering 99% of 
worldwide cultivation of GM varieties. Soybean leads with 51%, followed by maize with 30%, 
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cotton with 13.4%, and rapeseed with 4.8% (James 2015). James (2015) estimated that 83% of 
the global soybean area is cultivated as GM. For maize, cotton, and rapeseed these proportions 
are 29%, 75%, and 24% respectively (James, 2015). Cotton as a GM product raises less of an 
issue in the international trade environment because it is used as input in products that are not for 
human or animal consumption. Therefore, using corn, soybean, and rapeseed to evaluate the GM 
pipeline and the effect these crops have on trade flows is reasonable given that they cover 84% 
of worldwide GM cultivation. Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009a) forecast that the majority of 
GM events that would be approved by 2015 will be for previously approved GM crops that are 
cultivated worldwide.  
 
Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009b) developed a dataset for each GM event and its position in 
the GM pipeline till the end of 2015. Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 present the GM events and 
their position within the GM pipeline through the end of 2015 according to Stein and Rodriguez-
Cerezo (2009a). Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo’s analysis was completed in 2008, since then 
certain crop events have shifted between pipeline categories. For example: Soybean MON89788 
(Roundup Ready 2) and A2704-12 (Liberty Link) have moved from the commercial pipeline to a 
commercial crop. Soybean CV 127 (Imi) has moved from the regulatory pipeline to the 
commercial pipeline; and MON87769 (Omega-3) has moved from the advanced R&D pipeline 
to the commercial pipeline.  
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For simplicity, the 2008 dataset by Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009b) will be utilized as it 
provides a good fit with the GTAP
6
 dataset that employs 2007 as the base year. This essay only 
covers the individual GM events available through the end of 2015. Stacking events are not 
considered as the current literature does not provide a thorough review of future names and 
numbers for these events. A theoretical estimation is only available for maize as provided by 
Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo (2009a, 2010) in which they suggest approximately 12,962 
possibilities. If stacked maize events are to be considered in GTAP, each event would be 
incorporated as a separate sector, increasing the number of sectors to a point that it is simply too 
high for an accurate analysis utilizing CGE modeling.  
 
Table 2. 4: Commercial GM crops 
Type of crop Developer Product name Event name 
Soybean Monsanto Roundup Ready MON 40-30-2 
Maize Monsanto YieldGard Corn Borer MON810 
Monsanto Roundup Ready Corn2 NK603 
Monsanto YieldGard Rootworm MON863 
Monsanto Yield Gard VT MON88017 
Dow AgroSciences and Pioneer 
Hi-Bred 
Herculex I 1507 
Dow AgroSciences and Pioneer 
Hi-Bred 
Herculex RW 59122 
Syngenta Agrisure CB Bt11 
Syngenta Agrisure GT GA21 
Syngenta Agrisure RW MIR604 
Rapeseed Monsanto Roundup Ready GT73 
Bayer CropScience LibertyLink T45 
Bayer CropScience InVigor MS8 xRF3 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
 
 
                                                          
 
6
 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) consists of a large region and sector database that can be 
analysed through the application of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. A more detailed 
description of GTAP and CGE is provided in section 2.3.1. 
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Table 2. 5: Commercial pipeline for GM crops 
Type of crop Developer Product name Event name 
Soybean Monsanto Roundup Ready 2 MON 89788 
Bayer CropScience LibertyLink A2704-12 
Bayer CropScience LibertyLink A5547-127 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Optimum GAT 356043 
Maize Monsanto YieldGard VT PRO MON89034 
Monsanto High lysine LY038 
Syngenta n/a
7
 3272 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
 
Table 2. 6: Regulatory pipeline for GM crops 
Type of crop Developer Product name Event name 
Soybean Monsanto Roundup Ready MON 40-30-2 
BASF Plant Science and Embrapa Imi CV127 
n/a(China) n/a Gna 
Maize Syngenta AgrisureViptera MIR162 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Optimum GAT 98140 
n/a(China) n/a Cry1A 
n/a(China) n/a n/a 
n/a(China) n/a n/a 
Rapeseed n/a(China) n/a n/a 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
 
Table 2. 7: Advanced R&D pipeline for GM crops 
Type of crop Developer Product name Event name 
Soybean Syngenta n/a n/a 
Syngenta n/a n/a 
Monsanto Omega-3 MON87769 
Monsanto n/a n/a 
Monsanto n/a n/a 
Monsanto Vistive III MON87754 
Dow AgroSciences DHT n/a 
Bayer CropScience n/a n/a 
Bayer CropScience n/a n/a 
Maize Syngenta n/a n/a 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Optimum AcreMax 1 n/a 
Monsanto n/a MON87754 
                                                          
 
7
 n/a- Not available 
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Monsanto and BASF n/a MON87460 
Dow AgroSciences DHT n/a 
n/a(India) n/a Cry1Ac+cp4epsp4 
BASF Plant Science  NutriDense n/a 
Rapeseed Bayer CropScience n/a n/a 
Bayer CropScience n/a n/a 
Bayer CropScience n/a n/a 
BASF Plant Science n/a n/a 
BASF Plant Science n/a n/a 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
 
2.2.1 Trade Consequences in the Supply Chain of non-GM Crops as a Result of 
Asynchronous Approval of GM Events 
Soybeans, maize, and rapeseed are raw commodities where the primary use is inputs in the feed, 
food, and drink industries. Appendix A-Figure 2.A.1 lists the wide spectrum of food industries 
where soybeans, maize, and rapeseed are used as inputs. Since the value of these crops is low 
compared to the final products in which they are typically inputs infers that transport and storage 
must often be organized in bulk in order for operational and transaction costs to be kept low.  
 
The current supply chain structure in which these crops are traded creates several possibilities for 
impurities or co-mingling. It is common practice in food safety regulations to allow a minimum 
presence of unintended materials like dirt, weed seeds, and mycotoxins in crop shipments 
(Backus et al. 2008). However, this may not always be the case regarding the unintended 
presence of traces of an unapproved GM event in the non-GM crops (whether crops where no 
GM approvals have been made or crops where GM varieties have been commercialized). For 
example, the EU has a zero tolerance level for unapproved GM events in the shipments of crops. 
Thus, the case of asynchronous approval of GM varieties and differing thresholds for LLP 
among countries can lead to important impediments to trade. These can include returning, 
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relocation, or destroying cargos of non-GM varieties at the importing country’s port as a result of 
the unintended presence of GM traits. Also, with the growing number of GM events being 
licensed or within a particular stage of the pipeline, the probability of non-GM crops becoming 
co-mingled with GM traits is increasing.     
 
Exporters of soybeans, maize, and rapeseed have taken specific measures when shipping to 
importing countries in order to maintain their market access. These measures are in place to 
ensure that shipments of conventional crops are not mingled with traces of GM varieties that are 
not approved by the importing country. These measures are taken as a system to ensure “identity 
preservation” (IP) (Backus et al., 2008). As defined by Backus et al. (2008), IP is a system of 
crop or raw material management which preserves the identity of the source or nature of the 
materials. The size of the IP cost is determined by several factors, including the size of the 
market, the specific crop, and the level of tolerance in the importing country. The Literature on 
IP cost is diverse, covering estimates of IP cost for a particular year, specific part of the supply 
chain, location, or a specific crop (Kalaitzandonakes and Kaufman, 2010). Backus et al. (2008) 
state that even with the existence of IP systems, it is very difficult to prevent traces of GMOs in 
export shipments. Hence, IP measures will be more difficult, costly, and prone to failure when 
new GM events are introduced and accepted as new GM events increase the potential for co-
mingling with non-GM exports and for non-GM varieties of crops where GM varieties have been 
commercialized.   
  
The trade consequences, costs, and economic losses as result of unintended presence of GM 
traits in non-GM crops have been investigated by a number of authors (Backus et al., 2008; 
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Brookes, 2008; Nowicki, 2010; Dayananda, 2011). These studies have focused on co-mingling in 
the face of the EU’s zero tolerance for unapproved GM events as the majority of comingled 
shipment incidents resulting from unapproved GM events have occurred in the EU. During the 
period 1997-2010, there were 223 cases of non-GM crops co-mingled with unauthorized GM 
events worldwide, and from these cases 147 incidents occurred in the EU (Viju et al., 2011).  
 
Brooks (2008) calculated the cost to the EU rice sector as a result of presence of unapproved GM 
herbicide tolerance rice (LL601) in shipments from the US since 2006. The LL601 event was not 
approved by the US government at that time, but was used in field trails in Louisiana and 
Arkansas between 1998 and 2001. However, LL601 did find its way into the conventional crop 
supply and was detected in exports to the EU, resulting in trade disruptions. The trade disruption 
was lengthy and import volumes into the EU in 2007 were 95% lower than in 2006. The 
calculated average costs with an LLP of zero tolerance for unapproved GMOs at the company 
level (rice miller) range between 3.5 million euro and 7.4 million euro. At the industry level 
trade disruption costs reached between 52 million euro and 111 million euro in early 2008. This 
trade disruption also resulted in numerous lawsuits valued at US$750 million against Bayer 
CropScience, the developer of LL601 (Smyth and Phillips, 2015). Brooks (2008) also estimated 
that for the EU soybean sector that these costs would be much higher, at the company level costs 
could be between 82 million euro and 156 million euro and at the at the industry level could 
reach between 492 million euro and 936 million euro.  
 
Backus et al. (2008) review several cases where unauthorized GMOs have been detected in 
shipments, even in the presence of an IP system on the exporting side. For example, between 
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April 2007 and March 2008 the EU placed a temporary import ban for Argentinian maize as a 
result of shipments being co-mingled by an unauthorized maize event (GA-21). Even with the 
Argentinian government’s segregation efforts, the presence of GA-21 seeds in maize shipments 
could not be completely eliminated. This import ban resulted in a premium increase for non-GM 
maize of USD 30-50 per tonne. Previous to the EU import ban the non-GM maize premium was 
USD 50 per tonne before April 2007 and increased to USD 80-100 per tonne between April 2007 
and March 2008 representing an increase in cost for purchasers in the EU.  
 
In these two cases the IP system was not stringent, but a stringent IP system does not guarantee 
unintended presence. Backus et al. (2008) explain a case of unintended presence for GM maize 
event DAS-59122-7 (Herculex Root Worm Corn) took place when an applied stringent IP 
system was in place. In this case an Action Plan was implemented with the goal to apply 
measures that would prevent an unapproved GM event in maize products destined for export to 
the EU through monitoring measures at each barge loading point for corn gluten feed (CGF) and 
dried distillersgrains (DDG). Unfortunately these measures were not sufficient to prevent the 
unintended presence GM maize event DAS-59122-7.  
 
Since October 15, 2006 all vessels containing CGF and DDG leaving a US port have certificates 
that state negative test results for GM maize event DAS-59122-7. In April 2007 at the port of 
Rotterdam, a Greenpeace biosafety patrol activist was allowed on board a ship containing a 
maize shipment. The captain allowed the activist to take two samples from the cargo. 
Greenpeace states their analysis detected the presence of GM event DAS-59122-7 in the CGF 
shipment. In May 2007 two shipments tested positive for the presence of GM event DAS-59122-
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7, of which the DDG shipment indicated contamination up to 23% (Backus et al., 2008). The 
cost calculated to complete testing for the DAS-59122-7 event was estimated at USD 1 million 
on an annual basis. As a result, the export of CGF and DDG from US to EU was close to a zero 
between May and September 2007.   
 
In 2009 the EU market banned the import of Canadian flaxseed due to the detection of GM CDC 
Triffid Flax (FP967). Seven percent of vessels holds tested positively for CDC Triffid Flax in 
export shipments (Viju et al., 2011). Dayananda (2011) calculated the cost of this incident for 
Canada resulted in CAN$7.6 million in export losses to the EU market and CAN$8.3 million in 
export losses to global markets during 2009/2010. The total cost of testing for Triffid Flax was 
calculated at CAN$1.3 million and total segregation costs at CAN$4.2 million for export to all 
countries. However, testing and segregation costs continued for years after this single event 
happened. Ryan and Smyth (2012) estimate the total cost, including demurrage, quarantine, 
testing, segregation and other costs, to be CAN$29 million for Canada for the 2009 to 2011 
period. 
 
All the above cases reveal the difficulties and associated costs that can arise due to asynchronous 
approval of GM events and their unintended presence in non-GM shipments. The degree of 
economic impact depends on each country’s response to trade policy regarding GM events, 
which is specifically based on the LLP level of each country, the testing method at the port of 
entry, the rejection of imports, and the withdrawal of the products from the importing market. 
However, the above examples are just a few among the many in the world. A survey by a FAO 
(2014) reveals that between 2002 and 2013 there were total of 198 cases of adventitious presence 
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of GM events in conventional crop shipments, and a 138 of these cases were between 2009 and 
2013. 
 
The current literature on the global GM pipeline and its economic and trade effect as a result of 
asynchronous approval of GM events is mostly theoretical and policy focused, for example 
Backus et al., 2008; Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2010 and Kalaitzandonakes, 2011. The current 
research on the empirical measurement of the expanding global GM pipeline is mainly focused 
on specific regions and crops. However, little work on global quantitative measurement has been 
completed on the effect the expanding GM pipeline is likely to have on international trade given 
the constraint of asynchronous regulations for a new GM event among countries.  
 
2.3 Quantitative Approach in Defining the Effect the GM Pipeline has on International 
Trade 
To answer the research questions regarding measuring the trade flow of GM and non-GM crops 
between countries, given the unintended presence of GM events in the shipment of crops in 
parallel with the expanding global GM pipeline, involves a quantitative analysis of an applied 
economy-wide model with specifications regarding trade relations between economies. A 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is an applied multi-sector, multi-region, economy-
wide model that computes a system of equations describing the motivation and behavior of all 
the agents in the economy and the linkages among them. CGE produces numerical and precise 
answers that are theoretically consistent. The Global Trade Analysis project (GTAP) is a 
commonly used CGE model accepted by trade researches due to its large regional and sectorial 
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database. GTAP allows the impact of trade policies to be quantified through trade flows or 
welfare changes on a global level.  
 
2.3.1 Previous Literature Evaluating the GMO global impact with GTAP model 
There is limited literature that has used GTAP to estimate the global impact of GM products. 
Earlier studies by Nielsen and Anderson (2001) use the whole sector of cereal grains and 
oilseeds for the countries accepting GM technology. They distinguish GM technology from 
conventional by applying a 5% Hicks-neutral technology shift, meaning the productivity growth 
encompasses the whole sector. Research by Anderson et al. (2001) is a continuation of Nielsen 
and Anderson (2001) where they estimated the economic global effects of GMOs, however, the 
difference from the previous study is that GM cotton and rice were added to the analysis. The 
key conclusion of this paper is the capacity that the Western Europe ban on GMOs has had on 
reducing global welfare. A more detailed segregation of the sector was completed by Jackson 
and Anderson (2003), where for the first time the cereal grains and oilseeds sectors were 
segregated into GM and non-GM sectors. Jackson and Anderson (2003) also attempted to 
incorporate consumer resistance of GM products in the EU by placing a low elasticity of 
substitution between GM and non-GM crops.  
 
The analysis completed by Jensen (2009) is a step forward as some policy-relevant limitations 
for the adoption of GM food products in the EU was considered. Among the policy limitations 
considered was the lack of approval of GM food crops in the EU. In this research, GM 
productivity advancement is modeled as a reduction in input costs. The results indicated that the 
EU benefits on the consumption side as a result of the spillover effects from import of GM 
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products. In addition, the benefit would be even higher if the EU decided to cultivate GM 
products. Philippidis (2010) completed a more sophisticated GTAP analysis exploring the impact 
of the zero tolerance policy for unapproved GMO imports on EU livestock, meat and dairy 
sectors. His model considers the common agricultural policy (CAP) in the EU along with 
biofuels. The import ban is modeled by a reduction in consumer utility corresponding to a 
specific imported product. The results indicate an alarming impact on EU livestock production, 
specifically on the swine and poultry sectors that are highly dependent on soy as a feed input. 
Economic and environmental impacts related to the elimination of GMO events for three major 
crops, corn, soybeans and cotton in the US was completed by Taheripour et al. (2015). Their 
findings estimate that the price of corn could increase as much as 28%, while soybean prices 
could increase 22%. 
 
2.3.2 Structure of the Global Trade Analysis Project, GTAP 
GTAP, based at Purdue University in the US, started in 1992 as a project with the goal to lower 
the costs of entry barriers for researchers conducting analysis in international trade issues with 
applications of the global CGE framework (Hertel, 2013). GTAP encompassed a growing global 
network of researchers conducting quantitative analysis of international policy issues (GTAP, 
2014).  
 
GTAP has two major components, the GTAP database and the GTAP model. The GTAP 
database underlies the GTAP Model and GEMPACK(General Equilibrium Modelling Package)  
software allows manipulation of the dataset and implementation of the GTAP model. 
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2.3.2.1 GTAP Database 
GTAP 8, the database version, covers 129 countries (Appendix B-Table 2.B.1), 57 sectors 
(Appendix B-Table 2.B.2), and 5 factors (land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, and 
natural resources) with benchmark years 2004 and 2007 (GTAP, 2014). The GTAP database 
registers global annual flows of goods and services for the world economy in the benchmark 
years. The database consists of detailed bilateral trade, transport, protection matrices, and 
individual country/ regional input-output economic database that accounts for inter-sectorial 
linkages within regions (Narayanan et al., 2012).  
 
The following two types of data are used in creating the GTAP database, the regional input-
output (I-O) tables and data from international organizations. The regional (I-O) tables are 
collected by individual researches sourced from national published input-output tables. Several 
international trade organizations are used, the United Nations Comtrade, Eurostat, World Bank 
Development Indicators, International Trade Center MAcMap system, International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistic and International Energy Agency for collecting 
merchandise trade data, service trade data, macroeconomic data, tariff data, income and factor 
taxes and energy data respectively. The inconsistency of merchandise and service trade data 
reported by two countries is reconciled by applying the Gehlhar
8
 method (Harslett, 2013). The 
trade data is collected at the HS6-digit level
9
. The database is operationalized in a standard 
                                                          
 
8
 Gehlhar approach determines the reliability of each country as reporter of information 
9
 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS) is an international classification for 
products. It classifies products using a six-digit code. The first two digits define a product in more broad 
categories and each additional digit of the code defines the products into a more detailed division. It is 
used on an international level for the purpose of countries to classify products on a common base when 
engaged in international trade.   
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modeling framework with the potential for modification and extension (Narayanan et al., 2012), 
and the unit of value in the database is in millions of US dollars. 
 
To solve the GTAP model in computable form the data has to be arranged in a social accounting 
matrix (SAM). SAM is a square matrix in which each row and column is called an account. 
SAM describes the inter-industry and inter-activity transactions (value flows) within an economy 
at the regional, national, or international level for the benchmark period (Wing, 2004). In the 
SAM matrix the income of all agents in the economy (households, government, producers, 
investors, and rest of the world) is recorded in the appropriate row and the expenditures are 
recorded in the appropriate column. Thus, each cell element shows the payment from a column 
account to a row account. The dimensions of a SAM are diverse for CGE models and depend on 
the number of industries, factors of production, and households. Figure 2.B.1 in Appendix B 
displays a common SAM structure for GTAP models. The SAM table must balance, which 
means each column total must be equal to the corresponding row total. For example, the 
aggregate demand must equal aggregate supply. Balancing the SAM matrix establishes the 
accounting identities to build the CGE model and data boundaries. Figure 2.B.2 (Appendix B) 
lists the accounting identities that establish the trade data boundaries in SAM and the global 
GTAP model.     
 
The GTAP database uses three categories of pricing: agent, market, and world. The agent and 
market prices differ depending whether the commodity is domestic or imported. The calculation 
of market and agent pricing is shown below in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2. 8: GTAP database pricing 
Imported commodities 
Market prices = World prices + Trade and transport margins + import duties 
Agent prices = Market prices + sales and purchase taxes 
Domestic commodities 
World prices = Market prices - export taxes (exported domestic commodity) 
Agent prices = Market prices + sales and purchase taxes 
  Source: Fjellheim (2011) 
 
2.3.2.2 Overview of the GTAP Model and Institutions 
The standard GTAP Model is a static multi-region, multi-sector, CGE model where consumers 
and producers are model under neoclassical theory. Consumers maximize their utility subject to a 
budget constraint and producers maximize their profit subject to a technology constraint. The 
behavior of the agent in the economy is based on the following assumptions: perfect competition, 
constant returns to scale, full labour market employment, and that domestic goods and imports 
are treated as heterogeneous goods.  
 
The intuition behind the GTAP model is to represent an instrument that is able to capture the 
behavior of the economy and the changes of that economy when external shocks are applied, 
while  remaining consistent with economic theory. The global GTAP model equations and 
parameters are derived from the SAM account identities presented in Section 2.3.1.1; which 
includes the functional forms of agent behavior, and the market clearing conditions for general 
equilibrium. 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a simple overview of value flows in the GTAP model. The behavior of the 
agents in the GTAP model’s demand and supply system is represented with multiple levels or 
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nest functions. The starting point in the demand side is regional households, which represents the 
country specific whole income of the economy.  
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Figure 2. 1: Value flow between the institutions in the GTAP model for a multi-region open 
economy 
Source: Brockkmeier (2001) 
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Regional household income uses an aggregate Cobb-Douglass utility function to allocate income 
into three forms of final demand: private household expenditures (PRIVEXP), Savings (SAVE), 
and government expenditures (GOVEXP). The three types of final demand in the GTAP model 
have a fixed share of the total regional income, therefore, a change in regional income causes an 
equivalent change in private expenditures, government expenditures, and savings. Lastly, each 
agent in the open economy cannot spend more than what they receive as income.  
 
The private household regional income is received as value paid by the producers for the use of 
factor endowments. The primary factor endowment consists of land, skilled labour, unskilled 
labour, capital, and natural resources in the GTAP model.   
 
The private households and government spend income on domestic and imported commodities. 
The private household preference in each country is modeled by constant difference elasticity 
expenditure functions (CDE) that consider the non-homothetic (differences in income) nature of 
the final consumption. Governmental behaviour is modeled by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
Thus, the nesting structure of aggregate consumption function for individual i can be shown in 
the form:  
 
  𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓 [𝑃𝑖, 𝑔 (𝐶𝑚1 … . . 𝐶𝑚𝑚 , 𝑑(𝐷𝑖𝑀𝑖), 𝐺𝑖 , ℎ(𝐶𝑚1 … . . 𝐶𝑚𝑚 , 𝑘(𝐷𝑖𝑀𝑖)) , 𝑆𝑖]                                 (1)    
 
Total consumption Ci is represented by a top level nested Cobb-Douglas function aggregating the 
private consumption Pi, government consumption Gi and the savings Si by the individual i. The 
bundle of commodities Cm1….Cmm consumed by the private household Pi is aggregate by a CDE 
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function, and the bundle of commodities Cm1….Cmm consumed by the government Gi is 
aggregated by a Cobb-Douglas function representing the second level of nesting. In addition to 
the consumption of bundled commodities by private households and the government, the third 
level of nesting allows the households and government to decide whether the commodity will be 
domestic Di or imported Mi. Savings are fully spent on investment which is a fixed proportion 
from regional income. The function f, g, d, h, k represent the various levels of nesting functions. 
The consumption nested structure is presented in Figure 2.2.  
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional household utility 
Private 
consumption 
Government 
consumption 
Savings  
Commodity1……….Commoditym 
Commodity1……….Commoditym  
 
Domestic                   Foreign 
Domestic                         Foreign        
Region1 ……..Regionr Region1…………..Regionr 
Cobb-Douglas 
CDE 
Cobb-Douglas 
CES 
CES 
CES 
CES 
Figure 2. 2: Consumption nesting structure in the GTAP model 
Source:  modified from Burfisher, (2011) 
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The production side of the model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale for 
production technology. The perfect competition assumption, or zero profit assumption, indicates 
that the revenue of the producer is determined by the management of producer costs. Constant 
returns to scale indicate that a percentage change in the price of any output commodity will equal 
the weighted sum of the percentage change in input prices. In the GTAP model, producers 
receive income from selling their output to private households, the government, intermediate 
inputs to other producers, and exports to the Rest of the World.  
 
Production technology is represented by a nested production function, indicating that producers 
are making decisions in several independent steps. Each sector produces a single output by 
combining the value added by the factor endowments with the intermediate inputs in fixed 
proportions through the Leontief function. The output production Qo represents the top level of 
the nested production function. The value added QvA nests the five factor endowments (skilled 
labour Ls, unskilled labour Lu, capital K, natural resources R and land P) through the constant 
elasticity of substitution function (CES). The intermediate inputs Qf, which can be imported Qfm 
or domestic Qfd, are combined through the CES function. Hence, the nested production function 
for sector j can be shown as: 
 
   𝑄𝑜𝑗 = 𝑓 [𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑗 , 𝑔 (𝐿𝑆𝑗 , 𝐿𝑈𝑗 , 𝐾𝑗 , 𝑅𝑗 , 𝑃𝑗) , 𝑄𝑓𝑗 , ℎ (𝑄𝑓𝑑𝑗 , 𝑄𝑓𝑚𝑗)]                                                      (2)       
 
Where the functions f, g, and h represent the various levels of the nested functions. 
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Figure 2.3 represents the production technology of the GTAP model. On each level of the 
production tree there is a variable for implementing technological change (ao, ava, af) resulting 
from value added savings, intermediate input savings, or overall Hicks-neutral savings. Thus, 
there is a possibility for substitution between inputs from the same level as result of a change in 
prices, but there is no possibility of substitution between inputs from different levels of the 
nested function as a result of a change in prices. For example, the demand for intermediate inputs 
is determined by the change in prices of intermediate inputs but this is independent from the 
change in prices for a factor endowment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry output 
Value added 
Intermediate inputs 
Land        Labour               Resources     Capital 
           (skilled/unskilled)  
Domestic            Foreign 
Region1 ……..Regionr 
Leontief 
CES 
CES 
CES 
ao(j,r) 
ava(j,r) 
af(i,j,r) 
Figure 2. 3: Production nesting structure in the GTAP model 
Source: modified from Hertel and Tsigas, (1997) 
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The Rest of the World represents all other countries in the global economy, and they behave in 
the same manner as the region of interest described in Figure 2.1. The interaction of the rest of 
the world with the other agents in the region is monitored through trade flows. Hence, import and 
export flows can be traced by the type of commodity, specific sector of the economy (agents), 
and the region of origin and destination.  
 
Modeling of international trade in GTAP is completed using the Armington assumption 
represented by the CES function. The Armington assumption treats the imported and domestic 
commodities as imperfect substitutes. Thus imports are distinguish by the country of origin and 
aggregated at the border into a two-stage nesting process. Thereby, producers and consumers 
choose first the bundle of commodities, then whether to consume a domestic or imported 
commodity. If a decision is made to consume an imported commodity then the producer or 
consumer would choose the region of the import. In Figures 2.2 and 2.3 the trade decision is 
presented after the foreign sector or the border line for the consumption and production 
technology respectively. 
 
The two stage nested trade function applied in the GTAP model: 
 
   𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓[𝐷𝑖 , 𝑔(𝑀𝑖1 … .𝑀𝑖𝑟)]                                                                                                         (3) 
 
The function f represents the top level nested function, determining the mixture of domestic Di 
and imported Mi for product Ci. The lower level nested function g determines the region of 
import (1…r). Both functions have CES elasticity. Considering that the Armington assumption 
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in (3) is present in both the producers’ production and consumers’ consumption decisions in 
equations (1) and (2), then we can describe (3) in more detail:  
 
𝐶𝑖 =
𝑓 [𝑃𝑖, 𝑔 (𝐶𝑚1 …𝐶𝑚𝑚 , 𝑑 (𝐷𝑖 , 𝑙(𝑀𝑖1 …𝑀𝑖𝑟))) , 𝐺𝑖, ℎ (𝐶𝑚1 …𝐶𝑚𝑚 , 𝑘(𝐷𝑖, 𝑛(𝑀𝑖1 …𝑀𝑖𝑟))) , 𝑆𝑖]         (4)    
 
 𝑄𝑜𝑗 = 𝑓 [𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑗 , 𝑔 (𝐿𝑆𝑗 , 𝐿𝑈𝑗 , 𝐾𝑗 , 𝑅𝑗 , 𝑃𝑗) , 𝑄𝑓𝑗 , ℎ (𝑄𝑓𝑑𝑗 , 𝑑 (𝑄𝑓𝑚𝑗1 …𝑄𝑓𝑚𝑗𝑟))]                               (5)    
 
There are two global sectors in the GTAP model, global banking and global transportation. The 
global banking sector maintains the balance between global savings and global investment 
through macroeconomic closure. The global transportation sector accounts for the difference 
between FOB export values and CIF import values on a global level.   
 
The modeling process consists of modeling variables, coefficients, and parameters. The variables 
in the database are defined in terms of value, such as the value of imports/exports from the 
source region to the destination region. Value terms are calculated by the quantity and price 
variables. Price and quantity are endogenous variables that result in the database variables being 
updated by the value terms once the model is solved. The value terms in the GTAP database are 
defined in an agent’s market and world price levels. The difference between the value of the 
agents’ prices and the market prices defines the taxes or subsidies. The difference between the 
terms of value for exports and imports at market and world prices defines border interventions 
(tariffs, quotas, etc). The use of taxes and border interventions in forming the agent, market, and 
world prices is outlined in Figure 2.4 using an example of output value. Various taxes, subsidies, 
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and border interventions describe policy variables in the GTAP model, which provides linkages 
between market prices at various levels (Lotze, 1998). There are also various slack variables in 
the GTAP model that are used to change model closure, for example changing an endogenous 
variable for an exogenous variable.  
 
Domestic market in region “r” Value of output at agents’ prices 
+Output taxes/subsidies 
=Value of output at market price 
    =>Domestic sales, exports, and transportation  
Value of exports at market prices 
+Export taxes/subsidies 
World market =Value of export at world prices (fob) 
+Value of international transportation 
=Value of imports at world prices (cif) 
Domestic market at region “s” +Import taxes/subsidies 
=Value of imports at market prices 
     =>Import purchase of private households, 
government and firms  
Figure 2. 4: Taxes and border interventions effect on forming agent, market, and world prices 
Source: Lotze, (1998) 
 
The GTAP model brings flexibility through the closure option, which allows for the 
differentiation of variables into endogenous and exogenous classes. In the standard model 
endogenous variables include prices, quantities of non-endowment commodities, and regional 
income. Exogenous variables include policy, technical change, population, land, labour, and 
capital. Only exogenous variables, one per model simulation, can be shocked. However, if 
shocking an endogenous variable is of interest there is an option to swap an endogenous variable 
for an exogenous variable. Behavioral parameter equations for all factors can also be modified 
within the model. Lastly, model output includes a matrix of bilateral trade flows by sector and 
region, private and governmental consumption, regional welfare, and a variety of summary 
variables (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
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2.3.3 Extensions to the GTAP Model and Database 
The structure of GTAP version 8 is broad, allowing 57 commodities and 129 regions to be 
linked.  To meet the research specifications of this essay both the GTAP data and model requires 
modification.  
 
The first step of the modification is to aggregate the regions and sectors
10
. Region aggregation is 
completed by grouping the largest exporters and importers by country based on the following 
three crops: soybean, maize, and rapeseed. The remaining countries are aggregated into one 
group labeled Rest of the World.  
 
Sector aggregation is completed to simplify the model through aggregation of sectors that are 
outside of our area of interest into larger concentrated sector clusters for further modification. 
The aggregated regions and sectors are presented in Table 2.9. This initial aggregation resulted in 
a total of 14 regions and 17 sectors.   
 
Table 2. 9: Region and sector aggregation in the GTAP model 
Region Aggregation Sector Aggregation 
1 Argentina 1 Rice 
2 Australia and New Zealand 2 Wheat 
3 Brazil 3 Cereal Grains 
4 Canada 4 Vegetables,fruit,nuts 
5 China 5 Oil seeds 
6 EU28 6 Sugar cane, Sugar beet 
7 India 7 Plant-based fibers 
8 Japan 8 Crops 
9 Mexico 9 Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 
                                                          
 
10
 For aggregating region and sectors GTAP AGG software is used. 
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10 Paraguay and Uruguay 10 Animal products 
11 Rest of the World 11 Natural Resources 
12 Russia 12 Meat: cattle,sheep,goat,horse 
13 Ukraine 13 Vegetable oils and fats 
14 US 14 Food Products and Beverages 
  15 Chemical 
  16 Manufacturing 
  17 Services 
Source: Authors modification of the GTAP database 
 
The next level of data modification is to disaggregate specific sectors. Since soybeans and 
rapeseed are part of the oil seed sector and maize part of the cereal grain sector, we have to first 
disaggregate them as a separate sector. Additionally we are also disaggregating the three sectors 
of interest into GM and non-GM varieties, leading to a total of 23 sectors. Furthermore, the GM 
varieties are disaggregated into GM events for each stage of the global GM pipeline. Thus, the 
final outcome will be 72 sectors and 14 regions.  
 
The application of disaggregation and the introduction of new commodities into the existing 
GTAP database will be completed using “SplitCom” software. SplitCom software is provided by 
the GTAP network and allows users to disaggregate commodities using shares supplied by the 
user (Horridge, 2008). The utility of SplitCom is consistent with the SAM matrix, such that the 
old sector has to equal the new split sectors. For example, cereal grains are a sum of maize and 
other cereal grain sectors, and the oilseeds sector is a sum of soybeans, rapeseed, and other 
oilseed sectors.  
 
SplitCom consists of four weight areas that are used in splitting the sectors: trade share, row 
share, column share, and cross share. Trade share requires data on production, export, and import 
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values across the region. Row share requires data on the consumption of new products across the 
agents in the economy. Column share requires information on the cost structure of the new 
sectors. Cross share requires information on the use of new commodities in the new sectors. 
However, not all weight shares need to be applied when splitting sectors.  Each weight area can 
be applied based on the available external data. The external data used for splitting sectors within 
this research is listed in Table 2.10. 
 
Table 2. 10: External data used for splitting sectors 
External  data applied for splitting in “Split 
Com” 
Source 
Area, production, and yield of Corn, 
Soybeans, and Rapeseed 
FAOSTAT (2014) 
Trade of Corn, Soybeans, and Rapeseed for 
all countries 
UN Comtrade (2014) 
GM crop production and trade FAO (2014) 
James, (2011) 
GM event approval stage  BIO (2014) 
Stein and Rodríguez-Cerezo, (2009b) 
GM crops productivity effect Jensen et al., (2009) 
Brookes, (2008) 
Alston et al., (2013) 
Gruere et al., (2007) 
Source: Authors application 
 
The new structured database can now be used in the standard GTAP model through the circular 
flow of income and spending, and the linkages among them, in the economic activities of 
production, consumption, employment, tax and savings, and trade. Production, consumption, and 
trade are key economic activities that must be observed when designing the global GM pipeline 
model. 
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2.3.3.1 Extension on the Production Side of the GTAP Model   
As previously described, each of the three commodities will be segregated by GM and non-GM. 
The inclusion of GM crops in the model implies that a productivity gain from the adaptation of 
the new technology should be a key parameter of consideration. There are a number of studies 
that have used GTAP models for examining the welfare effect of GM technology adoption in a 
specific region, including that productivity gain is one of the key parameters necessary to fully 
understand the effect of GM technology (Nielsen and Anderson 2001, Nielsen, et al. 2003, 
Anderson, et al. 2004, Jensen et al. 2009, Antoine and Gruere 2011). For example, Nielsen, et al. 
(2003) assume that GM oilseed and GM cereal grain sectors have a 10% higher productivity 
factor and a 30% chemical cost reduction compared to their non-GM conventional counterparts 
across all countries.  
 
When applying the efficiency gain of a new technology across regions and sectors, the varying 
differences amongst those regions and sectors must be acknowledged and accounted for. For 
example, the license agreements for GM seed in Argentina and Brazil are not enforced, leading 
to an increase in crop productivity while reducing production costs for farmers (Jensen et al., 
2009). In Jensen et al. (2009), we see the application of different assumptions across regions and 
crops regarding the relative input cost structure of a new technology. Alston et al. (2013) use a 
global trade model to determine different production cost savings for Roundup Ready Soybeans 
in seven different countries.    
 
The GM technology productivity gain/loss across regions and crops will be applied in the GTAP 
model as a productivity shock to the variable implementing technological change. Within the 
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GTAP model there are multiple variables for technological change, for the purpose of this 
research the technology variables that will be shocked are the specific intermediate inputs and 
labour parameters within the production function. The modified production technology tree with 
the inclusion of the GM global pipeline is presented in Figure 2.5. Hence, the demand for the 
intermediate inputs for GM and non-GM soybeans, rapeseed, and maize will depend on the 
prices of the respective GM and non-GM crops through the CES function. Adding this nesting 
function into the demand for intermediate inputs creates a new structure of the production 
function where the GM crops and non-GM crops will be selected by the producers based on the 
lowest price.   
 
The new production function including the GM and non-GM nesting function is as follows: 
   
𝑄𝑂𝑗 =
𝑓
[
 
 
 
 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑗 , 𝑔 (𝐿𝑆𝑗𝐿𝑈𝑗𝐾𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑃𝑗) , ℎ (𝑄𝑓𝑑(𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑀)𝑗 , 𝑑 (𝑄𝑓𝑚(𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑀)𝑗1 …… . 𝑄𝑓𝑚(𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑀)𝑗𝑟)) , 𝑄𝑓𝑑(𝐺𝑀)𝑗 ,
 ℎ (𝑄𝑓𝑑(𝐺𝑀)𝑗 , 𝑑 (𝑄𝑓𝑚(𝐺𝑀)𝑗1 … . . 𝑄𝑓𝑚(𝐺𝑀)𝑗𝑟)) ]
 
 
 
 
    (6) 
 
On the consumer side of the model, the decision on whether to consume a GM or non-GM 
product will be decided through an additional CES nesting function. Thus the private and 
government consumers will first decide whether to consume GM or non-GM soybeans, rapeseed, 
or maize, and then whether the product will be domestic or imported. The purchase decision 
regarding commodity consumption will depend on the price of the good.  
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2.3.3.2 Extension on the Trade Side of the GTAP model 
The current model design, including the modification of production technology and where the 
distinction between GM and non-GM products is made based on the lowest prices, will present a 
 
Intermediate inputs 
Other intermediate inputs 
Intermediate inputs 
(Soybeans, rapeseed and maize) 
 
CES 
Non-GM soybeans, 
rapeseed 
and maize  
GM soybean, 
rapeseed and maize  
GM imports 
GM domestic 
Non-GM 
imports  
Non-GM 
domestic 
CES 
CES 
CES 
GM event1…………………GM event51  
Leontief 
GM domestic GM imports 
CES 
Region1………Regionr 
Region1………Regionr 
Region1…….Regionr 
CES 
CES 
Figure 2. 5: Production technology tree including the global GM pipeline 
Source: Authors application 
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picture of world trade for the commodities without any import constraints for GM events. 
However, as previously mentioned, the trade of GM commodities is specific because each 
country has differing regulations and the number of events authorized among countries varies. 
Therefore, GM events that are not authorized in a specific country or are still contained within 
the pipeline process will be labelled as having import ban or temporary import ban for that 
particular product within the model. The standard way of imposing an import ban in GTAP is to 
fix the import quantity at a specific value, in the case of unauthorized GM events that value will 
be zero.  
 
Pilippidis (2010) proposed a novel method of designing an import ban, where the ban is 
constructed by a reduction in consumer utility corresponding to a specific imported product, and 
this in turn motivates an import reduction. However, in our case the ban on certain GM events 
arises as a result of regulation delays or asynchronicity among country regulations, and not as a 
result of consumer acceptance. Therefore, the standard traditional way of imposing an import 
ban is used.  
 
To modify the model for a specific unapproved GM event in an importing country, the 
endogenous import quantity variable is swapped with the import tariff. This switch provides an 
opportunity for import quantities to be controlled by a fixed percentage, and at the same time the 
import tariff variable will be adjusted by raising the price on that particular import. The rise of 
the import price is equivalent to the reduction of the import quantity. After switching these two 
variables, the model is shocked by placing a zero value for the import quantities, which will 
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create a rise in the import tariff at an equivalent value
11
. This modification allows trade flow 
amongst countries within the global GM pipeline to be identified.  
 
Measuring the effect of the unintended presence of GM events in the export of non-GM crops on 
trade flows between countries requires import tariff modifications for the non-GM crops in 
regions where new GM events are still not approved or contained within the pipeline. As 
mention in Section 2.2, there are a number of cases where shipments of non-GM crops are co-
mingled with traces of unintended GM events and the cost for grain traders can vary between 
sectors and countries. Backus et al. (2008) states that these costs vary between USD 27 to 90 
million, and that costs for testing, demurrage, and destruction of soybean shipments are included 
in those figures. Viju et al. (2011) revealed that 7 percent of export vessel holds did test positive 
for CDC triffid flax. Based on these results and to simplify model modifications, it is assumed 
that export vessels of non-GM crops co-mingled with GM events will vary between 5 and 10 
percent.  
 
The assumption for co-mingling of non-GM vessel crop exports is applied in the same way as 
modeling an import ban. First the import quantities of the non-GM crops are switched with an 
import tariff for the same crop, and then imports are exogenously reduced for non-GM crops in 
specific regions as a result of the unintended presence of GM events in the supply chain. The 
shock for non-GM crops is then applied simultaneously by reducing import quantities between 5 
and 10 percent due to co-mingling of a GM event. Once the results for the base case were 
                                                          
 
11
 Modeled in a standard way of imposing an import ban in GTAP 
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obtained, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the percent of co-mingling and cross co-
mingling between GM and non-GM crop shipments. 
 
2.3.4 Model Scenarios  
Considering the model modification in the database, production and trade, scenarios are 
developed in order for the research questions to be answered.  The summary of the scenarios is 
presented in Table 2.11. The structures of the scenarios start with a base scenario, where 
regulations are synchronized without trade barriers for the commercial GM technology. Each 
additional scenario considers the previous scenario adding higher level of protection or more GM 
events commercialization.   
 
Table 2. 11: Scenarios summary 
   Commercial crop GM pipeline category 
 Production Trade 
barrier 
Production Trade 
barrier 
Contamination 
of non-GM 
crops 
Scenario1 yes     
Scenario2 yes yes    
Scenario3 yes yes yes   
Scenario4 yes yes yes yes  
Scenario5 yes yes yes yes yes 
Source: Authors application  
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2.3.4.1 Scenario Description 
Scenario 1: Trade flows of approved commercial GM events considering their productivity effect 
without trade barriers (all countries are synchronized) 
Scenario 1 distinguishes between GM and non-GM crop production technology where the main 
difference is the cost structure of the input. Therefore, only the input cost structure is considered 
for three main GM crops: maize, soybean, and rapeseed. Efficiency gains of new GM technology 
vary among regions and sectors, and this variation has been acknowledged and accounted for in 
this scenario.  
 
Table 2.12 lists the applied assumptions across regions and crops regarding the relative input 
cost structure. The productivity gain/loss from GM technology across regions and crops are 
applied as an external shock of the intermediate input chemicals and the value added labour 
within the production function of the GTAP model.  
 
Table 2. 12: Assumptions About the Relative Cost Share of GM crops Across Regions and 
Sectors in Percent Value 
Crop 
Type 
Parameter EU-
28 
US Argentina Brazil Canada PryUry
12 
Australia Mexico 
GM 
Maize 
Yield 2.1 5 5  5 5   
Chemicals  -1.5 -5      
Labour -5 -5 -5 -15 -5 -5   
GM 
Soybean 
Yield  -0.5      -0.5 
Chemicals  -10 -43 -0.3 -30 -0.3   
Labour  -10 -7.7 -7.7 -10 -10   
GM 
Rapeseed 
Yield  10.3   10.7  22.11  
Source: Brookes (2008); Alston et al. (2013); Gruere et al. (2007); Jensen et al. 2009 
 
                                                          
 
12
 PryUry- Paraguay and Uruguay   
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Scenario 1 considers only the commercial GM events of maize, soybean, and rapeseed available 
on the market (see Table 2.13) as presented by Stein and Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a). The GM 
cost assumption across regions and sectors from Table 2.12 is applied to the GM events in Table 
2.13 based on the crop group they belong to.  
 
Table 2. 13: Commercial GM maize, soybeans and rapeseed 
No. Sectors in the GTAP Events/Name 
1 CGMaize1 MON810 
2 CGMaize2 NK603 
3 CGMaize3 MON863 
4 CGMaize4 MON88017 
5 CGMaize5 1507 
6 CGMaize6 59122 
7 CGMaize7 Bt11 
8 CGMaize8 GA21 
9 CGMaize9 MIR604 
10 CGMSoy MON 40-3-2 
11 CGMRape1 T45 (HCN28) 
12 CGMRape2 GT73 (RT73) 
13 CGMRape3 MS8 
14 CGMRape4 RF3 
Source: Authors application 
 
Scenario 1 does not consider GM technology trade barriers between regions, thus the commercial 
GM crops can be easily traded among regions and all countries are synchronized regarding the 
regulation of GM crops. 
 
Scenario 2: Scenario one with trade barriers implemented in selected regions where the 
approved commercial GM events are not approved (non-synchronized)   
Scenario 2 builds on scenario 1 with the introduction of trade barriers in regions where the 
commercial GM events from Table 2.13 are not approved. Table 2.C.1 in Appendix C lists the 
45 
 
commercial GM events for maize, soybean, and rapeseed that are approved or not approved in 
selected regions according to Stein and Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009b). The implementation of trade 
barriers on specific GM events for the selected regions is obtained from Table 2.C.1. 
 
Scenario 3: Scenario two plus a 5% adoption rate for GM events currently in the commercial 
pipeline, regulatory pipeline, and advanced R&D pipeline (all countries are synchronized) 
Scenario 3 builds on scenario 2 with a 5% adoption rate of the GM events that are currently in 
the commercial pipeline, regulatory pipeline, and advanced R&D pipeline according to Stein and 
Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a). Table 2.14 categorizes the GM events by commercial, regulatory, 
and advanced R&D pipelines. No trade barriers exist for the GM events in the three pipelines 
listed in Table 2.14, thus regulations are synchronized across regions. 
 
The 5 % adoption rate applies to the following countries that are already cultivating GM crops: 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, US, Paraguay and Uruguay for GM maize and soybean; and 
Australia, US, and Canada for GM rapeseed. A 5% adoption rate for GM events that will be 
specifically developed by China and India for use within their borders has been applied in the 
model as part of scenario three.  
 
Table 2. 14: GM maize, soybean, and rapeseed events in the commercial, regulatory, and 
advanced R&D pipelines 
No. Sectors in GTAP Event/Name Pipeline Group 
1 CoGMaize1 MON89034 Commercial pipeline 
2 CoGMaize2 LY038  Commercial pipeline 
3 RgGMaize1 3272 Regulatory pipeline 
4 RgGMaize2 MIR162 Regulatory pipeline 
5 RgGMaize3 n/a(China) Regulatory pipeline 
6 RgGMaize4 98140 Regulatory pipeline 
7 RgGMaize5 n/a(China) Regulatory pipeline 
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8 RgGMaize6 n/a(China) Regulatory pipeline 
9 RgGMaize7 MON87460 Regulatory pipeline 
10 RaDGMaize1 MON87754 Advanced R&D pipeline 
11 RaDGMaize2 n/a(Monsanto) Advanced R&D pipeline 
12 RaDGMaize3 n/a(Monsanto) Advanced R&D pipeline 
13 RaDGMaize4 DHT Advanced R&D pipeline 
14 RaDGMaize5 n/a(India) Advanced R&D pipeline 
15 RaDGMaize6 n/a(BASF) Advanced R&D pipeline 
16 CpGMSoy1 A2704-12 Commercial pipeline 
17 CpGMSoy2 MON 89788 Commercial pipeline 
18 CpGMSoy3 356043 Commercial pipeline 
19 CpGMSoy4 A5547-127 Commercial pipeline 
20 RgSoy1 305423 Regulatory pipeline 
21 RgSoy2 n/a(China) Regulatory pipeline 
22 RaDGMSoy1 CV127 Advanced R&D pipeline 
23 RaDGMSoy2 n/a(Syngenta) Advanced R&D pipeline 
24 RaDGMSoy3 MON87769 Advanced R&D pipeline 
25 RaDGMSoy4 n/a(Syngenta) Advanced R&D pipeline 
26 RaDGMSoy5 n/a(Monsanto) Advanced R&D pipeline 
27 RaDGMSoy6 n/a(Monsanto) Advanced R&D pipeline 
28 RaDGMSoy7 MON87754 Advanced R&D pipeline 
29 RaDGMSoy8 n/a(Bayer) Advanced R&D pipeline 
30 RaDGMSoy9 n/a(Bayer) Advanced R&D pipeline 
31 RaDGMSoy10 n/a(DHT) Advanced R&D pipeline 
32 CPGMRap CPGMRap Commercial pipeline 
33 RgGMRap n/a(China) Regulatory pipeline 
34 RaDRape1 n/a(Bayer) Advanced R&D pipeline 
35 RaDRape2 n/a(Bayer) Advanced R&D pipeline 
36 RaDRape3 n/a(Bayer) Advanced R&D pipeline 
37 RaDRape4 n/a(BASF) Advanced R&D pipeline 
38 RaDRape5 n/a(BASF) Advanced R&D pipeline 
Source: Authors application 
 
Scenario 4:   Scenario three with trade barriers introduced for upcoming GM events in the three 
pipelines 
Scenario 4 builds on scenario 3 with the introduction of trade barriers in regions where certain 
GM events in the pipeline are not yet approved. Table 2.C.2 in Appendix C, lists approved and 
unapproved GM events in the pipeline for selected regions according to Stein and Rodríguez-
Cerezo (2009b). Following this, trade barriers on certain GM events in selected countries is 
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being introduced. However, where data was not available concerning the approved or not 
approved status of GM events in the pipeline, as marked by n/a in table, the following 
assumptions were made. GM maize and soybean events were assumed to be approved by 
Argentina, Brazil, US, Canada, Paraguay and Uruguay, Mexico, Japan, China and Rest of the 
World. GM rapeseed events were approved by Canada, Australia, US, China, Mexico, Japan, and 
Rest of the World. The events developed in China and India are approved only within their 
specific country borders.  
 
Scenario 5: Scenario four with an initial 5% of co-mingling and cross-co-mingling rate of the 
following non-GM crops: corn, soybean, rapeseed, wheat and rice      
Scenario 5 builds on scenario 4 with inclusion of the unintended presence of GM events in the 
imports of non-GM maize, soybean, rapeseed, wheat and rice in the EU 28. The assumption of a 
5% co-mingling level of non-GM vessel crop exports is applied by swapping the bilateral trade 
flow for maize, soybean, rapeseed, wheat and rice non-GM crops with the import tariff of the 
same crops. After substituting the variables, the bilateral trade flow is shocked simultaneously by 
reducing import quantities 5% due to co-mingling with GM event.  
 
2.3.5 Result Description 
Variations in trade values are the basis for explaining the results of the five scenarios.  Base data 
showing the global and bilateral trade flows between countries was initially calculated. Next the 
individual scenario results are compared to the base data and the changes in trade flows between 
countries are evaluated if either a higher level of protection exists or more GM events are 
commercialized.   
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2.3.5.1 Base Data 
The base data in Figures 2.6, 2.9 and 2.12 provides an overview of the global aggregate trade of 
GM and non-GM maze, soya and rapeseed respectively. Figures 2.7, 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, 2.13 and 
2.14 explain in detail the bilateral trade flows among countries for GM and non-GM maize, soya 
and rapeseed.   
 
Figure 2.6 displays the three largest exporters of maize are the US, Argentina and Brazil. 
Respective maize exports for the US, Argentina and Brazil total  US$10.2 billion, US$2.5 billion 
and US$2.2 billion with GM maize accounting for US$7.4 billion, US$1.5 billion and US$1.3 
billion respectively. The three largest importers of maize are ROW (rest of the World), Japan and 
Mexico. Maize imports for ROW, Japan and Mexico are   US$12 billion, US$3.1 billion and 
US$1.7 billion from which US$6.8 billion, US$1.9 billion and US$1 billion are GM maize 
imports respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 6: Global trade of GM and non-GM maize 
Source: GTAP 8 analysis 
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Figures 2.7 and 2.8 provide a detailed overview about the trade flows for the largest exporters 
and importers of GM and non-GM maize. Major destinations for US GM maize are ROW, Japan 
and Mexico with total exports of US$6.9 billion. Brazil’s major partners are the EU28 and ROW 
with total exports of US$1.2 billion of GM maize. For Argentina the major destination for GM 
maize is ROW with a total of US$1.4 billion.  
 
For GM maize imports, ROW sources the majority of their imports from the US and Argentina 
for a total value of US$5.7 billion. The US is the largest supplier for Japan and Mexico with an 
import value of US$1.8 billion and US$1 billion respectively. The results indicate that the 
majority of maize traded by the largest exporters and importer is genetically modified. Hence, 
the US, Argentina and Brazil maize exports are 72%, 59% and 58% genetically modified. For the 
largest maize importers the results show that GM maize comprises 57%, 61% and 59% of total 
maize imports for ROW, Japan and Mexico respectively. 
 
Figure 2. 7: Bilateral exports of GM and non-GM maize 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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Figure 2. 8: Bilateral imports of GM and non-GM maize 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
For soya the largest exporters are the US, Brazil and Argentina with total exports of US$ 7.7 
billion, US$6.7 billion and US$3.5 billion respectively. GM soya exports account for US$6.5 
billion for the US, US$4.4 billion for Brazil and US$3.4 billion for Argentina. The largest 
importers of soya include China, EU28 and ROW with US$12 billion, US$4.7 billion and 
US$4.4 billion of which GM soya accounts for US$9.4 billion, US$3.3 billion and US$3.4 
billion respectively. 
 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 overview the major trade flows between the largest exporters and 
importers of soya. In the global soya market there are six countries that account for the majority 
of bilateral trade flows.  The three major soya exporters are the US, Brazil and Argentina who 
supply China, EU28 and ROW, the three major soya importers. GM soya accounts for 97%, 84% 
and 66% of total soya exports from Argentina, the US and Brazil respectively. Imports of GM 
soya into China, ROW and the EU28 accounts for 78%, 77% and 70% of total soya imports 
respectively.  
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Figure 2. 9: Global trade of GM and non-GM soya 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
 
Figure 2. 10: Bilateral exports of GM and non-GM soya 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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Figure 2. 11: Bilateral imports of GM and non-GM soya 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
The base data results for the largest rapeseed exporters are Canada, ROW and Ukraine with total 
exports of US$1.4 billion, US$595 million and US$511 million respectively. Canada is the only 
country exporting GM rapeseed which is valued at US$829 million. The largest rapeseed 
importers are Japan, Mexico and EU28 with US$506 million, US$486 million and US$416 
million of which US$262 million, US$265 million and US$3.9 million are GM rapeseed 
respectively. 
 
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 overview of the bilateral rapeseed trade flows amongst the largest 
exporters and importers. Canada exports GM rapeseed to Japan, Mexico, China and ROW with 
trade values of US$238 million, US$231 million, US$174 million and US$134 million 
respectively. Genetically modified rapeseed accounts for 59% of Canada’s rapeseed exports.  
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Figure 2. 12: Global trade of GM and non-GM rapeseed 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
 
Figure 2. 13: Bilateral export of GM and non-GM rapeseed 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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Figure 2. 14: Bilateral imports of GM and non-GM rapeseed 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
2.3.5.2 Results for Scenarios 1 and 2 
The first scenario describes the global trade of maize, soya and rapeseed by considering the 
efficiency gain that GM technology can bring in the absence of technological trade barriers. 
Current commercial GM events are considered based on country level adoption rates described 
in Appendix D Table 2.D.1. The CGE model assumes perfect competition with producers 
earning zero profit and the producers (sectors) that adopt the technology reduce their input cost 
which reduces output prices.  
 
GTAP utilizes the Armington assumption for international trade which indicates that the source 
of imports for a specific country will be determined by the lowest price. Countries adopting the 
technology in the three sectors, maize, soya and rapeseed, become more competitive on the 
export market if there is no trade barrier as a result of a reduction in prices. The export flow of 
the countries that have adopted the technology should increase, but this is dependent on the 
volume traded of the three crops. Additionally, the technology gain may transfer to other sectors; 
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however, the application of the GTAP model will create those linkages between sectors and 
countries via the bilateral trade flows. 
 
Tables 2.15, 2.17 and 2.19 display the changes in export values from the base data for the largest 
exporters of GM maize, soya and rapeseed as a result of implementing the technological change. 
Tables 2.16, 2.18 and 2.20 display the changes in import values from the base data for the largest 
importers of GM maize, soya and rapeseed. For simplicity the trade data is shown in aggregate 
and only for the GM crops where a large change in the result was found.    
 
In scenario 1 the influence of technology adoption by certain countries results in a  total change 
in trade flows of US$287 million for maize, US$591 million for soya and US$44 million for 
rapeseed. With the US being a technology adopter and having the largest trade share in the maize 
and soya markets it benefits to the greatest degree and receives the major share of the increased 
exports which are valued at US$222 million or a 3% increase for the maize sector and US$623 
million or a 9.5% increase for the soya sector (see Table 2.15 and 2.17). Argentina and 
Paraguay-Uruguay GM maize exports increase 3.7% and 6% respectively from the base values. 
The increased exports of maize and soya crops are mainly absorbed by imports to ROW, Mexico 
and EU28. ROW and Mexico imports of GM Maize increased by 3.4% and 3.3% respectively. 
Imports of GM soya increased 7.1% for the EU28 for a total value of US$235 million and 6.1% 
for ROW or a total value of US$227 million. The rapeseed export market is dominated by 
Canada and thus the adoption of technology boosts the export of GM rapeseed by 4.5% or 
US$37.7 million. On the import side the largest increase of imports is by ROW with 17.8% 
growth or US$28.4 million. 
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Table 2. 15: Changes in the export value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 1 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Canada Paraguay and 
Uruguay 
US Total 
GM maize base value 1,461.7 402.9 112 7,358 10,616 
Changed in values due to scenario 1 53.4 5.291 6.8 221.7 286.8 
Percent change in value 3.7 % 1.3% 6% 3% 2.7% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 16: Changes in the import value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 1 (million US$) 
Description EU28 Mexico ROW Total 
GM maize base value 1,218 1,061.7 6,780.5 11,697.6 
Changed in value due to scenario 1 14.5 34.7 229 286.7 
Percent change in value 1% 3.3% 3.4% 2.5% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 17: Changes in the export value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 1 (million US$) 
Description Argentina US Total 
GM soya base value 3,428.2 6,529.6 15,723 
Changed in value due to scenario 1 37.3 622.9 591 
Percent change in value 1.1% 9.5% 3.8% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 18: Changes in the import values of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 1 (million US$) 
Description China EU28 Japan ROW Total 
GM soya base value 9,442.8 3,313.6 1,069.3 3,715.9 19,054.4 
Changed in value due to scenario 1 118.7 235 14.8 226.8 591 
Percent change in value 1.3% 7.1% 1.4% 6.1% 3.1% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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Table 2. 19: Changes in the export value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 1 (million 
US$) 
Description Australia and  
New Zeeland  
Canada Total 
GM rapeseed base value 10 829.7 878.2 
Changed in value due to scenario 1 6.9 37.7 44 
Percent change in value 68.6% 4.5% 5% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 20: Changes in the import value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 1 (million 
US$) 
Description China EU28 ROW Total 
GM rapeseed base value 189 3.9 160 965 
Changed in value due to scenario 1 7.5 1.2 28.4 44 
Percent change in value 4% 31.3% 17.8% 4.6% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Scenario 2 examines the impact on trade flows as a result of the asynchronous approval of the 
commercial GM maize, soya and rapeseed events. These impacts are shown in Tables 2.21 to 
2.26. The GM maize sector is the most affected by the asynchronous approval with a total 
reduction of trade flows pegged at US$239.6 million or 2.3% from the base value and US$527 
million or 5% compared to scenario 1 if the sector was synchronized. Brazil’s GM maize exports 
suffer a significant reduction of 28% (see Table 2.21). This is as a result of the existing 
asynchronicity on events GA21 and MON 863 with the EU28 as its largest importing market. 
Hence, the import of GM maize in the EU28 decreases by a total of 30.3% (see Table 2.22). The 
major markets for exports of US GM maize are Japan and ROW and the presence of 
synchronicity leads to a smaller impact with exports only decreasing by 1.7% compared to 
scenario 1, but exports increase 1.3% compared to the base values.  
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Table 2. 21: Changes in the export value of GM Maize due to shocks in scenario 2 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil Canada Paraguay 
and 
Uruguay 
US Total 
GM Maize base value 1,461.7 1,281.5 402.9 111.96 7,358 10,616 
Changed in value due to 
scenario 2 
56.6 -358 -18.4 -13.5 93.7 -239.6 
Percent change in value 3.9% -27.9% -4.6% -12% 1.3% -2.3% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 22: Changes in the import value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 2 (million US$) 
Description EU28 Japan Mexico ROW Total 
GM Maize base value 1,218 1,944.8 1,061.7 6,780.5 11,697.5 
Changed in value due to scenario 2 -368 4.3 -61 231 -239.6 
Percent change in value -30.3% 0.2% -5.7% 3.4% -2% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
The GM soya and rapeseed sectors are less affected by the asynchronous approval since 
approvals happen more evenly and there are less commercialised GM events present in these 
sectors. There is only one GM soya event commercialized and four GM rapeseed events 
compared to nine commercialized GM maize events. Application of the general equilibrium 
model shows the linkages between the various sectors and regions did affect these two markets. 
Even though the total trade flows increased US$295 million for GM soya and US$34 million for 
GM rapeseed, the result is less when compared to scenario 1 because of the linkage effect caused 
by the asynchronous shock. Since maize, soya and rapeseed are used as inputs in other industries 
such as meat products, food products, vegetable oils, etc. changes in the three crop sectors can 
cause changes in these other industries due to the linkages effect. In the first scenario there is a 
total increase of US$1.3 billion in trade flows for all industries including the maize, soya and 
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rapeseed sectors. In the second scenario where trade barriers are included there is a decrease of 
US$22 million in trade flow for all sectors compared to the base data values.                  
 
Table 2. 23: Changes in the export value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 2 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil Canada US Total 
GM Soya base value 3,428.2 4,360 524.5 6,529.6 15,723 
Changed in value due to scenario 2 253.7 -150.7 38 148 294.6 
Percent change in value 7.4% -3.5% 7.3% 2.3% 1.9% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 24: Changes in the import value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 2 (million US$) 
Description China EU28 Japan ROW Total 
GM Soya base value 9,442.8 3,313.6 1,069.3 3,715.9 19,054.4 
Changed in value due to scenario 2 63.3 99.7 10.6 131.8 294.6 
Percent change in value 0.7% 3% 1% 3.5% 1.6% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 25: Changes in the export value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 2 (million 
US$) 
Description AusNz
13
 Canada Total 
GM rapeseed base value 10 829.7 878.2 
Changed in value due to scenario 2 -1.6 37.1 34 
Percent change in value -16.2% 4.5% 3.9% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
 
Table 2. 26: Changes in the import value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 2 (million 
US$) 
Description China EU28 ROW Total 
GM rapeseed base value 189 3.9 160 965 
Changed in value due to scenario 2 3.9 -0.5 12.6 34 
Percent change in value 2% -12.8% 7.9% 3.5% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
                                                          
 
13
 Australia and New Zealand 
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2.3.5.3 Scenarios 3 and 4 
Scenario three examines the impact on trade flows when GM events in the commercial, 
regulatory and advanced R&D pipelines are adopted at a 5% level by countries that have 
previously adopted GM maize, soya and rapeseed. These effects are shown in Tables 2.27 to 
2.32. Scenario three includes a total of 38 GM events in the pipeline for the crops maize, soya 
and rapeseed. There are no trade barriers for the events in the pipeline, however, the trade 
barriers for the commercial GM events from scenario two are present.  
 
Considering the existence of free trade for the events in the pipeline the results indicate a boost 
in global trade flows. Hence, the total trade boost is US$1.24 billion for GM maize, US$1.5 
billion for GM soya and US$114 million for GM rapeseed. The existence of new varieties of GM 
maize reduced Brazil’s export loss that arose in scenario 2. In scenario 3 Brazil’s export loss is 
12% lower than the base value (see Table 2.27), comparatively in scenario 2 the export loss was 
37.9% lower than the base value. The situation on the import side is similar for the EU28’s 
imports of GM maize that come mainly from Brazil. The reduced EU28 imports are reduced 
16.6% from the base values (see Table 2.28), comparatively in scenario 2 import losses were 
30.3% lower than the base values.  
 
Exports of GM maize from the US actually increase US$1.3 billion or 17.9% from the base 
value. Japan and ROW, two major importers of GM maize from the US,  increased imports 14% 
and 14.6% respectively from the base values.    
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Table 2. 27: Changes in the export value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 3 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil Canada China US Total 
GM Maize base value 1,461.6 1,281.5 402.9 0 7,358 10,616 
Changed in value due to 
scenario 3  
89.4 -154.9 92.9 51.4 1,315.3 1,240.7 
Percent change in value 6.1% -12% 23% N/A 17.9% 11.7% 
Source: GTAP analysis  
 
Table 2. 28: Changes in the import value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 3 (million US$) 
Description EU28 Japan Mexico ROW Total 
GM Maize base value  1,218 1,944.8 1,061.7 6,780.5 11,697.5 
Changed in value due to scenario 3 -202.8 274.9 79.9 989.6 1,240.7 
Percent change in value -16.6% 14.1% 7.5% 14.6% 10.6% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
In the soya sector the US and Argentina received the largest export boost with values of US$708 
million and US$638.7 million respectively compared to the base values (see Table 2.29). 
Brazilian soya exports only increased US$82 million from the base value, but when compared to 
scenario 2 soya exports increased US$232.7 million. The increased exports from US, Argentina 
and Brazil are absorbed by the largest importers: China, ROW and EU28 whose imports 
increased US$619 million, US$363 million and US$318million respectively (see Table 2.30).  
 
Table 2. 29: Changes in the export value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 3 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil China US Total 
GM Soya base value  3,428.2 4,360 0 6,529.6 15,723 
Changed in value due to scenario 3 638.7 82 67.4 708.4 1,515.1 
Percent change in value 18.6% 1.9% N/A 10.9% 9.6% 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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Table 2. 30: Changes in the import value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 3 (million US$) 
Description China EU28 Japan ROW Total 
GM Soya base value 9,442.8 3,313.6 1,069.3 3,715.9 19,054 
Changed in value due to scenario 3 619.2 318.1 79.7 363.4 1,515 
Percent change in value 6.6% 9.6% 7.5% 9.8% 8% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Canada and the US as adopters of the new GM rapeseed events in the pipeline generate large 
export growth US$66.5 million and US$43.8 million respectively (see Table 2.31). The EU28 
experiences the largest percentage increase for GM rapeseed imports at 124% or US$4.8 million 
(see Table 2.32). In dollar value terms the largest import increase of GM rapeseed happens in 
Mexico and ROW with US$28 million and US$32 million. China has two domestic GM events 
in the pipeline, a GM soya and a GM rapeseed event, and while the purpose of their development 
is for domestic use the results did list China as a small exporter for both crops.  
 
Table 2. 31: Changes in the export value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 3 (million 
US$) 
Description Canada China US Total 
GM rapeseed base value 829.7 0 38.19 878.2 
Changed in value due to scenario 3 66.5 12.648 43.753 114 
Percent  change in value 8% N/A 115% 13% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Table 2. 32: Changes in the import value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 3 (million 
US$) 
Description China EU28 Japan Mexico ROW Total 
GM rapeseed base value 189 3.9 262 265.3 160 965 
Changed in value due to scenario 3 14.2 4.8 14 28 32.4 114.3 
Percent change in value 7.5% 124% 5.3% 10.6% 20.23% 11.8% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
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Scenario three only considered 38 single GM events in the pipeline. The literature predicts 
significantly more events forthcoming by way of stake events, and if stake events are to be 
considered then the trade growth would be considerably higher.   
 
Scenario four considers the existence of GM events in the pipeline where selected importers 
impose a trade ban for certain GM events. The asynchronicity is again considered as in scenario 
2, but with the presence of additional events and their effects on trade flows. Tables 2.33 to 2.38 
outline the changes in trade flows given the imposition of trade barriers for certain GM events in 
the pipeline.  
 
The common conclusion for scenario four is that the global trade for GM maize, soya and 
rapeseed is drastically reduced compared to scenario three even though there is an improvement 
from the base values. Comparison with the second scenario indicates that global trade is growing 
more when there are fewer asynhronized GM events on the market. With the presence of more 
GM events that are asynhronized there are more trade barriers placed for those events which 
have a negative impact on global trade flows.     
 
The total value of global trade increased by US$97 million for GM maize (see Table 2.33), 
US$1.1 billion for GM soya (see Table 2.35) and US$106 million for GM rapeseed (see Table 
2.37).   However, export growth is actually reduced when scenario 4 is compared to scenario 3 
from 11.7% to 0.92% for GM maize, from 9.6% to 7.3% for GM soya and from 13% to 12% for 
GM rapeseed. Equivalently to the export growth there is reduction in import growth when 
scenario 4 is compared scenario 3 (see Table 2.34, 2.36 and 2.38).   
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Table 2. 33: Changes in the export value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 4 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil PryUry US Total 
GM Maize base value 1,461.6 1,281.5 112 7,358 10,616 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 71.6 357.3 -98.3 409.6 97 
Percent change in value 4.9% 27.9% -87.8% 5.6% 0.92% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Table 2. 34: Changes in the import value of GM maize due to shocks in scenario 4 (million US$) 
Description EU28 Japan Mexico ROW Total 
GM Maize base value 1,218 1,944.8 1,061.7 6,780.5 11,697.6 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 -48.2 483.1 -650.7 240 97.2 
Percent change in value -4% 24.8% -61.3% 3.5% 0.8% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Table 2. 35: Changes in the export value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 4 (million US$) 
Description Argentina Brazil US Total 
GM Soya base value 3,428.2 4,360 6,529.6 15,723 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 331.4 275 600 1,147.7 
Percent change in value 9.7% 6.3% 9.2% 7.3% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Table 2. 36: Changes in the import value of GM soya due to shocks in scenario 4 (million US$) 
Description China EU28 Japan ROW Total 
GM Soya base value 9,442.8 3,313.6 1,069.3 3,715.9 19,054.4 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 723.3 104.2 95.5 77.2 1,147.7 
Percent change in value 7.7% 3.2% 9% 2% 6% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
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Table 2. 37: Changes in the export value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 4 (million 
US$) 
Description Australia and 
New Zeeland 
Canada China US Total 
GM rapeseed base value 10 829.7 0 38 878.2 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 -0.9 65.5 12.7 43 105.9 
Percent change in value -9% 7.9% N/A 112% 12% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
Table 2. 38: Changes in the import value of GM rapeseed due to shocks in scenario 4 (million 
US$) 
Description  China Japan Mexico ROW Total 
GM rapeseed base value 189 262 265.3 160 965 
Changed in value due to scenario 4 14.2 14.4 26.6 32.4 105.9 
Percent change in value 7.5% 5.5% 10% 20.3% 11% 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
2.3.5.4 Scenario 5 and Systematic Sensitivity Analysis 
As a result of the asynchronous GM event approvals, exporters take expensive measures to 
segregate GM and non-GM crops in their shipments. However, those measures are not successful 
at all times and can create shipment incidents that can be very costly for the exporter and can 
have a negative effect on the sector level. Past examples of such incidents are discussed in 
section 2.2.1. 
 
This scenario discusses the change in trade flows with an initial 5% co-mingling and cross co-
mingling rate for non-GM maize, non-GM soya, non-GM rapeseed, rice and wheat in the EU28 
region. Table 2.39 displays the results from scenario 5. A 5% co-mingling in the rice sector 
creates a reduction in trade for US$54 million, for the wheat sector the value is US$543 million, 
for the non-GM maize the value is US$543 million, for the non-GM soya the value is US$45 
million and for the non-GM rapeseed the value is US$5.8 million. The linkages effect captured 
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in the general equilibrium model indicates a decrease in the trade flows of meat products of 
US$390 million and vegetable oil of US$652 million.   
       
Table 2. 39: Changes of trade flow values with 5% of co-mingling and cross-co-mingling 
Description Total 
Rice base values (millions US$) 1,562 
Changed in values due to scenario 5 (millions US$) -53.7 
Percent change in value -3.4% 
Wheat base value (million US$) 29,820 
Changed in value due to scenario 5 -543.4 
Percent change in value -1.8% 
Non-GM maize base value (million US$) 14,436.4 
Changed in value due to scenario 5 -345.9 
Percent change in value -2.4% 
Non-GM soya (million US$) 4,928.5 
Changed in value due to scenario 5 -44.8 
Percent change in value -0.9% 
Non-GM rapeseed (million US$) 2,050.5 
Changed in value due to scenario 5 -5.8 
Percent change in value -0.3% 
Source: GTAP analysis  
 
 
The 5% assumption regarding co-mingling and cross co-mingling between GM and non-GM 
crops varies for each individual incident. For example Viju et al. (2011) indicates the case that 
seven percent of Canadian flax export shipments being comingled with CDC Triffid Flax. The 
known case of conventional US rice shipments destined for the EU market that were 
contaminated with GM event LL601 resulted in a 95% reduction in US rice exports to the EU 
market.  
 
Capturing the variation or sensitivity of co-mingling and cross co-mingling between GM and 
non-GM crops is implemented through a systematic sensitivity analysis. Figure 2.15 shows the 
systematic sensitivity analysis for scenario 5 with 100% variation in the external shock for co-
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mingling. In GTAP the 5% co-mingling is shown as a 5% reduction in the imports for the 
specific non-GM crops. In the rice sector the calculated mean for the shock is -5.7% and the 
deviation of the result is US$40.8 million, thus the final result can be in the range between 
negative US$86.4 million to US$ 29 million. The wheat sector has a 5% calculated mean and a 
standard deviation of negative US$40.8 million, therefore the final result can range between 
negative US$421.9 million to US$312 million. The mean for the non-GM maize is -6.9% with a 
standard deviation of US$40.8 and the final result ranges between -US$381.7 million to -US$ 
266.3 million. The calculated mean for non-GM rapeseed is -2.2% with a standard deviation of 
40.8 million and the final results ranges between negative US$74 million to US$7.5million. The 
mean for non-GM soya is 0% with a standard deviation of US$40.8 million and range between 
negative US$115.8 million and negative US$-6 million.    
 
 
Figure 2. 15: Systematic sensitivity analysis for co-mingling and cross co-mingling between 
GM and non-GM crop shipments 
Source: GTAP analysis 
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2.3.5.5 Summary of the Scenarios 
In summary, each scenario supplements the previous scenario through additional levels of 
protection or consideration of a new GM event and the gain that this technology can produce. 
Thus, reviewing the aggregate results provides a good view of the total effect that asynchronicity 
can cause in the presence of more and new GM events on the market.  
 
Table 2.40 summarizes aggregate trade flows for scenarios 1 through 4. The first scenario 
describes the global trade of maize, soya and rapeseed by considering the efficiency gain that 
GM technology can bring in the absence of technological trade barriers. The results reveal an 
increase in global trade of maize, soya and rapeseed valued at US$ 927 million. When the 
linkages to the other industries are considered, the increased trade flows is valued at US$ 1.28 
billion in total global trade. Scenario 2 assesses trade flows when the technological trade barriers 
are considered as a result of the asynchronous approval of commercial GM maize, soya and 
rapeseed events. As a result of barriers for certain commercial GM events there is a reduction in 
the trade value of maize, soya and rapeseed of US$ 843 million from scenario 1, and when 
linkages to other industries are considered the total reduction of global trade is US$ 1.3 billion, 
erasing the trade gains in scenario 1. Scenario 3 examines changes in trade flows when new GM 
events currently in the pipeline for maize, soya and rapeseed are considered, resulting in an 
aggregate trade increase to  US$ 3.7 billion for the three crops from scenario 2. When the 
linkages to other industries are considered, global trade increased to US$ 4.2 billion in scenario 
3. Scenario 4 builds on scenario 3 by only considering certain trade barriers for particular GM 
events in the pipeline for the three crops. The results show a decrease in global trade flows for 
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the three crops to US$2.4 billion compared to scenario 3 and when linkages to other industries 
are considered trade flows decrease to US$ 2.8 billion.   
 
Table 2. 40: Aggregate changes in trade flows due to shocks in scenario 1 through 4 
Crop  type Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Maize 0.5 -7.4 -1.68 4.62 
GM maize 287 -527 1,767.7 -1,670.7 
Soya  1.6 0.8 4.42 -1.02 
GM soya 591 -296 1,811 -664 
Rapeseed 2.9 -3.2 11.07 -4.83 
GM rapeseed 44 -10 124.33 -19.33 
Total 927 -842 3,716.48 -2,355.26 
Source: GTAP Analysis 
 
The asynchronized approval does reduce the benefit that biotechnologies can generate. This can 
be seen in scenarios 2 and 4 where asynchronicity is present for certain GM events as indicated 
by lower trade flows compared to scenarios 1 and 3 where trade flows are without barriers. As 
the availability of GM events increases in the pipeline there will be a larger impact on trade and 
thus a larger reduction in the absolute trade value flow when asynchronicity is present. This is 
shown in scenarios 2 and 4, where in scenario 2 there are fewer GM events commercialized and 
thus less of a reduction in trade compared to scenario 4 where more GM events are available. 
The reduction in trade flow in scenario 2 is US$ 843 million compared to scenario 4 where trade 
flows were reduced by US$ 2.4 billion. However, society is better off having more GM events 
on the market even with the presence of asynchronicity, as the increase in trade flows is larger as 
a result of new GM events over the reduction in the trade flows caused by asynchronicity. Thus, 
scenario 4 with more GM events available on the market resulted in an increase of overall trade 
flows for the three crops of US$ 1.4 billion from the base value, compared to scenario 2 with 
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fewer GM events that only resulted in an increase of trade flows of US$ 84 million from the base 
value.  
 
Asynchronicity also impacts co-mingling and cross-comingling of an unapproved GM event in 
non-GM crops. Scenario 5 considers trade flow changes for non-GM maize, non-GM soya, non-
GM rapeseed, rice and wheat in the EU28 region when there is a 5% co-mingling and cross-co-
mingling rate. Aggregating the losses of scenario 5 and scenario 4 results in a reduced trade flow 
value of US$ 3.4 billion from the presence of asynchronicity and co-mingling and cross-co-
mingling. Additionally, these crops are crucial inputs in the feed, food, and drink industries as 
shown in Appendix A, Figure 2.A.1. Thus, as mentioned in scenario 5 it does cause a certain 
level of reduction in the trade of meat products and vegetable oils, bringing the total aggregated 
loss of trade flows to US$ 4.4 billion. 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
In this essay a global measurement was completed on the effect that the expanding GM pipeline 
has on international trade given the constraint of asynchronous regulations for a new GM event 
among countries. More specifically it concentrated on the opportunities foregone including the 
gains and losses that evolved in the trade flows between countries caused by the asynchronous 
approval of GM events. Further to this, the increasing exports of non-GM crops being comingled 
with GM traits were evaluated. Therefore, the main measurements completed in this essay were 
the trade flow changes as new GM maize, soya and rapeseed events became available and were 
adopted by the following countries: US, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Canada and 
China (discussed in scenarios 1 and 3). Next, scenarios 2 and 4 calculated the trade flow changes 
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that arose from the asynchronous approval of these GM events, through the implementation of 
import bans for specific events. Lastly in scenario 5 the trade flow changes arising from co-
mingling and cross-co-mingling between GM and non-GM crops for EU28 region was 
calculated.  
 
The empirical measurements were conducted through the utilization of the GTAP model. GTAP 
uses global datasets and through summation of the microeconomic activities within the 
economies in question, can describe the macroeconomic behavior of those specific economies 
including the bilateral trade flows among the included countries. The advantage of utilizing a 
global computable general equilibrium model is when specific shocks are imposed the change in 
trade flows for the sector of interest can be measured while also capturing the trade flow changes 
resulting from the sector linkage effect. Moreover, the three crops of interest in this essay, maize, 
soya and rapeseed, are used as important inputs in the meat and food product sectors and 
capturing the linkage effect is an important component.  
 
The simulation results indicate that asynchronicity does affect trade flows on a global level. 
When commercial GM events were considered in scenario 2, the total trade flow reduction for 
GM soya, maize and rapeseed is US$833 million. When the linkages to other industries are 
considered as a result of this asynchronicity the value of trade lost is much larger at US$1.3 
billion compared to free trade. Moreover, the higher the number of GM events available with 
less synchronicity between them the greater the impact on trade flows. Scenario 2 shows that for 
the soya and rapeseed sectors that have fewer GM events commercialized the trade flow impact 
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is less severe compared to the maize sector that has significantly more commercialized GM 
events.  
 
In scenario 3 the adoption of additional new GM varieties by countries which have previously 
adopted GM maize, soya and rapeseed see a significant boost of US$2.8 billion in global trade 
for these crops when free trade for these new varieties is present. However, when asynchronicity 
is introduced in scenario 4 the trade gain is reduced to US$1.35 billion. While scenario 4 has an 
increased number of GM events available and trade barriers reduce the trade flow gain, the 
outcome is still an improvement over scenario 2 where the total trade gain across the three 
sectors was only US$89 million. 
 
The trade consequences resulting from the unintended presence of GM events in the shipment of 
non-GM crops has been of great concern since the asynchronicty of GM events evolved. This 
essay also considered the effect this trend has had on rice, wheat and the non-GM maize, soya 
and rapeseed sectors. The results for scenario 5 indicate a reduction in trade flows of US$993.6 
million for all of the sectors. Systematic sensitivity analysis indicates a larger variation in the 
value of rice, wheat and non-GM maize as a result of co-mingling and cross-co-mingling. 
 
Simulations that are conducted with general equilibrium models have the disadvantage of 
sizeable sector and region aggregation. However, this essay did extend alteration of sector 
disaggregation and included a wide range of region. In this way the results from the modified 
model reveal the need for better synchronization of GM events so that trading partners can 
absorb the technological benefits.    
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2.4.1 Contribution, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The major contribution of this research is quantifying the effect that asynchronized regulations 
for GM maize, soya and rapeseed have on international trade when GM events in the pipeline for 
the same crops are considered. Secondly, this research assesses the trade flow effect that 
asynchronized regulation through non-approval in the EU28 region have on co-mingling and 
cross-co-mingling for non-GM maize, non-GM soya, non-GM rapeseed, rice and wheat. Lastly, 
it contributes to GTAP modeling through the extended alteration for the maize, soya and 
rapeseed sectors by disaggregating them to GM and non-GM crops and finally the GM crops to 
GM events.  
 
The main limitation of this research relates to the GTAP analysis using a general equilibrium 
model. Thus, the model applies the assumption of full employment, perfect competition and 
consumer decision on purchasing a product based on the lowest price. However, preference and 
taste may be the factors that likely influence the purchase decision by EU consumers when 
deciding between GM or non-GM products. A second limitation of this study is that GTAP data 
is gathered from many sources and has to be adjusted for the assumptions of a general 
equilibrium model, thus some data values become an approximation to the real values.    
 
Based on the limitations, future work on this research question may include the application of 
different models where the factors of taste and preference are considered. Another area of future 
research would be to analyse the impact of asynchronous regulation on trade flows in the feed, 
food and drink industries given that maize, soya and rapeseed are crucial inputs in those 
industries On the production side, future research on the acreage changes between GM and non-
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GM crops given the commercialization of new GM events and the presence of asynchronicity 
constraints. Lastly, the application of biotechnology on other plants and crops and the impact on 
international trade given the constraint of asynchronicity is another potential extension of this 
research topic.    
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APPENDIX A - SOYBEAN, MAIZE AND CANOLA IN THE FOOD PRODUCTION 
 
Figure 2.A. 1: Use of soybean, maize and rapeseed in the food production 
Source: Landmark Europe, (2009) 
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APPENDIX B – REGIONS, SECTORS, AND SAM IN THE GTAP 
Table 2.B. 1: Region in the GTAP 8 
Code Region Description Code Region 
Description 
Code Region Description 
aus Australia nic Nicaragua kgz Kyrgyztan 
nzl New Zealand pan Panama xsu Rest of Former Soviet 
Union 
xoc Rest of Oceania slv El Salvador arm Armenia 
chn China xca Rest of Central 
America 
aze Azerbaijan 
hkg Hong Kong xcb Caribbean geo Georgia 
jpn Japan aut Austria bhr Bahrain 
kor Korea bel Belgium irn Iran Islamic Republic 
of 
mng Mongolia cyp Cyprus isr Israel 
twn Taiwan cze Czech Republic kwt Kuwait 
xea Rest of East Asia dnk Denmark omn Oman 
khm Cambodia est Estonia qat Qatar 
idn Indonesia fin Finland sau Saudi Arabia 
lao Lao People's 
Democratic Republ 
fra France tur Turkey 
mys Malaysia deu Germany are United Arab Emirates 
phl Philippines grc Greece xws Rest of Western Asia 
sgp Singapore hun Hungary egy Egypt 
tha Thailand irl Ireland mar Morocco 
vnm Viet Nam ita Italy tun Tunisia 
xse Rest of Southeast Asia lva Latvia xnf Rest of North Africa 
bgd Bangladesh ltu Lithuania cmr Cameroon 
ind India lux Luxembourg civ Cote d'Ivoire 
npl Nepal mlt Malta gha Ghana 
pak Pakistan nld Netherlands nga Nigeria 
lka Sri Lanka pol Poland sen Senegal 
xsa Rest of South Asia prt Portugal xwf Rest of Western Africa 
can Canada svk Slovakia xcf Central Africa 
usa United States of 
America 
svn Slovenia xac South Central Africa 
mex Mexico esp Spain eth Ethiopia 
xna Rest of North America swe Sweden ken Kenya 
arg Argentina gbr United Kingdom mdg Madagascar 
bol Bolivia che Switzerland mwi Malawi 
bra Brazil nor Norway mus Mauritius 
chl Chile xef Rest of EFTA moz Mozambique 
col Colombia alb Albania tza Tanzania 
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ecu Ecuador bgr Bulgaria uga Uganda 
pry Paraguay blr Belarus zmb Zambia 
per Peru hrv Croatia zwe Zimbabwe 
ury Uruguay rou Romania xec Rest of Eastern Africa 
ven Venezuela rus Russian 
Federation 
bwa Botswana 
xsm Rest of South America ukr Ukraine nam Namibia 
cri Costa Rica xee Rest of Eastern 
Europe 
zaf South Africa 
gtm Guatemala xer Rest of Europe xsc Rest of South African 
Customs  
hnd Honduras kaz Kazakhstan xtw Rest of the World 
Source: GTAP 8 database 
Table 2.B. 2: Sectors in the GTAP 8 
Code Sector Description Code Sector Description 
pdr Paddy rice lum Wood products 
wht Wheat ppp Paper products, publishing 
gro Cereal grains nec p_c Petroleum, coal products 
v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts crp Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 
osd Oil seeds nmm Mineral products nec 
c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet i_s Ferrous metals 
pfb Plant-based fibers nfm Metals nec 
ocr Crops nec fmp Metal products 
ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
oap Animal products nec otn Transport equipment nec 
rmk Raw milk ele Electronic equipment 
wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons ome Machinery and equipment nec 
frs Forestry omf Manufactures nec 
fsh Fishing ely Electricity 
coa Coal gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
oil Oil wtr Water 
gas Gas cns Construction 
omn Minerals nec trd Trade 
cmt Meat: 
cattle,sheep,goats,horse 
otp Transport nec 
omt Meat products nec wtp Sea transport 
vol Vegetable oils and fats atp Air transport 
mil Dairy products cmn Communication 
pcr Processed rice ofi Financial services nec 
sgr Sugar isr Insurance 
ofd Food products nec obs Business services nec 
b_t Beverages and tobacco ros Recreation and other services 
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products 
tex Textiles osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 
wap Wearing apparel dwe Dwellings 
lea Leather products 
Source: GTAP 8 database 
 
Table 2.B. 3: Accounting identities in SAM 
Aggregate demand= Aggregate supply  
Aggregate demand= Intermediate consumption(CIN)+ Household consumption(CH)+ 
Government spending (G)+ Gross capital formation(I)+Export(E) 
Aggregate supply= Domestic production (Y)+Imports(M) 
C+G+I+E=Y+M 
Y=C+T(tax payments)+Sh (private savings) 
I=Sh+Sg(government savings)+Sf(foreign savings) 
E+Sf=M 
Source: Kerkela, (2009) 
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 Producer Commodities Factor of 
production 
Household Government Savings-
Investment 
Rest of 
the 
World 
Total 
Producer  Domestic 
production 
     Domestic 
sales 
Commodities Demand for 
domestic and 
imported 
intermediates  
  Household demand Government 
demand 
Domestic and 
import 
demand 
Exports Aggregate 
demand 
Factor of 
production 
Factor payment       Factor income 
Household   Net factor 
income 
Household income    Aggregate 
income 
Government Taxes on firm Import/Export 
taxes 
Income taxes Household /sales 
taxes 
 Taxes on 
capital goods 
Transfer 
from the 
rest of the 
world 
Government 
income 
Savings-
Investment 
  depreciation Domestic 
savings/investment 
Government 
savings 
 Foreign 
savings 
Savings 
Rest of the 
World 
 Imports      Foreign value 
outflow 
Total Gross value of 
production 
Aggregate 
supply 
Factor 
expenditures 
Household 
expenditures 
Government 
expenditure 
Investment 
expenditure 
Foreign 
value 
inflow 
 
Figure 2.B. 1: Social Accounting Matrix in GTAP 
Source: Burfisher, (2011) 
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APPENDIX C – LISTS OF APPROVED AND UNAPPROVED GM EVENTS IN THE PIPELINE  
Table 2.C. 1: Commercial GM events approval in certain regions 
  Argentina AusNz Brazil Canada China EU28 India Japan Mexico PryUry ROW Russia Ukraine USA 
Maize MON810 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
NK603 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
MON863 no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes 
MON88017 no no no yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
1507 yes yes yes yes no yes no yes yes yes yes no no yes 
59122 no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no no yes 
Bt11 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
GA21 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
MIR604 no yes no yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Soybean MON 40-3-2 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Rapeseed T45 (HCN28) no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no no yes 
GT73 (RT73) no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no no yes 
MS8 no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no no yes 
RF3 no yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no no yes 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
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Table 2.C. 2: GM Events in the Pipeline Approved in Certain Regions 
  Argentina AusNz Brazil Canada China EU28 India Japan Mexico PryUry ROW Russia Ukraine USA 
Maize MON89034 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no n/a n/a no No yes 
LY038  n/a yes n/a yes n/a no no yes yes n/a n/a no no yes 
3272 no n/a n/a yes yes no n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
MIR162 yes yes yes yes n/a n/a n/a no no n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
n/a(China) no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no 
98140 n/a n/a n/a yes n/a no n/a no n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
n/a(China) no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no 
n/a(China) no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no 
MON87460 n/a yes n/a yes yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
MON87754 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
n/a(Monsanto) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(Monsanto) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
DHT n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(India) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(BASF) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Soya A2704-12 yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
MON 89788 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
356043 no yes no yes no no no yes yes no yes no no yes 
A5547-127 yes yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
305423 n/a n/a n/a yes n/a no n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a no no 
n/a(China) no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no 
CV127 n/a n/a n/a yes n/a no n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a no no 
n/a(Syngenta) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no n/a 
MON87769 n/a n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
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 n/a(Syngenta) n/a n/a yes yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
n/a(Monsanto) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
n/a(Monsanto) n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
MON87754 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
n/a(Bayer) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no n/a 
n/a(Bayer) yes n/a yes yes n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
n/a(DHT) yes n/a yes yes n/a yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no yes 
Rapeseed CPGMRap n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(China) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(Bayer) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(Bayer) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(Bayer) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(BASF) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a(BASF) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: Stein, A.J. and E. Rodríguez-Cerezo (2009a) 
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APPENDIX D- ADOPTION RATE OF GM CROPS ACROSS REGIONS 
Table 2.D. 1: Cultivation of GM crops in regions in percent value 
GM Soybeans Rapeseed Maize 
1 Argentina 100 0 86 
2 Australia and New 
Zeeland 
0 8 0 
3 Brazil 75 0 56 
4 Canada 73.3 94 90 
5 China 0 0 0 
6 EU28 0 0 1.35 
7 India 0 0 0 
8 Japan 0 0 0 
9 Mexico 83 0 0 
10 Paraguay and Uruguay 97 0 83 
11 Rest of World 0 0 0 
12 Russia 0 0 0 
13 Ukraine 0 0 0 
14 US 93 88 86 
Source: James, 2011 
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CHAPTER 3 
EU Regulation of Genetically Modified Products: Implications for Exporter’s 
Risk 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The EU’s cautious approach towards biotechnology has resulted in import restrictions on GMOs 
including a de facto import moratorium from 1999 until 2003. This moratorium was perceived as 
a nontariff trade barrier by many countries whose export opportunities were reduced as a result 
of the EU’s domestic policy regulations. As a result, the US, Canada, and a number of other 
countries filed complaints with the WTO regarding the restrictive effect of the moratorium. The 
decision of the WTO Panel charged with resolving the dispute ruled  in September 2006 that the 
EU restrictions on GM products were in violation of international trade rules and that the EU had 
acted in ways which contradicted its obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement.
14,15
 Specifically, the Panel indicated that the EU had ignored its obligations to 
provide a justification for product-specific measures, allowed the use of non-science-based 
criteria, and failed to undertake a risk assessment.  Shortly after the WTO Panel handed down 
                                                          
 
14
 The purpose of the SPS Agreement is to regulate the movement of products across international borders 
and to ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations are not being used as disguised barriers to trade.  
15
 The panel found that EU Communities applied a general de facto moratorium on the approval of 
biotechnology products between June 1999 and August 2003, and thus violated Article 8 and Annex C(1) 
of the SPS Agreement. Further, it found that the EU acted inconsistently in respect to the approval of 24 
out of 27 biotech products. Finally, with regards to European Communities’ member state safeguard 
measures, the panel found that that EU acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 5.1 and 2.2 of 
the SPS Agreement regarding all of the safeguard measures at issue. These findings indicate that the EU 
moratorium and product-specific measures undertaken were not based on scientific evidence or on risk 
assessment requirements as specified under the SPS Agreement. 
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their ruling, the EU announced its intention to comply with the Panel’s recommendations and to 
work to resolve GMO legislative and trade issues within a reasonable period of time (RPT)
16
.  
 
Meanwhile, in 2003 a new stringent regulatory system was put in place regarding the approval, 
labeling, and traceability of GM products. This was accomplished through EU Commission 
directive 2001/18, and regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003. These regulations accommodated 
the preferences of various anti-GM groups and interests in the EU
17
.  
 
The first product that successfully passed the new EU regulation regime of 2003 was BASF’s 
Amylopectin (Amflora) potato, which received approval on March 15, 2010, five years after the 
original application in February 2005 (Viju et al., 2011). The case of a GM product being 
licensed even after five year long period in the approval process was very contentious in some 
quarters. It precipitated further changes in the EU GM regulations.  These changes resulted from 
domestic political difficulties in some of the individual Member States (MS) that continued to 
oppose the presence of any type of GM product in their territory, and these states continued 
using an internal EU safeguard measure as a tool to limit market access. This behavior resulted 
in new recommendations proposed by the EU Commission in July 2010. The suggested 
modifications were based on granting more freedom to the member states regarding the decision 
as to whether or not they will allow cultivation of GMOs that have been approved by the EU in 
their individual national territories. Under this recommendation member states (MS) can 
                                                          
 
16
 Due to the complexity of the issue, the EU asked for a reasonable period of time for implementation. 
17
 According to Viju, et al. (2011) there are four anti-GM groups with strong preferences: 1) consumers 
worried about the safety and quality of their food; 2) environmentalists; 3) those with ethical concerns; 
and 4) groups concerned about the influence of multinational corporations on the food supply.   
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prohibit, partially prohibit, or allow GMO cultivation when drafting and setting legislation for 
cultivation of GMOs. However, the authorization for allowing GMOs market access remains at 
the EU level.  
 
According to the EU, the changes made at EU level for the approval process of a GM product 
(with the passing of directive 2001/18 and regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003) along with the 
changes at the MS level (with the passing of recommendations 2010/C200/01) are in conformity 
with the SPS Agreement.  
 
The SPS Agreement justifies the adoption of new stricter standards that are above the 
international level, but only if there is a scientific justification for doing so. Additionally, these 
stricter measures must be based on a risk assessment. However, the EU considers speculative 
risk
18
 in the adoption of stricter standards, stating that the existence of no long term health effects 
and benign environmental impacts for GMO products has not been proven. As a result, the EU 
argues it is justified in using the precautionary
19
 principle to introduce a more stringent 
regulatory system, temporary or not. Thus, the EU, by moving away from science-based decision 
making, allowed the influence of political factors to impose more stringent GMO import 
regulations on the grounds of potential harm to human, animal and plant health. By choosing this 
approach, the EU increased the risk for firms that want to invest in biotechnology and bring GM 
products into the EU market (Kerr, 2004). Further, the EU argued that exporting firms should 
                                                          
 
18
 Speculative risk is explained by Isaac (2007) “as risk which lacks experience, data, a casual-
consequence mechanism and accepted analytical method for assessment, they are logical possibilities, 
irrefutable and untestable”.    
19
 The precautionary principle allows protective action to be taken before there is complete scientific 
information to justify that a risk is present, implying that protective action precedes scientific proof. 
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carry the burden of proof to demonstrate the safety of a product that an importing country had 
found to be “unsafe” and supported the “use of criteria other than science to justify SPS 
measures” (Freeman, 2004). Hence, when an exporting firm wants to sell a GM product on the 
EU market, it has to go through a lengthy approval process at the EU level, and, if needed, the 
cultivation process at the MS level. Both processes can be influenced by socio-economic factors 
beyond the control of the firm, and in spite of a product having received a science-based 
approval in the EU (as well as in the exporting country) (Viju et al., 2011).       
 
The structure of the regulations regarding GMO approval in the EU and it’s inconsistency with 
the multilateral trade commitments
20
 indicates potential presence of risk for firms in agricultural 
biotechnology that want to enter the EU market. Bridging the regulator risk of the country with 
the investment consequences for the exporting firm in an economic theory model is the subject 
of this essay. Hence, the specific objectives of this essay is: evaluating the regulations in the 
decision approval process of a GMO in the EU and their consistency with the multilateral trade 
agreements; examining the literature for political risk where it reveals that regulatory burdens 
can be considered as a risk that can affect the investment of a firm; linking the political risk and 
the regulation for approval of GMOs in the EU into a specific definition; and designing a theory 
which will incorporate the complexity of the decision process in the EU for GMO as political 
risk and the effect of that risk on the investment decisions of the firm wishing to invest in new 
GM crops. Based on the stated objective, the two research questions that are addressed are 
defining and modeling the specific political environment created by the regulation decision 
                                                          
 
20
 Section 2 discusses further the apparent inconsistency of EU GMO approval regulations with 
multilateral commitments.  
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approval process of GMOs in the EU, and incorporating this political risk into the investment 
decision of firm wanting to invest in new GM crops.  
 
3.2 EU Approach to the SPS Agreement and Risk Analysis Framework  
In order to understand the functioning of the SPS agreement, the broader scope of multilateral 
trade liberalization and agreements should be considered (Isaac, 2007). The EU accepted the SPS 
as part of its signing on to the Uruguay round outcomes. The relevant provisions for agriculture 
biotechnology in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arising from the Uruguay 
round are national treatment (Article I) and most-favored nation (Article III). It should also be 
noted that the concept of like products should be included as a third provision even though it was 
not formally acknowledged in the GATT (Isaac, 2007). These provisions state that the treatment 
of foreign products must be the same as domestic products; that there should not be 
discrimination between like products from different countries; and that all like products should 
be treated the same way regardless of the processes and production methods (PPM) used.
21
   
 
Incorporating biotechnology into these provisions means there should be no difference in the 
treatment of GM products and non-GM products because they are only un-like in their PPM. 
Thus, the international trading system should consider the outcome of the technology rather than 
the process of the technology (Isaac et al., 2002). As it is often not possible to physically 
distinguish the final GM product from the non-GM product, there should not be a trade barrier 
put in place on GM products on the basis of the PPM used (Dayananda, 2011). Hence, the end 
                                                          
 
21
 As described by Isaac et al. (2002) these three provisions are the baseline principles of the WTO 
principle of non-discrimination (PND) and can be used to identify legitimate violations of this principle 
given sufficient evidence. 
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use of the GM and non-GM product is the same regardless of the PPM that has been used in their 
creation (Isaac et al., 2002). However, under the SPS Agreement the violation of these three 
baseline principles can be allowed and will not be considered as discrimination of “like” 
products in cases where human, animal, and plant health and safety are at risk.  
 
On the 1
st 
January 1995 the SPS Agreement came in force; it includes human, animal and plant 
safety, and health regulations that a particularly country may put into place to restrict imports 
(Isaac, 2007). The purpose of the SPS Agreement is to regulate the movement of products across 
international borders without rules justified on Sanitary and Phytosanitary grounds being used as 
a disguised barrier to trade. Further, the SPS Agreement encourages countries to use agreed 
international standards
22
 pertaining to health and the environment that are consistent with the 
WTO regulations. Countries can create domestic standards that are stricter than those agreed in 
the CODEX, OIE or IPPC, but only if there is scientific justification for doing so. If no 
international standards exist, countries can develop their own standards. According to the 
agreement, the most objective way to decide the legitimacy of a measure is through a scientific 
risk assessment procedure (Isaac et al., 2002). In order to assess risk, members are committed to 
consider the risk assessment techniques used in the international standards setting institutions, 
even if the relevant international standard is not being used. This raises the issue of the quality 
and appropriateness of the science used. If the quality and type of science is equivalent, then how 
can one know when enough science has been completed to constitute an acceptable degree of 
                                                          
 
22
 Organizations that establish international standards and that are recognized and considered consistent 
with the WTO are; the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CODEX) which handles food safety; the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) which handles animal safety; and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) which handles plant safety.  
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risk? Hence, the major challenge is in finding the compromise between SPS measures that 
legitimately restrict trade in order to protect human, animal, and plant safety or health and those 
measures justified on SPS grounds that unnecessarily restrict trade (Isaac et al., 2002).  
 
Underlying the SPS Agreement is the Risk Analysis Framework (RAF), which provided 
boundaries on the type of unilateral trade restriction measures permissible to WTO Members if 
they wish to discriminate to restrict import of unsafe and risky agriculture products for the 
purpose of protecting human, animal, and plant health and safety (Issac, 2007). According to 
Issac (2007) there are three important provisions outlining circumstances when members are not 
required to grant either national treatment or most-favoured nation status.  These are: to 
agricultural exporters whose products  with unacceptable levels of risk associated with them are 
contaminating the domestic food supply or threatening the environment; they may establish 
domestics SPS measures higher than the international standard if there is legitimate justification 
to do so; and they may establish trade barriers based on the precautionary principle in event that 
there is insufficient scientific evidence to conduct an appropriate risk assessment (Isaac, 2007). 
These are described in Article 2:3, 3:3 and 5:7 of the SPS Agreement respectively. However, 
even though the SPS agreement is written in the language of the RAF, the interpretation and the 
application of the RAF is defined by domestic regulators when determining what is legitimately 
justifiable and what constitutes sufficient scientific evidence (Isaac, 2007).  
 
The two alternative interpretations to the Risk Analysis Frameworks are described by Isaac et al. 
(2002) as the scientifically rationality approach and the socially rationality approach. 
Accordingly, the EU practices the socially rationality approach where science is just one facet of 
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the society, and that society also consists of other stakeholders that should be a part of the 
decision process. Thus, science has an informative role in the decision process for what can be 
considered legitimately justifiable, along with the non-science information which is also 
considered as legitimate factors to be included in the decision to arrive at a legitimate 
justification. Accordingly, the socially rationality approach uses speculative risk in defining the 
safety level of new technology resulting in an adoption of zero risk and a perfectly safe market 
access rule for GM technology. Hence, the use of precautionary principle as trade barrier in the 
case of insufficient scientific evidence to conduct an appropriate risk assessment is becoming 
political precaution
23
, allowing the influence of political factors when deciding market access for 
GM products.  
 
3.3 Process management of the approval of a GM product at the EU level  
When an exporting firm from outside the EU wishes to market a GM product in one of the EU 
member states, then a certain processes are followed that must be considered both within the EU 
governmental structure and in the context of the interaction between those governmental 
institutions. Hence, each individual GM product to be sold on the EU market as either seed or 
used in the human food and animal feed industries must be approved through Directive 2001/18 
or Regulation 1829/2003
24,25
. The length of the application process ranges from 1.5 to 8 years, 
regardless of the type of authorisation required (Viju et al., 2011).  
                                                          
 
23
 The ‘precautionary principle’ is nothing more than a retreat from decision making on the basis of 
scientific principles so that ‘political precaution’ can dominate decision making (Isaac et al., 2002). 
24
 Regulation 1823/2003/EC regulates the placement of food and feed on the market; and Directive 
2001/18/EC regulates the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment.  
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3.3.1 Approval Process through Regulation EC 1829/2003 
Regulation 1829/2003/EC regulates the placement of food and feed on the EU market. The 
process for approval through this regulation starts by the firm submitting an application to the 
national competent authority (NCA) of one of the EU member states (Wesseler and 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). Potential factors determining the MS through which the firm will start 
the application process are explained by Viju et al. (2011) as: interest of the MS in the specific 
GMO; whether the applicant company is a crucial component of a strategic sector for the MS; 
the political and economic influence of the applicant company in the MS; whether the GMO in 
question is a significant component in the feed and food of a specific livestock sector or 
manufacturing industry in the MS respectively; MS history of successful applications for 
authorisation and its lobbing abilities at the community level; applicant prior experience working 
with the MS in GMO authorization; relationship between the firm applicant and the MS; and the 
location of the field trials. The NCA does the assessment of the application within 14 days and 
submits it to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Viju et al., 2011; Wesseler and 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). Further, the NCA informs all other MS about the application being 
made and informs the public by making summary of the application available (Wesseler and 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2011).   
 
The EFSA preforms the scientific risk assessment of GMO products regarding food and feed 
safety and environmental safety. The EFSA provides a scientific opinion and advice through 
supporting decisions in the design of policy and legislation for the European Commission (EC) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
25
 The difference between the regulation and directive is that the regulation is more binding in its 
definitions and each MS has to accept the same definitions, whereas the directive gives more freedom to 
the MS to interpret the ruling in various ways.   
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(EFSA, 2013a). After receiving the application the EFSA has a six month period to provide 
scientific opinion to the EC, this period can be extended if further data is required. Approval 
times vary with each individual evaluation (Viju et al., 2011). Lastly, the EFSAs opinion on the 
validity of the detection method
26
 provided by the applicant to the EFSA is included, even 
though validation of the detection method is conducted by the EC Joint Research Center (JRC) 
(Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). The EFSA does not approve or authorise GMOs, it 
provides a science-based assessment (opinion) to the European Commission and the MS who 
take this into account together with other factors when deciding on the approval of the GMO 
(EFSA, 2013b).     
 
After receiving the EFSAs opinion, the EC has to produce a draft decision within three months. 
In this period the EC releases the EFSAs opinion to the public and the MS. The EFSAs opinion 
is published on the Commission’s website, where public has the opportunity to comment within 
30 days of its publication (Viju et al., 2011). The EC analyzes all public comments and by 
consultation with the EFSA determines if the comments have an impact on the EFSA’s opinion 
and if it should be considered in the draft decision by the EC.  
 
The EC’s formal draft decision leads into the Examination procedure27,28 (Viju et al., 2011). The 
Examination procedure begins with submission of the EC draft decision to the Examination 
                                                          
 
26
 Detection method is test using biochemical (molecular) techniques to detect the type of GMO and 
amount present in the specified food or feed.   
27
 The legislative approval in this essay is described under the Treaty of Lisbon, post March 1, 2011. For 
further description of the differences pre and post March 1, 2011 see Viju et al. (2011), and Hardacre and 
Kaeding (2011a).  
28
 Article 5 of the Implementing Regulation 182/2011 EU. 
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Committee, known as the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (SCoFCAH)
29
. 
The Examination Committee evaluates the draft decision of the EC and uses a voting procedure 
to ascertain its position based on Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
30
. If the Examination 
Committee accepts the draft decision with a positive opinion, the EC will implement the draft 
decision. In a case where the Examination Committee rejects the draft decision, the EC cannot 
implement the draft decision and will either propose a new version to the Examination 
Committee or refer the original version to the Appeals Committee (AC) (Viju et al., 2011). In a 
case where the Examination Committee expresses no opinion, the EC may adopt the draft 
decision, however, it cannot adopt the measure in a case when the implementing act is related to 
issues of health and safety or if the majority of the Examination Committee votes are opposed to 
the adoption of the draft decision (Viju et al., 2011). GMOs are often considered as raising the 
question related to consumer health and safety, despite the EFSA declaring them as safe, which 
led to the EC not being able to adopt the draft decision. In this case the EC has the option to 
either propose a new version to the Examination Committee within a period of two months or 
submit the same draft decision to the AC within a period of one month. The examination 
procedure
31
 is described in Figure 3.1.  
 
                                                          
 
29
 The SCoFCAH consists of representatives of all member states. 
30
 Post-Lisbon calculations of QMV represent 55% or more of the Member States and 65% or more of EU 
citizens (EC, 2015a). 
   
31
 The GM event will receive a “positive opinion” if the Committee vote is with a QMV for approving the 
specific GM event. If the Committee vote is with a QMV to not approve the GM event then the result is a 
“negative opinion” situation. If the Committee is unable to get a QMV for approving or not approving the 
GM event then the committee issues a “no opinion” result.   
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Figure 3. 1: Examination Procedure 
Source: Hardacre and Kaeding (2011b).  
 
The AC is composed of one representative from each MS, mainly a Director-General of a 
Ministry or a representative from a higher political level and is chaired by the Commission 
(Hardacre and Kaeding, 2011b). As described by Hardacre and Kaeding (2011a, p.18):  
 
AC will have the power to vote changes to the text, to adopt the text or to reject it. The 
Appeal Committee was created because the Council wanted to have a political body to 
look at controversial acts, i.e. ones that have been voted against, or received no opinion, 
in committees – which whilst not significant in number can be very sensitive for the 
Council. 
 
The AC evaluates the draft decision and decides based on QMV within two months (Wesseler 
and Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). If AC give a positive opinion the GMO is approved, if the opinion 
is negative the GMO is not approved. In case of no opinion by the AC, the EC may adopt the 
decision but it can also refer it back to the Examination Committee (Viju et al., 2011). Hence, for 
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highly controversial GMOs the decision process can result in the expressing no opinion by the 
Examination Committee and then no opinion under the AC, leading to a circle of no opinion and 
an issue of who is making the final decision regarding approval of the GMO, whether it will be 
the EC or the MS (Hardacre and Kaeding, 2011b). Lastly, the Parliament and Council, by Article 
11, have the right of scrutiny which allows them to pass a non-binding resolution at any time 
during the draft act process if they believe that the Implementing Act exceeds the implementing 
powers of the Commission (Hardacre and Kaeding, 2011a). Figure 3.2 describes the decision 
approval process for a GM product in the EU.  
 
If a draft decision is successfully implemented by the EC, then the particular GMO in question is 
granted authorisation to the EU market for the following 10 years (Viju et al., 2011). After ten 
years authorisation must again be granted through the same decision process if the firm desires 
continued market access. Once authorised, the GM product must be labeled as “genetically 
modified” and is subjected to specific labeling requirements32.   
                                                          
 
32
 As of April 22, 2015 the EC proposed that MS have the option to implement opt-out measures 
regarding regulation 1829/2003. Thereby giving MS the right to decide on GMO use for food and feed in 
their territory (EC, 2015b)   
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Figure 3. 2: The Decision Process for Approval of GM Product in EU 
Source: Authors application
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3.3.2 Approval Process through Directive 2001/18/EC   
The purpose of Directive 2001/18/EC is to control the risk associated with deliberate release of 
GMOs into the environment from both research and development and when placed on the 
market. Examples of deliberate release into the environment includes planting GMO seed for 
crop or seed production, import of GM commodities for direct use in food and feed, or 
processing into food products (Viju et al., 2011). 
 
The process for approval through Directive 2001/18/EC starts with submission of notification by 
the applicant to the national competent authority (NCA) of the MS whose territory the release of 
the GMO will take place. The MS will complete a scientific assessment report and respond to the 
notification within 30 days (Viju et al., 2011). If the assessment is negative the applicant can 
submit a new application through the NCA of another MS. If the assessment is positive and the 
release of the GMO would be allowed on the MS market, then the assessment report is submitted 
to the EC. The EC submits the report to the other MS countries within 30 days, after which MS 
countries have the option, within 30 days, to comment on the report, either through the EC or 
through the NCA of the MS country where the application took place. If there are no objections 
to the assessment report by the EC or other MS countries, then the NCA can authorise the GMO 
product where the original application took place. If there is an objection to the assessment a 
conciliation period between the MS, the EC, and the applicant takes place to address those 
concerns. If objections are still present after the conciliation period the decision moves to the EU 
level for approval. At the EU level, the approval process mirrors the approval process as 
previously described under regulation EC 1829/2003 in section 3.3.1 and Figure 3.2.   
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Within this Directive, countries may invoke the safeguard measure under Article 23. The 
safeguard clause allows MS to place a ban, provisionally restrict, or prohibit the use or sale of a 
GMO in whole form or in products within their territories. The safeguard clause applies only 
when new scientific information is available that will affect the risk assessment of the approved 
GMO, thereby indicating that the GMO constitutes a risk to human health and the environment. 
Hence, in order to invoke the ban, the MS should have scientific reasoning. A number of MS 
(Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Luxembourg, and Poland) have invoked the 
safeguard measure on the argument of insufficient and inconclusive risk assessment and 
insufficient monitoring plans (Greiter and Heissenberger, 2012). However, the majority of bans 
were found by the EFSA and the EC not to be based on scientific evidence and the information 
was insufficient to affect the original GMO authorisation (Viju et al., 2011). The EC, using 
committee processes, has requested the MS to repeal the bans, but the EC has not once received 
a QMV from the Regulatory Committee in favour of their proposal, therefore the final decision 
made by the European Council has resulted in rejection of the EC’s proposal that the MS should 
lift the national safeguard measure. Throughout this extremely lengthy process the GMO bans in 
the MS remain in place, resulting in market withdrawal of selected products subjected to the 
safeguard measure (EC, 2013).  
 
In attempt to satisfy the demand of the MS and still comply with the SPS regulation, the EC 
proposed two recommendations in July 2010 regarding greater flexibility for MS to create 
coexistence measures (Recommendation 2010/C20/01) and the possibility for MS to legally 
prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territories (Recommendation 2010/375; Dobbs, 2010).  
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These propositions were added under Article 26(b) in Directive 2001/18/EC and Directive 
2015/412 in April 2015. The idea behind these recommendations was to provide MS with the 
possibility to apply veto power on GM products and at the same time reduce the use of safeguard 
measures (Dobbs, 2010). Thus, MS can now restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their 
territory on criteria other than those assessed by EFSA in its risk assessment (EC, 2015c). 
 
3.4 Defining the Decision Process for GMO approval in EU as Regulation-based Political 
Risk  
As described in section 3.3 the decision approval process is lengthy and complicated, leading to 
approval delays which can directly affect the investment decisions of agricultural biotechnology 
firms interested in the EU and global marketplaces. The regulatory burden created by the 
institutions involved in the decision process creates uncertainty for firms seeking EU market 
entry, and thus creates an external risk that cannot be controlled by the firm. However, in light of 
this external risk, the firm can manage the investment decision internally
33
. Under this 
assumption, the external regulation risk can be broadly included in the theory of political risk.   
 
Political risk has been commonly used in business models, when the firm is developing entrance 
strategies with the purpose to evaluate the macroeconomic condition of the country, especially 
political instability in case of war, riots, and terrorism, for example. However, the definition of 
political risk covers a broader range of events. Root (1973) segregates risk into three areas: 
transfer risk covering potential restrictions on the transfer of funds, products, technology, and 
people; operational risk concerning uncertainty as it applies to regulations, hindrance of 
                                                          
 
33
 Explained later in the model description 
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governmental administrative procedures on results, policies and management of operations in the 
foreign country; and lastly, risks on control of capital that discriminate against foreign firms, 
expropriation and forced local shareholding. Hence, within this definition the policies and 
regulations for GM approval in EU can be characterised as operational risk. Further, Kennedy 
(1988) define political risk as strategic, financial, or personnel loss for a firm because of such 
non-market factors
34
 as macroeconomic and social policies (fiscal, monetary, trade, investment, 
industrial, income, labour, and developmental), or events related to political instability 
(terrorism, riots, coups, civil war, and insurrection). Therefore, within this definition, social 
policy factors that firms are exposed to can increase the investment risks for agriculture 
biotechnology firms. More recent definitions have widened the concept of political risk by 
including all factors that influence the investment environment (Clark and Tunaru, 2003). Thus, 
political risk can be simply approached as the risk that arises from the activities of the 
government or its agents whose policies harmfully impact the interest of the stakeholders by 
reducing expected return on investment (Chen and Funke, 2008; Jarvis, 2008).  
 
Jarvis (2008) typologies political risk based on its practical application, level of analysis, the 
dominant risk drivers, actors, and the end users. Based on these factors he segregates political 
risk into International Business Risk Analysis, Public Sector Risk Analysis, Policy Risk 
Analysis, and International Risk Analysis. International Business Risk Analysis is one possibility 
for analysing the effect of country risk on the investments of foreign firms as a result of the 
decisions by a regulatory body. Hence, this subgroup of political risk is applicable for defining 
                                                          
 
34
Kennedy (1988) defined legal-governmental and extra-legal political risks as non-market factors. Legal-
governmental risks are produced by events within the legitimate authority structures of the state; extra-
legal risks are caused by events that are considered illegitimate by the existing political system. 
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the risk associated with the decision process for GMO approval in the EU. The political risk 
typology defined by Jarvis (2008) and its application to the GMO approval process in the EU is 
described in Figure 3.3.  
 
The Area The 
Application 
Level of 
Analysis 
Dominant Risk 
Drivers/Actors/Agents/Processes 
Major 
End Users 
International 
Business Risk 
Analysis  
Country risk 
analysis 
International Governmental body and agencies/ 
Regulatory and statutory bodies 
Foreign 
direct 
investors 
GMO approval process in EU  
International 
Economic 
Risk Analysis 
Specific risk 
analysis of 
the decision 
process in 
approving 
GMOs in the 
EU 
International 
trade 
EFSA, MS, EC, Examination 
Committees, AC, Consumers 
organizations, and NGOs 
GMO 
Investing 
firms 
Figure 3. 3: Political Risk Typology Defined by Jarvis (2008) and its Application to the GMO 
Approval Process in the EU 
Source: Adopted from Jarvis (2008) with modifications by the author regarding the GMO approval 
process in the EU  
 
Being consistent with the definitions for political risk described above, the approval process for 
GMOs in the EU as described in section 3.3 can be defined as political risk driven by the 
regulatory bodies and lobbying groups involved in the decision process of approving GMOs in 
the EU. More specifically the time delays in the approval process of GM products in the EU and 
the presence of non-scientific political factors in the decision process by EC, the Examination 
Committees, and the AC can cause uncertainty and increase risk in the EU for agriculture 
biotechnology firms that want to invest in developing new GMOs by reducing the rate of return 
expected by investors.  
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3.5 Model Framework   
Modeling political regulatory risk will focus on a specific environment, considering the risk 
generating events that are characteristic for the regulatory decision process in approving GMOs 
in the EU and, thus, causing uncertainty for the firm investing in biotechnology. Two risk 
generating events will be examined, the scientific risk assessment process and the legislative 
approval process. The jurisdiction of the scientific risk assessment is handled by the EFSA (Viju 
et al., 2011) as outlined in Figure 3.2. Each GMO event is handled on a case by case basis by a 
21 independent member GMO Panel. The members have extensive knowledge and experience in 
the GMO area (EFSA, 2013a).  
 
Tests related to the GMO approval process have fixed protocols that are agreed upon by 
international risk assessment bodies. GMO studies included in the application regarding the risk 
assessment must comply with the  OECD principles of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) where 
applicable and be accompanied by a formal statement of Quality Assurance (EFSA, 2013b).  The 
data supplied is often prepared by an independent private (contracted) laboratory on behalf of the 
applicant who operates according to international laboratory standards such as GLP, Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP), and International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) (EFSA, 
2013b). To date, the application for approval of a GMO event have, in general, complied with 
high scientific standards, however in 95 % of the cases the GMO Panel has asked the applicant to 
supply more information in order to be able to carry out a full risk assessment (EFSA, 2013b). 
The fact that the majority of applications fulfill the scientific standards of the EFSA creates a 
lower probability that an investment would be affected by the EFSA assessment, and thus alter 
the investment decision of the firm. However, the high probability of extra information being 
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required by the EFSA increases the time element of the risk assessment process. The time 
element for a GMO event risk assessment can range from 4 to 24 months. This time range can 
create uncertainty that may negatively impact an investor’s investment costs.  
 
The legislative approval process, as discussed in Section 3.3 and Figure 3.2, covers the GMO 
authorisation process, but excludes the EFSA risk assessment. The EFSA must conclude that 
science-based risks are sufficiently low for the application to progress. The legislative approval 
process includes the uncertainty created by the existence of political precaution in the decision 
process of the EC, the Examination Committees, the AC, and the MS. More specifically, the firm 
undergoing the rigorous approval process is influenced by political factors beyond the control of 
the firm and contrary to the scientific evidence. Overall, the average length of time for GM 
import authorisation is 45 months, however based on past evidence this average can vary from 
25 months to 75 months (Europa Bio, 2011). Measured over years the average approval process 
period has increased, and this extreme variation in process time reveals the lack of predictability 
of the approval process (Europa Bio, 2011). 
 
The traditional neoclassical method of incorporating political risk into the investment decisions 
of an exporting firm was to estimate a risk premium, cash flow, or discount rate adjustment 
factor that is then incorporated into the traditional Net Present Value (NPV)
35
 equation (Clark 
and Tunaru, 2003). With this approach the variables are fixed constant values and future cash 
flows are discounted to the level that represents the riskiness of the project being modeled (Choi, 
                                                          
 
35
 The NPV rule is to invest when the discounted present value of the investment return is at least as large 
as the investment cost.   
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2011). However, this approach does not consider the three important characteristics of 
investment decisions: 1) irreversibility, the initial investment costs are partially or fully sunk; 2) 
the uncertainty about future payoffs from the investment; and 3) the timing of the investment, 
when you postpone your investment to get more information about the future (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). Also, the NPV method does not consider the multivariate stochastic nature of political 
risk, thus resulting in determination of the adjustment factors on ad hoc basis (Clark and Tunaru, 
2003). The alternative approach which can capture the characteristics mentioned above is the 
Real Options model. The Real Options model can capture the uncertainty
36
 from the regulatory 
framework, the future development of the market, and the irreversibility of the investment 
decision by the biotechnology firms. Adner and Levinthal (2004) depict graphically the 
boundaries between the application of the Real Options and NPV models in Figure 3.4. Hence, if 
the investment project has a high level of sunk cost and is highly connected to the uncertainty 
factor, then the Real Option model should be applied.  In contrast, if the investment has a low 
level of sunk cost and uncertainty, then the NPV model is the more applicable approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
36
 In this essay the terms risk and uncertainty are used interchangeably as in Levy and Sarnat (1984). 
                                  Uncertainty 
                                          Low                                       High 
   
                                Low 
 
 
                  Irreversibility 
 
 
                               High 
 
NPV 
Real Options 
Figure 3. 4: Boundaries of Applicability for Net Present Value and Real 
Option Model 
Source: Adner and Levinthal (2004) 
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To combine multiple sources of uncertainty by the risk assessment and legislative approval 
process, the investment decision is modeled as the investor holding an option to make an 
irreversible investment in the project. 
 
3.5.1 Real Options 
The development of real options theory is founded in the financial theory of rational option 
pricing developed by Black and Scholes (1972 and 1973). Thus, the most widely and acceptable 
definition for financial option is that it gives the holder the right, not the obligation, to buy (call 
option) or sell (put option) an asset at a given price (also called a strike price or an exercise 
price) within a specific time period. The last day that the option can be exercised is called the 
“expiration date” or “maturity date” (Black and Scholes, 1973). For example, the call option 
gives right to the holder to buy an asset at a strike price at any time prior to the expiration date 
and for that right the buyer pays a fee. At the expiration date if the market price of the assets is 
greater than the strike price the buyer will exercise the option. Hence, the option is valuable 
because the holder buys the asset for lower price than the market price, and the difference 
between the two prices is the gross profit of the investment (Cox and Rubinstein, 1985). Other 
options include an “American option” and “European option”. The holder of an “American 
option” can exercise the option at any time up till the “maturity date”, and the holder of a 
“European option” has to exercise the option at the “maturity date”. 
 
Option pricing theory found rapid and wide application in finance theory. Starting with Cox et al. 
(1979) the use of option pricing theory penetrated in other fields of investment economics using 
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real assets as investment rather than using financial assets (stocks and bonds). Subsequent to this, 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) developed real options into a more sophisticated real model that 
included uncertainty. Therefore, a firm that wants to invest holds an option and has the right, but 
not the obligation to buy or sell an asset at some future time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Thus 
when a firm makes an irreversible investment it gives up the possibility of waiting for new 
information that might affect the timing of the expenditure (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The lost 
option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the cost of the investment 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  The analogy behind the connection between a call option and a real 
option is the irreversible investment opportunity, which is like a financial call option where the 
manager can spend (though not obliged) the investment costs to obtain a production asset and the 
investment opportunity is only available for time interval (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
 
Luehrman (1998) indicated six comparable variables between financial and real options (see 
Figure 3.5).   The financial asset is represented by stock, currencies, debt insurance, futures 
contract and other financial assets, and their price (values) is defined through capital market 
trade.  The real asset value is defined as the present value of the expected cash flow without 
considering management flexibility, and this value is determined as a proxy to another asset that 
can be observed on the market. 
 
Exercise price or strike price of the financial option represents the cost that the buyer has to pay 
for having the right to buy a security prior to the expiration date. In real options it represents the 
cost for implementing the investment or the revenue received for abandoning the option.  The 
expiration time in the financial option is the date at which the stock or the security expires, and 
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with the real option it is the maximum time that the investment can be postponed without losing 
the option.  
 
The risk free interest rate in financial and real options is the government interest rate that 
represents no default risk. The standard deviation represents the volatility in the values of the 
financial asset and in real options it is the uncertainties of the investment asset that can come 
from external or internal sources. The dividend represents the payment made by the firm to its 
shareholders as a result of owning the financial asset, whereas in a real option it is the lost 
project value throughout the life of the option.  
 
Financial Option Value  Real Option Value 
Financial asset price (ex. stock price) S Real asset value (ex. present value of a project) 
Exercise price X Investment costs 
Time to expiration  t The time frame the investment might be postponed  
Risk free interest rate r Risk free interest rate 
Volatility of the financial asset value σ2 Uncertainty of the investment asset   
Dividend  δ Value lost to preserve the option 
Figure 3. 5: Comparable Variables between Financial Options and Real Options 
Source: Luehrman (1998) 
 
An increase of the present value of the project, the risk free interest rate and the uncertainty of 
the investment asset increase the value of the real option. However, an increase in the investment 
cost and the lost value to preserve the option decrease the value of the real option. The extension 
of time for postponing the investment also has a positive impact on the value of the real option 
since it gives the investor more time to acquire additional information on the uncertainty of the 
investment.  
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The uncertainty that arises from the market and the application of real options theory gives a 
manager the flexibility to adapt to the new condition and react accordingly. Thus, according to 
Trigeorgis (1993) the investment opportunity gives the manager flexibility with the option to 
defer, abandon, contract, expand, or switch. The option to defer the investment indicates that 
management has the choice to wait (keeping the same status opened or closed) for x number of 
years to see if the output prices will justify the building of a production asset (V) such as a plant 
for example. The option to abandon gives the manager the choice to abandon the project 
permanently in exchange for the salvage value, in a case where the market condition declines 
severely and the performance of the project is worse than expected. The option to contract allows 
the manager the option to reduce operations and mitigate losses as a result of less favourable 
conditions than expected. On the contrary, the manager has the option to expand if the market 
conditions are more favourable than expected and thus increase operations. Lastly, the option to 
switch allows managers to alter the mix of outputs or inputs, which affects product and process 
flexibility respectively, in response to changes in market prices.    
 
3.5.2 Modeling Political Regulatory Risk 
Modeling of the regulatory environment for GMO approval in the EU will be based on the work 
of Clark (1997) and Clark and Tunaru (2003), whose models allow for exposure to investment 
loss in political environments. Thus, the exposure to investment loss in the regulatory 
environment when seeking GMO event approval will be equal to RI(t), where R is an index of 
ongoing regulatory climate that evolves over time as the application goes through the decision 
 116 
 
process, and I(t) is the  dollar value of the investment that also evolves through time according to 
geometric Brownian motion
37
.    
 
Figure 3.6 describes the regulatory environment (R) in the EU GMO approval process. There are 
two decisions that can influence the uncertainty of R, the scientific risk assessment process 
probability (DS) and the legislative approval process probability (DL), thus, R = λDS + μDL, 
where λ is the percentage of loss caused by the scientific risk assessment decision and μ is the 
percentage of loss caused by the legislative approval process. The scientific risk assessment 
decision can cause loss for the firm in two ways, the negative risk assessment by EFSA (λ1) and 
the time delays as a result of additional information required from the firm by the EFSA (λ2), 
thus,  λ = λ1 + λ2. The legislative approval process can also cause losses for the firm in two ways, 
a negative decision by the EC, AC Examination Committees, and the MS institutions (μ1), and 
the time extension due to a no-opinion result by the same institutions (μ2), thus, μ = μ1 + μ2. For 
example, if the EFSA brings a positive opinion, but the loss of the time extension is 20%, then λ 
= 0.2, and if the legislative institutions have a positive opinion for the GMO event, but the loss of 
extension is 30%, then μ=0.3. Therefore, if the probability of the scientific risk assessment 
process, (DS), to influence the regulatory environment is 30% and the probability of legislative 
approval process, (DL), to influence the  regulatory environment is 70%, then the value of R will 
be: R = 0.2*0.3 + 0.3*0.7 = 27%, which signifies the potential investment loss. Hence the 
percentage and probability values μ, λ, DS, and DL can change from 20-30 in the above example 
                                                          
 
37
 Brownian motion, also known as Wiener process, is a continuous-time stochastic process that has three 
properties: 1) it is a Markov process, indicating that the probability distribution for all future values of the 
process depends only on its current value; 2) it has independent increments, indicating that the change in 
the probability distribution in any time interval is independent of any other time interval; and 3) the 
changes are normally distributed over any finite time interval (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p63). 
 117 
 
to 40-50, which will also influence the value of R. Therefore, the stochastic values of R and I 
will be modeled as Geometric Brownian motion with drift, as shown in equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
below.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dR(t) = αRR(t)dt + σRR(t)dZR(t)                                                                                             (3.1) 
 
dI(t) =  αII(t)dt + σII(t)dZI(t)                                                                                                  (3.2) 
 
The drift parameters αR and αI represent the rate of growth for R and I respectively, σR and σI 
represent the variance in the drift parameters, and dZR and dZI are standard Wiener processes 
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of dt. The existence of correlation between R and I 
is reflected in dZR(t)dZI(t) = ρRIdt, where ρRI is the instantaneous correlation between R and I, 
 
Ongoing regulatory environment(R) 
Scientific risk assessment 
process (λDS) 
Legislative approval process 
(μDL)  
Scientific assessment 
by EFSA (λ2) 
Time to do the 
assessment (λ1) 
Decision process 
of EC, AC, and 
MS (μ2) 
Time to make 
the decision (μ1) 
Figure 3. 6: Factors Influencing the Ongoing Regulatory Environment 
Source: Authors application 
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where a negative correlation implies that as the index of the regulatory environment increases the 
dollar value of the investment decreases, -1 ≤ ρRI ≤ 0.  
 
Let x(t) = R(t)I(t) be a stochastic variable and be the investment dollar value that is exposed to 
the regulatory environment, knowing that: 
 
𝜕2𝑥
𝜕𝑅2
=
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝐼2
= 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕2𝑥
𝜕𝑅𝜕𝐼
= 1                                                                                                      (3.3)     
 
 Using Ito’s Lemma38 and the stochastic processes of R and I in equation (3.1) and (3.2), we 
have: 
 
dx(t) = R(t)dI(t) + I(t)dR(t) + dR(t)dI(t)                                                                            (3.4) 
 
Substituting equation (3.1) and (3.2) for dR(t) and dI(t) respectively and reorganizing equation 
(3.4), we develop:  
 
dx(t) = (αR + αI + ρσRσI)x(t)dt + √𝜎𝑅 
2 + 𝜎𝐼
2 + 2𝜎𝑅𝜎𝐼𝜌𝑅𝐼  𝑥(𝑡)𝑑𝑧(𝑡)                                  (3.5) 
 
Where,  𝑑𝑧(𝑡) =  
𝜎𝑅𝑑𝑧𝑅+𝜎𝐼𝑑𝑧𝐼
√𝜎𝑅
2+𝜎𝐼
2+2𝜌𝑅𝐼𝜎𝑅𝜎𝐼
                                                              (3.6) 
 
                                                          
 
38
 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) pp. 79.  
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Let, 𝐴 = (𝛼𝑅 + 𝛼𝐼 + 𝜌𝜎𝑅𝜎𝐼), and 𝜎𝑥 = √𝜎𝑅
2 + 𝜎𝐼
2 + 2𝜎𝑅𝜎𝐼𝜌                                                  (3.7) 
 
Substituting equation (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.5), we receive:  
 
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt + σxx(t)dzx(t)                                                                                                 (3.8) 
                                           
In equation (3.8) A is the drift parameter of the dollar amount exposed to regulatory risk, and it is 
dependent on αR, αI, and the volatility of R (t) and I (t) and the correlation between them, where 
the Wiener process dzx(t) has a mean of zero and variance of dt. The intuition behind equation 
(3.8) is that the dollar amount exposed to regulatory risk of the EU GMO decision approval 
process is expected to change with size of A, and the volatility of x multiply with the ongoing 
stochastic change of the Wiener process.  
 
To solve the investment problem we need to make the growth rate (drift parameter A) into a risk 
neutral rate β. As suggested by Clark and Tunaru (2003) this can be performed through the 
Girsanov
39
 theorem.  In an environment where risk is present, the application of the contingent 
claims approach allows the growth rate to be equal to the differences between total expected rate 
of return π (compensation the investor obtains for taking risk) and the convenience yield δ (as 
described by Pindyck (2001), which is the opportunity cost of delaying construction of the 
                                                          
 
39
 Girsanov theorem is used in financial mathematics to convert probabilities that the underlying 
derivatives (indexes, cash-flows, etc.) will take into a risk neutral measure. The intuition behind Girsanov 
theorem is that if we have a random process x generated by Brownian motion with α drift then we can 
find an equal random process y that will have a drift value of 0, therefore indicating that the expectation 
of the future value of the process is the same as the current.      
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project and instead keeping the option to invest alive), thus α = π – δ. Therefore, the risk neutral 
growth rate can be represented as the difference between riskless rate r, that can be observed, and 
the convenience yield δ, where β = r – δ. Applying the risk neutral rate to equation (3.8) 
becomes:  
 
dx(t) = βx(t)dt + σxx(t)dz
*
(t)                                                                                                       (3.9) 
 
3.5.3 Incorporating Regulatory Risk into the Real Option Model 
3.5.3.1 Solving the Investment Problem  
The solution to the investment problem will be determined by the critical value of x
*
, the 
investment dollar value that is exposed to the regulatory environment when the option to invest 
will be exercised. To solve the investment problem a calculation of the value of the investment 
project and the option to invest is required.  
 
The volatility of the investment project is estimated as a function of the investment dollar 
exposed to the regulatory environment V = V(x,t). Thus, the project value depends on the benefit 
from x discounted at π, the risk adjusted rate of return, and the annual growth of x at rate β. Thus 
the present value of the project release at time T is given by: 
 
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐸 [∫ 𝑥(𝑡)𝑒−𝜋𝑇𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
],                                                                                                 (3.10) 
 
Considering that x follows geometric Brownian motion, the project V also evolves through time 
stochastically according to the following geometric Brownian motion: 
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dV(x) = β(V(x), t)dt + σx (V(x), t)dzv(t)                                                                              (3.11) 
 
As the value of the project is a constant multiplier of the dollar exposed to the regulatory 
environment x, β is the constant drift rate and σx is the constant variance parameter for both 
variables x and V.  
 
Integrated over the interval (t,T),  V( x,t) at the point of release is given by:  
 
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑡) =
𝑥𝑇
𝜋−𝛽
 =
𝑥𝑇
𝛿𝑥
                                                                                                                  (3.12) 
 
The difference between π and β represents the convenience yield δ or the opportunity cost of 
delaying the investment and keeping the option to invest alive. In this case where V is a constant 
multiplier of x, the risk-adjusted discounted rate of return π is also the market risk-adjusted 
expected rate of return on x. By using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) formula 
𝜋 =  𝑟 +  𝜙𝜎𝜌𝑥𝑚, where r is the riskless rate, ϕ is the market price of risk and ρxm is the 
correlation coefficient between the asset that tracks x and the whole market portfolio.    
 
Before the project is set up the firm possess a portfolio (asset) for which it holds an option to 
invest and the investment opportunity value is F(Vx). However, Vx is a constant multiplier of x 
and it has the same drift and diffusion parameter as x, and thus the value of the option for the 
holder of the asset is dependent on x, and can be written as F(x(t)) instead of F(Vx). Solving the 
option value can be defined as an optimization investment problem where the decision rule 
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considers the option to defer the investment, and the owner of the option decides whether to 
invest or wait if regulation risks changes. The analytical derivation of the option employs the 
contingent claims approach to real option valuation
40
.   
 
To find F(x(t)) the return on the portfolio should be considered, where the opportunity to invest 
is worth F(x(t)) and n units of the asset are sold short with price x. Thus, the value of the 
portfolio is:  
 
Q=F(x)- nx                                                                                                                               (3.13) 
 
The composition of the portfolio is continuously changing because as x changes, n will change 
from one short time interval to the next. However, for each short interval dt, n is kept fixed. 
 
A rational investor will not enter into long run investment in this project without a dividend 
payment, thus the short position of this portfolio requires a payment of δnx dollars per time 
period to the holder of the long position. δ is the opportunity cost (dividend payment) of delaying 
the investment and keeping the option to invest alive. Considering the opportunity cost of 
delaying the investment the total return on the portfolio value is: 
 
Q = F(x) - nx - δxnx                                                                                                                 (3.14) 
                                                          
 
40
 According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) real options theory valuates investment opportunities in two 
ways, as either contingent claims or a dynamic programming approach. This research focuses on the 
contingent claims approach where the discounted rate is determined endogenously as a consequence of 
the capital markets equilibrium. 
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The instantaneous change in the value of the portfolio will be: 
 
dQ = dF(x) - ndx – nδxxdt                                                                                                      (3.15) 
 
By Applying Ito’s Lemma in equation (3.15) to obtain the expression for dF:  
 
dF(x)= Fxdx + 
1
2
 Fxx(dx)2                                                                                                        (3.16) 
 
Where: 
 
dx= xdt + σxxdzx , and dx2= 𝜎𝑥
2x2dt                                                                                      (3.17) 
 
To have a riskless portfolio substitution n=Fx in equation (3.15), and for dx
2
= 𝜎𝑥
2x
2
dt in equation 
(3.16) the return on the portfolio value is: 
 
dQ= Fxdx + 
1
2
 Fxx𝜎𝑥
2x2dt – Fxdx- Fxδxxdt                                                                                 (3.18) 
 
Rearranging:  
 
dQ= 
1
2
 Fxx𝜎𝑥
2x2dt  – Fxδxxdt                                                                                                      (3.19) 
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In the time interval (t, t+dt) the capital gain for the portfolio holding is:
 1
2
 Fxx𝜎𝑥
2x
2
dt and the 
capital cost is: Fxδxxdt. The return of the portfolio in equation (3.19) should be equated with the 
risk free return where: 
 
rQdt= r(F(x)- Fxx)dt                                                                                                               (3.20) 
 
Applying equation (3.19), (3.20) becomes: 
 
 
1
2
 Fxx𝜎𝑥
2x2dt – Fxδxxdt = r(F(x)- Fxx)dt                                                                                  (3.21) 
 
Dividing by dt and rearranging the equation (3.21) gives the differential equation: 
 
1
2
 Fxx𝜎𝑥
2x2 + Fxx(r-δx)-rF=0,                                                                                                    (3.22) 
 
Equation (3.22) is a homogeneous and second order differential equation linear in the dependent 
variable F and its derivatives. By substituting Ax
θ 
in equation (3.22) with θ representing the root 
of the quadratic equation we get equation (3.23):  
 
1
2
𝜎2𝜃(𝜃 − 1) + (𝑟 − 𝛿𝑥)𝜃 − 𝑟 = 0                                                                                         (3.23) 
  
With the two roots being:  
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𝜃1 =
1
2
−
(𝑟−𝛿𝑥)
𝜎𝑥
2 +√[
(𝑟−𝛿𝑥)
𝜎𝑥
2 −
1
2
]
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎𝑥
2       > 1,                                                                    (3.23.1)          
 
𝜃2 = 
1
2
−
(𝑟−𝛿𝑥)
𝜎𝑥
2 −√[
(𝑟−𝛿𝑥)
𝜎𝑥
2 −
1
2
]
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎𝑥
2     < 0                                                                      (3.23.2) 
 
Thus, the general solution of the differential equation (3.22) is a combination of any two linear 
independent solutions presented in equation (3.24): 
 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐴1𝑥
𝜃1 + 𝐴2𝑥
𝜃2                                                                                                          (3.24) 
 
The solution of equation (3.24) is valid for a range of values in x, from zero to an investment 
threshold x
*
, for which it is optimal to hold the option. The unknown x
*
 and the constants A1 and 
A2 need three conditions in order to be determined as part of the solution. Thus F(x) must satisfy 
the following three boundary conditions for a solution of equation (3.22): 
 
𝐹(0, 𝑡) = 0                                                                                                                               (3.25) 
 
𝐹(𝑥∗) = 𝑉(𝑥∗) − 𝐾                                                                                                                 (3.26) 
 
𝐹𝑥(𝑥
∗) = 𝑉𝑥(𝑥
∗)                                                                                                                       (3.27) 
 
The condition in (3.25) explains when the value of x is very small the option should be worthless 
at this extreme and thus the investment project will have a simple NPV solution. For F(x) to go 
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to zero as x goes to zero the coefficient A2 of the negative power of x should be set to zero 
(A2=0). 
 
For conditions (3.26) and (3.27) we consider the option F(x) at the threshold x
*
. Thus, condition 
(3.26) explains that at the threshold x
*
 it is optimal to exercise the option F(x) and thus acquire 
an asset of the project V(x) minus the initial investment cost K (sunk cost). This condition is 
known as the value-matching condition, where the value of the option must equal the net value 
obtained by exercising the option. Condition (3.27), known as the “smooth pasting” condition, 
sets the option value F(x
*
) at the optimal investment value of the dollar exposed to regulatory 
risk x*. Using the functional form for F(x) and V(x) conditions (3.26) and (3.27) can be written 
as: 
 
𝐴1(𝑥
∗)𝜃1 =
𝑥∗
𝛿𝑥
− 𝐾     and,                                                                                                       (3.26) 
 
𝜃1𝐴1(𝑥
∗)𝜃−1 =
1
𝛿𝑥
                                                                                                                    (3.27) 
 
Solving equation (3.23) with the boundary conditions yields the following solutions:  
 
𝑥∗ =
𝜃1
𝜃1−1
𝛿𝑥𝐾                                                                                                                          (3.28) 
 
𝐴1 =
𝑥∗−𝐾
(𝑥∗)𝜃1
=
(𝜃1−1)
𝜃1−1
(𝐾)𝜃1−1(𝛿𝑥𝜃1)𝜃1
                                                                                                    (3.29) 
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Using equation (3.12) the x
* 
threshold can be expressed in a value term threshold: 
 
𝑉∗ =
𝜃1
𝜃1−1
𝐾                                                                                                                              (3.30) 
     
3.5.3.2 Description of the Solution 
The solution from equations (3.24) to (3.30) gives the value of the project and the option in terms 
of the dollar exposed to the regulatory environment of the GMO approval process in the EU. The 
results provide the threshold critical values (x
*
, V
*
) at which it is optimal to invest, also known as 
the optimal investment rule. The value-matching condition in equation (3.26) indicates that when 
the firm decides to invest the calculation of the full value of the project V(x
*
) must include the 
irreversible sunk cost K and the opportunity cost F(x
*
). When V(x)<V(x
*
) we have F(x)>V(x)-K 
and thus the value of the project is less than its full costs (V(x)<F(x) +K). In this situation we say 
that the stochastic process of V(x) is less than the optimal value of the project V(x
*
) and the 
investor should wait and keep the option alive. The moment V(x) reaches the threshold value 
V(x
*
), the investor should exercise the option.  
 
The optimal conditions are presented in Figure 3.7. The strait line shows the present value of 
starting the investment immediately, V(x)-K, and the nonlinear line shows the option value F(x), 
both lines should meet tangentially at x
*
 and continue linearly into one line. In the area to the left 
of the optimal threshold x
*
 the option value is above the present value of starting the investment 
immediately (F(x)>V(x)-K), thus keeping the option alive and delaying the investment till more 
information arrives is more economical than immediate investment. To the right side of the 
threshold x
*
 the option value is equal to the value of immediate investment. Thus the optimal rule 
 128 
 
for investment will be if the value of the project exposed to the regulatory environment is as high 
as the critical value V(x
*
), then the option value should be exercised.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. 7: The Real Option Value to Invest as a Function of Dollar Exposed to Regulatory 
Environment X* 
Source: Authors application 
 
From equations (3.28) and (3.30) we can see that uncertainty creates a wedge between the 
critical values (x
*
, V
*
) and the irreversible sunk costs K. This wedge is with a factor magnitude of 
[θ1/θ1-1]δx and θ1/θ1-1 accordingly, also known as the hurdle rate (Dixit, 1994). From equation 
(3.23.1) we can determine the magnitude of the hurdle rate depending on the changes of 
parameters δx, σx and r. Thus, the optimal investment rule and the regulations implemented on 
GM approval can be observed based on the changes of parameters δx, σx and r.     
 
The model till this point has been derived assuming that irreversible cost are certain, however the 
regulatory environment also creates uncertainty on the sunk cost. The uncertainty arises from the 
 
X
* 
F(x) 
   Real option line 
V(x)-K 
Traditional net value  
F(x
*
), V(x
*
)-K 
F
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 V
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)-
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perspective that it takes a significant amount of time for the GMO event to be approved and the 
cost for the approval process is carried by the investing firm. According to Wesseler (2003) we 
can transform equation (3.28) to calculate the threshold for the acceptable level of sunk cost, and 
thus be able consider the uncertainty of the irreversible sunk cost:  
 
K∗ = x
θ1−1
δ𝑥θ1
                                                                                                                               (3.31) 
 
With the introduction of equation (3.31) we can analyse the maximum acceptable irreversible 
cost for the firm wanting to invest in the EU market considering the regulatory environment for 
GMO approval x. Figure 3.8 graphically presents the optimal solution for the investor, 
considering the irreversible cost being stochastic. Hence the optimal investment decision rule is 
to invest if the stochastic irreversible costs K are less than the critical threshold K
*
, and if K is 
greater than K
*
 postpone the decision.     
 
Figure 3. 8: The Real Option Value to Invest with Stochastic Irreversible Cost K* 
Source: Authors application 
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3.5.3.3 Properties of the Uncertainty in the Investment Solution 
The optimal values of the variables X
* 
and K
* 
depend on parameter values that include growth 
rate β, interest rate r, convenience yield δx and uncertainties σx, σI and σR. This optimization 
structure creates opportunities to analyze the effect regulations on GMO approval in the EU has 
on the firm’s investment decision. The impact of uncertainty on the investment can be analysed 
through comparative statics by looking at the impact of the variance parameters σx and σR on the 
critical investment thresholds x
*
 and K
*
. By calculating the partial derivatives of the investment 
threshold with respect to the uncertainty parameters σx and σR, we can assess the behaviour of a 
biotechnology investor in the EU.  
 
The effect on the investment when increasing the uncertainty of the regulatory environment of 
the GMO approval process can be derived through the partial derivatives of  
𝜕𝑋∗
𝜕𝜎𝑥
  and  
𝜕𝐾∗
𝜕𝜎𝑥
 . 
 
𝜕𝑋∗
𝜕𝜎𝑥
= 𝛿𝐾
𝜕(
𝜃1
𝜃1−1
)
𝜕𝜎𝑥
= 𝛿𝑥𝐾 (
1
𝜃1−1
−
𝜃1
(𝜃1−1)2
)
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜎𝑥
> 0                                                         (3.32) 
 
∂K∗
∂σx
=
𝑋
δ
∂(
θ1−1
𝜃1
)
𝜕𝜎𝑥
=
𝑋
𝛿𝑥
1
𝜃1
2
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜎𝑥
< 0                                                                                                (3.33) 
 
Equations (3.32) and (3.33) are explaining the changes in the threshold values of x
*
 and K
*
 with 
regard to the changes in uncertainty.  Thus, when a GMO event goes through the steps of the 
approval process and the approval is delayed or rejected as described in sections 3.3 and 3.4, the 
uncertainty of the investment increases. The increase in uncertainty, σx, places a higher future 
value, increasing the option value and moves the line upward in Figure 3.9. However, the 
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movement of the project value line in Figure 3.9 will depend on the relationship between the 
convenience yield δx and the variance σx. No matter the relationship between δx and σx, with 
increased uncertainty in the regulation environment the threshold x
*
 will increase and will move 
to the right in Figure 3.9. This indicates that future investment is more attractive and results in 
postponing the investment. Further on, if we look at the changes of the optimal critical sunk cost 
K
*
 while uncertainty σx is increasing, it can be concluded that the acceptable level of sunk cost 
that the investor is willing to put in place decreases as shown in Figure 3.10.  
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Figure 3. 9: The Real Option Value to Invest with Increased Uncertainty σx 
Source: Authors application 
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Evaluating the results with regard to the specific uncertainty of the regulatory step process can be 
done through the partial derivatives of the threshold values x
*
 and K
*
 with respect to the 
regulatory variance σR: 
 
∂x∗
∂σR
=
∂x∗
∂σx
∂σx
∂σR
= 𝛿𝑥𝐾 (
1
𝜃1−1
−
𝜃1
(𝜃1−1)2
)
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜎𝑥
𝜎𝑅+𝜎𝐼𝜌
𝜎𝑥
 ; (
𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝜎𝑅
|
𝜌=−1
←   ) > 0                                     (3.34) 
 
Equation (3.34) implies that the changes of the threshold x
*
 will depend on the correlation of the 
variance for the regulatory index σR and the dollar value of the investment σI. Thus, as the 
volatility of the regulatory index increases and the dollar value of the investment decreases, this 
will lead to a correlation value closer to ρ = -1. This will increase the threshold value x* which 
will move to the right in Figure 3.9. This situation again indicates postponing the investment 
 K
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K
)-
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Figure 3. 10: The Real Option Value to Invest with Stochastic Irreversible Cost K* and 
Increase in Uncertainty σx 
Source: Authors application 
 133 
 
until more certain information is known. The acceptable critical sunk cost K
*
 that the investor is 
willing to put in place will decrease as the negative correlation between σR and σI increases. As 
the uncertainty in each of the approval steps increases, the acceptable level of sunk cost the 
investor is willing to invest is reducing.              
 
3.5.3.4 Consequences of the Regulatory Uncertainty 
We are living in a world where technologies like planes, mobile phones, computers, web 
applications etc. are important factors of economic growth. Similarly, biotechnology is important 
factor in both economic growth and agriculture as it can increase global food production in an 
environmentally sustainable manner. Biotechnology can contribute to the food security in two 
ways; the first is through increasing agriculture productivity which in turn increases global food 
availability at affordable prices (Qaim and Virchow, 2000). The second is that the appropriate 
genetically modified crop can raise agricultural revenues which are the dominant source of 
income in many poor and rural parts of the world (Qaim and Virchow, 2000). However, this 
particular contribution of biotechnology should not be considered as solving world hunger and 
poverty. Many problems in developing countries are not solvable with only the introduction of 
biotechnology. 
 
Regulating technology is important in order for governments to provide human, animal and plant 
safety and health. However, inefficiencies in regulations where decision making is based on 
political factors and not scientific evidence complicate the accessibility of some countries to 
specific technology, and thus slows technology development. Such an example is EU regulation 
on biotechnology, where the social rational approach is used when granting GM event approval. 
 134 
 
With the EU approval process the EFSA completes the scientific opinion regarding the 
technology and the decision making for approval is performed by political institutions like EC, 
Examination Committee and the Appeals Committee. These institutions consist of 
representatives from the MS higher political level or Ministry, thus political factors are driving 
the decisions in the regulatory approval of GM events. In this research these political factors are 
part of the legislative approval process and the political decisions within the approval process 
slow the growth of the biotechnology industry and constrain the accessibility of this technology 
for developing and poor countries.  
 
The influence of the political factors on the regulatory decision approval process is explained in 
the model in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 of this essay. We will explore two conditions that result 
from political factors. The first being when the uncertainty is large as a result of the variation in 
the legislative approval process resulting from the presence of political factors in the decision 
process. Thus, the first condition describes the current situation the decision process for GM 
approval in the EU. The second condition is when uncertainty is low in the legislative approval 
process and thus is without the presence of political factors in the decision process. Table 3.1 
summarizes the parameter changes when the above two conditions are considered along with the 
investment decision of the exporting firm.  
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Table 3. 1: Summary of the parameters when the decision process involves/does not involve 
political factors 
 DL DS R/ σR/αR/σx I ρRI Investment 
decision 
With uncertainty of the 
legislative approval  
Large Small Large Small -1 Increasing F(x) 
Increasing x
* 
Decreasing K
* 
Without uncertainty of the 
legislative approval  
Zero Small Small Large 0 Decreasing F(x) 
Decreasing x
* 
Increasing K
* 
Source: Authors application 
  
In the first situation where political factors are present in the decision process and the drivers of 
the decision regarding whether the GM event will be approved include the EC, Examination 
Committee and the Appeals Committee, the result is a high probability value for the legislative 
approval process (DL). The higher probability increases the value of the regulatory index (R) and 
the uncertainty of the regulatory environment and the investment (σR, σx). This leads to a 
decreased dollar value of the investment (I) indicating a correlation value close to ρRI = -1. As the 
uncertainty in the legislative approval process increases so does the value of the option to 
increase F(x), causing the critical threshold x
*
 to move to the right in Figure 3.9 and K
*
 to the left 
in Figure 3.10. Therefore, it is more profitable to postpone the investment and invest in the future 
when more information will be available. The decision to postpone the investment, in turn, 
reduces the acceptable level of sunk costs K
*
. Thus, given the EU approval process the threshold 
values of x
*
 is too far to the right and the value of K
*
 too far to the left in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 
respectively. This reduces the investors willing to invest at the current time and given the high 
level of uncertainty their acceptable level of sunk cost is low.  
 
 136 
 
In the field of biotechnology as new varieties are developed they have a finite time before they 
are replaced with newer varieties (Smyth et al., 2014). The variety type has largest economic 
impact when the adoption rate reaches its peak (Smyth et al., 2014). Therefore, if this phase of 
crop development does not happen as a result of the delayed regulatory approval process then the 
cost of the variety will be higher than the benefit for the exporter. Thus, the high uncertainty and 
value of x
*
 will result in investment always being postponed and eventually not occurring since 
there will be no economic importance for the particular variety. Over time this situation will lead 
to a slowdown in technology development.   
 
In the second situation the parameters and the investment decision of the exporter are opposite to 
the first situation. This is a theoretical situation where the uncertainty of the legislative approval 
process is eliminated, thus DL =0 and there is only a small level of scientific uncertainty DS. In 
this situation the option value for future investment decreases and thus it is more profitable to 
invest earlier as shown in the model where the critical value of x
* 
is smaller and K
*
 is larger. In 
both situations there is a small level of uncertainty arising from the scientific evaluation of the 
GM product, however, this is considered a necessary step in the regulation decision to provide 
human, animal and plant safety and health. 
                     
3.6 Summary and Conclusion  
In this essay a theoretical real options model was developed that considers the political risk of 
the stringent post moratorium regulations regarding GMO approval in the EU that is imposed on 
the investing biotechnological firm. More specifically it analysed the decision approval process 
of a GMO event in the EU, their inconsistency with the multilateral trade agreement and how 
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that regulation structure can be defined as political risk that can influence the investment 
decisions of firms that want to bring GM products to the EU market. The regulation (political) 
risk is captured as uncertainty that can influence the optimal decision of the investment firm.  
 
The real options model was utilized because of its capabilities to capture the uncertainty created 
by the regulatory environment while considering the irreversible sunk cost of the investing firm. 
Thus, the model solution is given by a critical cash flow threshold influenced by regulatory 
environment x
* 
and a maximum acceptable level of irreversible sunk cost by the investor K
*
. This 
optimal solution can vary with the changes of regulation uncertainty, and thus influence the 
decision of an investor whether to invest immediately or wait for future times when additional 
regulation information is available. Through differentiating the critical values with respect to the 
regulation uncertainty parameter σx and more specifically with the uncertainty of each step of the 
EU decision process σR, we can explain the behaviour of the investor regarding decision process 
risk of the EU GMO approval process.  
 
Figure 3.11 summarizes changes in the optimal solution as we increase specific regulation 
uncertainties created by the EU GMO approval process. As we increase the uncertainty in the 
regulation environment the changes in the threshold value x
*
 increases while the threshold value 
of K
*
 decreases. These uncertainties place a higher value on the opportunity cost and thus 
increase the opportunity value. The increase in opportunity value makes the investment more 
attractive in the future, and postpones the decision of the investor to invest until a future time 
when the regulatory environment will improve.     
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Regulation 
uncertainty 
Partial 
derivative  
Optimal 
solution (X
*
) 
Opportunity 
value F(x
*
) 
Value of the 
project V(x
*
)-
K 
Maximum 
allowable 
irreversible cost 
(K
*
) 
σx 
𝜕𝑋∗
𝜕𝜎𝑥
>0     
σR 
𝜕𝑋∗
𝜕𝜎𝑅
>0     
Figure 3. 11: Summery of Changes in the Investment Decision as Uncertainty Changes 
Source: Authors application 
 
By taking a closer look at the specific steps in the approval process of a GMO event in the EU 
we can evaluate whether uncertainty comes from the scientific risk assessment process or the 
legislative approval process by increasing the volatility of the regulatory index σR. The increase 
of a specific uncertainty also increases the threshold value of x
*
 and the option value. With each 
step of the approval process gradually increasing the uncertainty, the threshold value x* is also 
gradually increasing which postpones the investment decision into the future. However, the 
postponement of the investment and the increasing uncertainty (σx and σR) causes the investor’s 
acceptable level of irreversible costs, K
*
, to decrease. This leads to a situation where over time 
the actual investment may not happen.  
 
The contribution of this research defines the regulatory GMO approval process in the EU as 
political risk and as such incorporates it into a theoretical real options model. The incorporation 
of the regulation decision process steps into the real options model is an addition to the literature. 
However, an empirical and policy analysis on the theoretical model would be beneficial and 
should be considered in future research.   
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CHAPTER 4 
An Appropriate Policy to Inhibit Smuggling to Preserve “Disease Free” Status 
under SPS Regulation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The management of diseases is an important topic in the trade of agricultural goods, especially 
when one considers the significant impact that international agricultural trade may play in the 
spread of diseases from one region of the world to another. Until the Uruguay Round, when a 
country experienced a localized disease outbreak the entire country was considered infected for 
the purposes of international trade. Thus, an importing country could embargo meat and/or live 
animals originating from an entire country where a disease had been found – even if the disease 
outbreak was localized and contained in a geographic sub-region.  The Uruguay Round, 
however, included the possibility of regionalization or zoning. Regionalization, or zoning, 
allows, in principle, for countries to differentiate disease-free areas from infected areas within a 
specific country or group of countries (Australia Department of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry, 2001). The concept of the regionalization means that if an outbreak occurs, but can be 
controlled and localized to a specific area within the country, then constraints on international 
trade need only apply to products originating from the infected area, thereby allowing the 
uninfected area of the country or countries in question to continue exporting (Loppacher et al., 
2006). Guaranteeing that the country can control and localize a disease outbreak may lead to 
significant economic and trade benefits. Thus, the concept of regionalization under the WTO is 
likely to be of growing importance in international agriculture markets.  
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Article 6 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS)
41
, describes regionalization and its 
application as defined within WTO regulations. 
 “SPS Agreement recognizes the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas. Such an 
“area” may be only part of a country, or all or parts of several countries, in which a 
specific pest or disease is not prevalent. The efficiency of control measures and 
epidemiological surveillance are important factors in defining such areas. The 
practical implication is that an importing Member should not deny access to goods 
from such areas even if the disease prevails elsewhere in the exporting country(ies). 
Similar to the provisions for equivalence, it is the exporting Member’s burden to 
prove the disease-free status that it claims for the region, and the exporting Member 
is obligated to grant access to the importing Member for investigation of the claim.” 
(WTO, 2006, pp.1) 
 
When the WTO designed the compliance system for regionalization under the SPS Agreement, 
specific measures where established regarding recognition of a member country’s regionalization 
efforts. Under the SPS Agreement the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) are the organizations housing the technical 
expertise that member countries must work with to gain regionalization recognition. Once a 
member country has accessed assistance and subsequently gained approval
42
, then the decision to 
allow imports from a disease-free area belongs to the importing country. 
 
                                                          
 
41 On the 1st January 1995 the SPS Agreement was came into force as part of the new WTO. It includes 
human, animal and plant safety, and health regulations that a particularly country may put into place 
(Isaac, 2007).  The purpose of the SPS Agreement is to regulate the movement of products across 
international borders without the regulations being used as a disguised barrier to trade.  To accomplish its 
objectives, the SPS Agreement encourages countries to use international standards for human, animal and 
plant health, as well as the environment, that are consistent with the WTO regulations. Countries can 
create stricter domestic standards but only if there is scientific justification for doing so. 
42
 The process for gaining regionalization recognition is described in Terrestrial Animal Health Code of 
OIE (Chapters 4.3 and 4.4) and in the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures, ISPM No.29 of 
IPPC. However these are guidelines for technical recognition of the zone without the presence of 
administrative procedures and time frame for response.      
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The regionalization regulation under the SPS agreement provided an incentive for a number of 
countries to make significant investments in control measures designed by each country’s 
veterinary services. However, a number of countries experienced difficulties in obtaining 
recognition of their disease free regions due to administrative delays in importing countries. One 
of the main reasons for the failure of trade taking place under the regionalization provisions of 
the SPS is that the focus of the WTO, OIE, IPPC, and other regulatory agencies is in improving 
the technical guidelines for obtaining disease free status rather than ensuring that importing 
countries recognize and accept this status. While there is general agreement that these 
administrative guidelines should be created, there is significant disagreement between members 
as to where they should be created and their scope and detail (Loppacher et al., 2006)
43
. A 
question that should be considered within the regionalization question is why countries are not 
willing to accept an exporter’s claim that the sub-national region is free from disease, and as a 
result postpones (sometimes in perpetuity) acceptance by imposing administrative delays.  
 
Loppacher et al. (2006) suggest that administrative delays may stem from the belief that 
smuggling of agricultural goods from the disease outbreak area to other areas of a country cannot 
be prevented through regulatory constraints on the physical movements of animals in isolation. 
Therefore, the potential for disease transmission through exports remains a legitimate concern 
                                                          
 
43
 For example, Loppacher et al. (2006, pp.52) state: “that some countries wish to see extensive guidelines 
with timeframes stated for each step. Others are opposed to any set timeframes to be included as they feel 
it would take away much needed discretion. Some countries, the most active of which is Chile, suggest 
technical guidelines should be left to those that have the necessary expertise – the OIE and IPPC but that 
administrative guidelines should be created by the SPS Committee. Other countries that support this 
position include Peru, Argentina, China, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the 
European Union. Canada was the first Member to put forth the position that administrative rules should 
be created at the OIE and IPPC”. 
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for a potential importer. The potential for smugglings between infected and a disease free area is 
the significant problem. The use of mechanisms that physically control the movement of animals 
in and of themselves will not eliminate smuggling between regions and, hence, creates doubts 
that an exporting country can ensure a disease or pest free area remains so (Loppacher et al., 
2008). The existence of smuggling and the inefficiency of the control mechanism to deal with it 
can be supported by the following examples. The Argentinean National Foot-and-Mouth disease 
(FMD) control program controlled and eradicated the disease and Argentina received status 
recognition as an FMD-free country from the United States, Canada, and several other countries. 
This resulted in the ban on Argentina’s exports of fresh, chilled, and frozen beef being lifted in 
1997. However, the ban was reinstated in 2000 by the US as a result of smuggled animals 
infected with FMD crossing the Argentine border. Smuggling led to regulatory breakdowns in 
seven of the eleven outbreaks of FMD in Europe between 1991 and 1996 (Otte et al., 2004).  The 
illegal importation of livestock or livestock products was the underlying cause in these seven 
cases. Thus, in one FAO report, smuggling was described as one of the main reasons for the 
spread of disease – food and mouth disease (FMD) – internationally.  
   “The risk of FMD entry into free areas is low through legal trade of animal and 
animal products from zones or countries officially recognized as FMD-free by the 
OIE. However, there is evidence of high volumes of animal products entering free 
countries by various routes, some of which are likely to carry infection. In 2005-6 
most of the international spread of the disease has been attributed to movements of 
live animals but the risk of movement of meat products remains, and is highest. 
Smuggling of animal products is a significant issue and the probable main route of 
virus introduction into FMD-free areas [e.g. United Kingdom (2001)].” (FAO, 2007, 
pp. 9, 10) 
 
Extensive regulations regarding the control measures have been developed under the OIE. 
However, there is a lack of unified measures regarding the private incentives for farmers. Otte et 
al., 2004 state that all measures may fail with inadequate funding for private incentives for 
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farmers. Thus, the efficacy of the regionalization concept can be increased by finding an 
appropriate balance between the control measures and the private incentives faced by producers 
(or others that could acquire animals for purposes of smuggling) when attempting to control an 
outbreak. If individual producer incentives are not considered during regulation design, then the 
detrimental effect of an outbreak could be increased (Hoag et al., 2006). 
 
There has been a little research done on the reasons why the regionalization concept has failed in 
implementation, the reasons behind the reluctance of importing countries to accept disease free 
regions, and the reduction of incentives to smuggle between regions. Previously Loppacher et al. 
(2006) (2008) and Ferrier (2008) have undertaken research in this topic area. The analysis of 
Ferrier (2008) is focused on the price disparity arising as a result of a trade ban and its effect on 
the incentive for smuggling agriculture goods and wild animals. His analysis, however, centers 
on the smuggling among countries rather than on the regionalization issue.       
 
The objective for this essay is to shed light on how to improve the efficacy of the trade regime 
for sub-national export under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. Thus, 
assessing cases where countries have difficulty obtaining disease free status for the whole or part 
of its territory by the importing country is the first objective. This will be followed by the 
construction of a more detailed partial equilibrium analysis of regionalization accounting for the 
incentive to smuggle. Further, a more detailed policy analysis of the science-based disease 
control criteria associated with regionalization is explored through design of a policy regime that 
would remove the appeal of smuggling from the infected area to the non-infected area.  
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Based on the stated objective, the following two research questions are addressed: 1) Modeling 
regionalization accounting for the incentive to smuggle (producers’ incentive to smuggle and 
casual smuggling); and 2) designing a policy for eliminating the incentive to smuggle between 
regions as a result of a disease outbreak.    
 
4.2 Cases Where the Importing Countries have been Reluctant to Accept Disease Free 
Status 
Obtaining status as a disease free zone within the OIE requirement is costly process that depends 
on the financial ability of the exporting country to achieve as well as maintain that status. For 
example, just the global costs for administrating FMD vaccine every year are estimated to be 
US$2.35 billion (Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb, 2013). Thus, countries with large exports in 
certain agriculture goods must invest significant resources in constraining the disease in regions 
where an outbreak has started. Theoretically, countries recognize the economic and trade benefit 
the regionalization concept has to offer through obtaining disease free zone. However, the cases 
for some major exporting countries has revealed that gaining the approval from the importing 
countries takes a long time after the exporting country has gained OIE approval. This section of 
the essay presents some cases where the importing countries have been reluctant to accept the 
OIE evaluation of the disease status of the exporting country.     
 
Example 1(Argentina): Exports of beef products represent important revenue for Argentina as 
they represent 10 to 15 percent of the national beef production (Deblitz and Ostrowski, 2004). 
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During the early 1990s the countries of the Southern Cone44 experienced a major Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak, but towards the end of the 1990s they were able to eradicate the 
disease. In 1997 Argentina received the OIE status of FMD-free with vaccine and in 2000 their 
status switched to FMD-free without a vaccine
45
. However, an FMD outbreak occurred on 
August 2, 2000 at Clorinda, in the province of Formoso near the Argentinian-Paraguay border. 
Only four animals were infected and these animals had been illegally imported from a 
neighbouring country on July 22, 2000, a discovery that was made through routine 
epidemiological surveillance activities and procedures carried out in the border zones (OIE, 
2000). The next outbreak was found in a province over 500 km away from the initial outbreak. 
The disease continued to spread during 2000 with OIE suspending Argentina’s FMD free status 
till November 2000. However, the Argentinian government did not acknowledge the spread of 
the disease, resulting in FMD gaining momentum in May 2001 (Rich and Nelson, 2007).  
 
Argentina’s policy of controlling the movement of animals and stamping out the disease were 
unsuccessful. Hence, Argentina switched to a policy of regionalization and segregated its 
territory into five regions. Patagonia is among the regions and was declared to be FMD free 
without vaccination while the other four regions were required to vaccine. Even with this change 
in policy most of the high valued export markets including the EU, US, Canada, Japan and Korea 
remained closed for Argentinian beef from the Patagonia region during 2001.  Starting in 2003, 
Argentina was allowed to export precooked and individually frozen meals to the US market and 
                                                          
 
44
  Argentina, (southern) Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
45
Countries can be recognized by the OIE as FMD-free with vaccination and FMD-free without 
vaccination. Countries or zones within countries have the risk of FMD entering from a neighboring region 
or country and a protective vaccination program is applied but it is thought not to have been exposed to 
the virus. Vaccinated animals create a barrier to the further spread of the disease. 
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in 2015 it was announced that Argentina would be allowed to resume fresh beef exports to the 
US market. Rich and Nelson (2007) remarked that the rationale for the US decision for keeping 
its market closed to Argentine beef was based, in part, on Argentina not being forthcoming when 
the outbreak first took place. The Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman has stated that 
the ban was due to “poor handling of the foot-and-mouth disease by the government in 2001,” 
and that they have been disease-free since 2007 (Illinois Farmers Today, 2015). 
 
Even with its regionalization effort the disease re-emerged in Argentina in the summer of 2003 
with outbreaks occurring in a pig farm in the province of Salte near the borders of Bolivia and 
Paraguay. The OIE suspended the designation FMD-free for regions in Argentina north of the 
42
nd
 parallel. The regions south of this parallel were free from FMD without vaccination but 
some of the high value markets
46
 remained closed to exports of Argentinian fresh beef (Rich and 
Nelason, 2007).  
 
The US market closure for Argentinian beef ended in 2015 after Argentina filed a complaint on 
August 30, 2012. In the complaint, Argentina claimed that the United States had imposed an 
undue delay in the approval procedures on Argentina’s requests regarding import authorization 
for fresh beef and recognition for the Patagonia region as FMD-free. Argentina also argued that, 
with respect to products from Patagonia, the United States had not complied with its obligations 
to adapt its measures to accommodate pest or disease-free areas and to recognize the concept that 
such areas exist (WTO, 2015). A WTO disputes panel found that the United States measures 
applied to Patagonia were inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                                          
 
46
 Canada, Japan, Korea, and the United States. 
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The Patagonia region had been free from FMD since 1994 and was recognized by the OIE as 
FMD-free without vaccination in 2002 (USDA, 2014). However, the sequences of FMD 
outbreaks that happened between 2000 and 2007 in the other regions of Argentina led to the 
closure of the high valued US market to Argentinian product, including the Patagonia region. 
Argentina’s Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria (SENASA) requested the 
US recognize the Patagonia region as free from FMD and submitted information supporting the 
request to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS). Table 4.1 summarizes the timeline regarding the US recognising Patagonia as 
FMD free. From the table we can see that took 13 years for Argentina’s request that the 
Patagonia region be accepted as FMD-free to be approved by the importing country. The 
Patagonia region was accepted as FMD-free at the same time that all of Argentina was accepted 
as FMD-free by the US, even though Argentina in its entirety was recognised by the OIE as 
FMD-free without vaccination in 2007.      
 
Table 4. 1: Timeline for the Patagonia region to obtain FMD-free status by the US 
Time Action 
2002 SENASA submitted information to APHIS and USDA 
December 2003 APHIS evaluates the submitted information and visits Argentina 
2005 APHIS completed the Patagonia South risk analysis 
January 2007 APHIS published the risk analysis report in the Federal Register 
February 2009 APHIS revisited the region in order to update the 2005 risk analysis 
November 2013 Conducted another visit to further update the risk analysis 
August 2014 APHIS announced its intention to add Patagonia to a list of countries deemed 
free of FMD 
June 2015 USDA announced changes to the rules that would allow imports of fresh beef 
from Argentina 
Sources: USDA, 2014; Bridges Weekly, 2015 
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Example 2 (Brazil): Brazil, like other countries from Southern Cone, struggled with FMD 
outbreaks through much of the 20
th
 century. Since 1999, the Brazilian government has adopted 
the SPS regionalisation concept and the guidelines of the OIE. It divided its territory into five 
regions. The FMD outbreak in 2000 and 2001 across the Southern Cone countries also included 
Brazil, initially in the Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina regions. Prior to 2000, both regions 
were recognised by the OIE as FMD-free with vaccination and FMD-free without vaccination 
respectively. The 2000 and 2001 outbreaks were mitigated by switching export markets for beef 
from the high value markets to low value markets in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The 
additional increase in domestic production and higher exports to the low value markets helped 
limit the loss of the high value markets. Hence, the effect on the export markets was minimal as a 
result of diversity in its destination markets and increased quantities of exports. 
 
The last FMD outbreak in Brazil was first reported in September 2005 in the provinces Mato 
Grosso do Sul and subsequently one month later in Parana. This outbreak affected both the 
export quantities and prices of beef and pork. Several countries imposed a ban on imports of 
meat from Brazil; not just from the two infected regions but also neighboring regions. The 
exports from these provinces account for over 50% of Brazil’s total beef and pork exports (FAO, 
2006). The impact of the bans was greater for the Brazilian pork industry compared to the beef 
industry due to the larger export volume of pork going to Russia. Approximately 65% of pork 
exports were going to the Russian market (FAO, 2006). Thus when the import ban was 
implemented by Russia and 50 other countries to regions of Brazil that were free from FMD (i.e. 
Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul) the previous exports from these provinces was redirected 
to the domestic market. This resulted in domestic pork market prices dropping by 30% (FAO, 
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2006). The extension of the import ban to two provinces free from FMD resulted in a 30% drop 
in exports of beef (Costa et al., 2015). After 28 months, Russia lifted the import ban in December 
2007 (Costa et al., 2015).     
 
Example 3 (Canada and US): On May 20, 2003 the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) 
confirmed that a cull cow sent for slaughter in Peace River, Alberta in January 2003 was infected 
with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) (Forge and Frechette, 2005). In December of 
2003 a case of an infected cow with BSE was found in Washington State in the US.  These BSE 
cases led to the closure of major export markets for Canada and the US. Additionally, the import 
ban remained in place for specific Asian markets for 30 months for Canadian beef, even though 
Canada was registered as minimum-risk country for BSE under the OIE code.  
 
Prior to 2003 Canada and the US together represented 25% of world beef exports
47
. Thus the 
prolonged ban by the importing countries resulted in a reduced supply of beef in world markets 
and created a nearly 20 % rise in the Pacific market prices for beef (FAO, 2006). The extra 
supply of beef from Canadian and US had to be redirected to their domestic markets. The US is 
large beef exporter as well as a large beef importer, therefore the net result was little change in 
domestic prices as a result of the increased domestic beef supply. However, Canada exports 12 
percent of its live animals and nearly 50 percent of its total beef production, thus the import bans 
resulted in cattle prices dropping by approximately 50 percent as domestic beef supplies 
increased (FAO, 2006).   
 
                                                          
 
47
 10% comes from Canada (FAO, 2006) 
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Example 4 (Indonesia): Indonesia is considered an FMD-free country without vaccination under 
the OIE code. Indonesia is a large importer of beef and its policy states that beef imports have to 
come from countries free from FMD without vaccination and, hence, these policies result in high 
domestic beef prices. Domestic beef prices also face pressure from rising incomes and changing 
consumption preferences for meat (Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb, 2013). A lower beef price due 
to the presence of FMD in neighbouring India creates an incentive for larger quantities of meat to 
be smuggled into Indonesia from India (Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb, 2013).  
Summarising the cases presented above brings to light several important points. Importing 
countries prefer to place a ban on the entire exporting country when a disease outbreak occurs. 
Hence, even with the regionalisation concept available and put into practice by beef exporting 
countries, the ban is still placed on the whole country or in a best case scenario on only the 
infected regions and the neighboring disease free regions. For example, the import ban placed on 
Brazilian beef by Russia was imposed on the neighboring provinces of Mato Grosso do Sul and 
Parana. Thus, the final outcome is a larger share of exports being banned. The reason for this 
kind of action may be due to the fact that most of the cases where the disease has spread it came 
from a neighboring country or region through illegal channels. A summary of selected FMD 
outbreaks from Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb (2013) is presented in Table 4.2. The summary lists 
the country of the FMD outbreak along with certain details on the cause of the outbreak. In most 
cases, the cause of the FMD outbreak is due to illegal importation of diseased animals from a 
neighboring country.    
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Table 4. 2: Details surrounding the detection of FMD that occurred between 1992–2003 in 
countries and zones considered FMD-free by the OIE 
Country/Year Premises/Species  Details of the cause of an outbreak 
Italy 1993 Detected on a farm/ beef 
cattle 
Cattle entered Italy with forged import 
certificates 
Greece 1994 Cattle Illegal importation of infected live sheep from 
Turkey to Lesbos 
Taiwan 1997 Farrow-to-finish 
farm/Pigs 
Pigs or other animal products illegally imported 
by fishing boats 
S. Korea 2000 Dairy farm/ Dairy cattle Imported hay, international travelers, and 
windborne introduction by Asian (yellow) dust 
suggested 
Greece 2000 Free-grazing beef herd/ 
beef cattle 
Animals from Turkey crossing the Evros river 
Argentina 2000 Communally owned 
establishment/cattle 
Illegal importation of cattle 
Uruguay 2000 Field shared by 3 owners/ 
beef cattle 
Sow that consumed feed of animal origin 
France 2001 Cattle farm/ Dairy cattle Infected sheep 
imported from UK by neighbor 
Ireland 2001 Holding with cattle and 
sheep/sheep 
‘Strong circumstantial evidence’ of spread by 
indirect contact with index case in N. Ireland via 
neighboring farm 
Uruguay 2001 Farm with cattle 
and sheep/cattle 
Spread from Argentina 
Botswana 2002 Crush area with 
cattle/cattle 
Spread from Zimbabwe, probably by smuggling 
due to price differentials. 
Paraguay 2002 Cattle farm on border 
with Brazil/ Breeding 
cattle 
Unknown 
Source: Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb, 2013           
 
4.3 Modelling Regionalization Accounting for the Role of Incentives   
Loppacher et al. (2006) developed an economic model of why the agreed regionalization 
provisions are not being implemented along with ways that can improve the effectiveness of 
regulatory attempts at regionalization. The model looks at the occurrence of an outbreak and the 
effect it has on two regions within a single country. Thus, when regionalization is applied as a 
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result of an outbreak, exports will continue to originate from the uninfected region, whereas the 
infected region would be subject to an export ban.  
 
In the short run, the infected region suffers from not being able to export outside the region either 
internationally or to disease-free parts of its own country. The previously exported supply must 
be consumed within the infected region. Further, demand may decrease due to an adverse 
consumer reaction; the result is lower prices. The uninfected region is still able to export and 
receive the export price. The export ban on the infected region reduces world supply and, hence, 
increases the world price of the agriculture product in the non-infected market – both domestic 
and international. The price differential between an infected region and the uninfected regions 
may create incentives for smuggling. Ferrier (2008) has shown that as the price differences 
between the two regions increases, so does the incentive for smuggling agriculture goods.  
 
Research on smuggling agricultural goods has shown that increasing the risk for risk averse 
smugglers through penalties and higher probabilities of being caught as a result of government 
enforcement will significantly reduce smuggling (Pitt 1981; Martin and Panagariya 1983; Ferrier 
2008; Ferrier 2009). However, a significant reduction of smuggling is not enough to prevent the 
spread of a disease outbreak. Even a single smuggling incident from the infected region can 
cause the disease to spread in the uninfected region, thus endangering the exporting status of the 
entire country. Therefore, even the positioning of a control points to manage and limit livestock 
movements and deter smuggling will not be effective, as economic studies have shown that if 
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there exists an incentive to smuggle, then some smuggling will occur even with the presence of 
control points (Saba et al., 1995)
48
.  
 
The existence of an incentive for smuggling from the infected region can lead to an outbreak in 
the uninfected region. Thus, the end result is increased importer risk. Hence, the result is an 
export ban on the entire exporting country. Adding the topics of smuggling and incentive 
removal pertaining smuggling to the discussions between WTO members may be the best way to 
break the holdup that currently exists in regionalization negotiations which focus on non-
economic aspects such as restraints on the movement of animals (Loppacher et al., 2006).  
 
Additionally, Loppacher et al. (2006) discuss the design of incentive prices that should eliminate 
smuggling. They suggest that the equalization of the prices between the infected and the non-
infected area could be accomplished through a deficiency payment policy
49
. The producers in the 
infected area should be guaranteed the market price received in the non-infected area and be 
allowed the increase in production that is associated with that price. As such, producers in the 
infected area should be allowed to increase their output to the point where marginal cost equals 
price. Currently, the policy typically applied in a case of disease outbreak is compensation only 
for animal destruction/disposal costs (OECD, 2012). Hence, reducing and banning further 
production in the infected area is a normal process in managing a disease outbreak.  
                                                          
 
48
 The literature on the economics of smuggling is reviewed in section 3 below.  
49
 Loppacher et al. (2006) considers only commercial smuggling in the analysis and deficiency payment 
as a policy application only for commercial smuggling.  
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An important indicator that can reduce the price disparity between the regions is the size of the 
infected area. As the size of an infected area decreases there is less export disruption which 
reduces the price disparity in the infected areas. This will also reduce the budgetary cost for 
compensating producers in the infected area based on the daily market price in the non-infected 
area.  
 
The current management of diseases determines the size of the infected zone based on the 
possibility and opportunity to control the physical movement of the agriculture product. The 
criteria for establishing regions are mainly strategic geographical points, pre-existing 
administrative units, and sub-national political jurisdictions. Establishing the affected region 
using these criteria, as described by Loppacher et al. (2006), is not determined by science-based 
criteria, and can result in the size of infected area being larger than needed with the 
accompanying larger export disruption, and larger price disparity between the regions, ultimately 
increasing the incentive for smuggling. 
 
4.4 Literature Review for Smuggling                 
Among the first inclusion of smuggling within trade theory was in the paper by Bhagwati and 
Hansen (1973). They applied a Hicks-Samuelson theoretical model, and concluded that when a 
prohibitive tariff is in place, the non-smuggling situation is autarkic and that smuggling brings 
the benefits of trade. Thus, smuggling is necessarily superior to non-smuggling, even if 
smuggling is competitive or monopolistic; and whether it is subject to constant or increasing 
costs. However, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) do not incorporate the possibility of coexistence of 
smuggling with legal trade and price disparity between markets.  
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Later, Pitt (1981) included the coexistence of smuggling, legal trade, and price disparity and 
evaluates the coexistence of these three factors in a case where there is an export tariff or export 
quotas. Pitt (1981) used legal trade to evaluate smuggling activities and concluded that the 
greater the legal trade is, the easier it is to hide smuggling activities from enforcement agencies, 
and thus the less costly it will be to smuggle. Therefore viewing legal trade as an input into 
smuggling activities and maintaining a legal trade quota in a combination with corrupt 
enforcement leads to a smuggling boom as a result of the price differential between the domestic 
and world price. Pitt (1981) introduces smuggling as a constant function over time and assumed 
smuggling is a monotonically increasing function of the incentive to smuggle.  
 
Martin and Pangariya (1983) build a link between the models of Bhagwati and Hanson (1973) 
and Pitt (1981) by considering illegal trade through illegal entry points and illegal trade through 
legal entry points. Additionally, Martin and Pangariya (1983) model smuggling as an illegal act 
for which the consequences are unknown, ex-ante, by the traders. Thus, it incorporates the risk 
and uncertainty associated with smuggling, and the cost of smuggling to the firm is considered 
endogenous. In their model the probability of detection is a strictly increasing function that 
depends upon the ratio of illegal to legal trade. Lastly, Martin and Pangariya (1983) only 
considered transport at zero cost, which was later criticized by Norton (1987).  
 
Norton (1987) studied the smuggling of agriculture goods between two specific regions, the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. To benchmark his model with previous research, he 
decides that smuggling cannot influence the market price as a result of the quantity increase. In 
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his model, he uses “iceberg” transportation costs for the smuggled good with the explanation that 
live animals do lose weight with transport. Therefore, transportation cost will have a greater 
effect on the marginal smugglers who earn an insignificant rent compared to those located closer 
to the frontier who can earn large rents from smuggling.  
 
Norton (1987) also considers the impact that increasing taxes will have on prices between the 
two countries in his model. As taxes increase it will extend the distance from where the marginal 
smuggler can earn small rent even with higher transport costs. Based on previous indicators, he 
concludes that the smuggling of agriculture goods is an increasing cost industry. For example, in 
order for smuggling to increase, there has to be an increase in price disparity, considering that the 
transport cost of smuggling will increase with distance.  
 
Thus far the literature examined has only considered the case of professional smuggling across 
borders. However, in agriculture goods the possibility of casual unintended smuggling is also a 
possibility. Saba et al. (1995) measure the motivation for casual smuggling of cigarettes across 
state boundaries in the United States. They conclude that the primary reason for smuggling 
(referred as border-crossing), is the often significant divergence between locational prices caused 
by varying tax treatments across US states. Additionally, their research also found in the state of 
North Carolina that when the border crossing is controlled, there still exists a certain level of 
organised smuggling. The findings of Saba et al. (1995) indicate that casual smuggling cannot be 
eliminated to zero even with a border control program, rather the level of smuggling that exists 
will transform into a more organized form.  
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Heltberg (2001) looks at the incentive to engage in poaching. Poaching and smuggling share 
similar traits, mainly the desire to move a banned product to another location for profit. Heltberg 
(2001) looks at the effect of the ivory trade ban on the poaching incentive. He concludes that the 
ban increases the incentive to smuggle as well as the poacher’s risk premium. He indicates that 
even though the primary goal of trade bans is to save biodiversity, they are rarely fully enforced 
and, thus, illegal markets exist. 
 
The previous studies about smuggling mainly focus on goods that, through economic analysis, 
can increase the welfare of the final consumer due to the decrease in price as a result of 
smuggling. However, in the case of smuggled agriculture products that carry the high risk of 
being infected, additional externalities are created that must be considered. A recent study by 
Ferrier (2008) looks at an agriculture trade ban arising from SPS risk. The risk that an invasive 
disease may become established domestically creates negative externalities for society.  
 
Ferrier (2008) made four prepositions regarding the smuggling of agriculture goods with respect 
to price disparity between three trading countries. Proposition one reveals that the smuggling of 
goods depends on the elasticity of supply and demand. The more inelastic demand or supply is, 
smuggling will increase since the disparity between prices will increase. Proposition two reveals 
that smuggling will increase as the number of partners which trade that product decreases. 
Therefore, the greater the number of partners supplying that product, the less pressure there will 
be on the price of the product in the importing country. Proposition three explains that when risk 
averse traders face higher risk, less smuggling occurs. Thus, when penalties for smuggling and 
the probability of detecting smuggling are high, the supply of smuggling will decrease due to 
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increased smuggling costs being a deterrent. Proposition four concerns the regionalization of the 
SPS agreement. Smuggling is more likely to happen when the restricted region is the primary 
supplier of that product but it does not consume majority of the product. Hence, the region is 
export dependent leading to the price in the restricted region to fall drastically, creating large 
price disparity between the region and the world price. This, in turn, provides an incentive to 
engage in smuggling. 
 
4.5 Model Framework 
Loppacher et al. (2006) consider an economy where world trade consists of only two countries, 
an exporter and an importer which is formally defined as the Rest of the World (ROW). The 
market in the exporting country is divided into two regions, one region is where the disease 
outbreak has occurred (“infected area”) and the other is where the disease has not yet emerged 
(“non-infected area”). The model constructs the infected area based on the OIE requirements for 
geographical regionalization, as designed by veterinary criteria. Under the OIE, zoning is the 
geographical segregation of the region where a disease outbreak has occurred. Zoning is defined 
as determining the subpopulation of distinct health status primarily on geographical basis (using 
either natural, artificial, or legal boundaries) within its territory for the purpose of disease control 
or international trade (OIE, 2013). Additionally, the model explains the trade flow between the 
countries in two scenarios. The first scenario evaluates the trade effect and flows when the 
disease outbreak has not occurred and thus there are no trade bans imposed. The second scenario 
evaluates the trade effect and flows with the occurrence of a disease outbreak. Thus, there is a 
trade ban imposed on the infected region in the exporting country. Within this second scenario, 
the economic reason for the failure of regionalization is evaluated. The major reason is the 
 163 
 
unwillingness of the importing country (ROW) to accept the disease free status of the region due 
to the presence of the incentive to smuggle between the two regions within the exporting 
country.  
 
The model framework in this essay is elaborated in two sections. The first section is the algebraic 
evaluation of the partial equilibrium before the disease outbreak, the first scenario in Loppacher 
et al. (2006). The second section is the algebraic evaluation of the partial equilibrium with the 
disease outbreak. Within the second section, the existence of smuggling is shown in the presence 
of price disparity between the regions. Additionally, the model designs the appropriate policy 
response in the infected area to eliminate the incentive for smuggling resulting from the price 
disparity between the two regions within the exporting country. When considering the 
elimination of the incentive for smuggling two cases are studied. The first case is organized 
smuggling, where the primary motive is earning profit as result of the price disparity between the 
two regions. The second case is the casual smuggling, when people unintentionally spread the 
disease by crossing the border from the infected to the non-infected region through transport of 
an infected product or visiting a farm that contains the virus. 
 
 4.5.1 International Trade Market Equilibrium Before the Disease Outbreak                          
The assumptions used in Loppacher et al. (2006) model include that the infected area and the 
non-infected area in the exporting country are competitive on the world market and thus can 
influence the world price
50
; transportation and transaction costs are significantly small so they 
                                                          
 
50
 The quantities supplied by the exporting county are large enough on the world market that any variation 
in supply from the exporting country can influence world prices.     
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are ignored in the analysis; one homogeneous good is traded; the capacity constraint that may 
arise from the trade ban in the exporting country are not considered
51
; all countries that are 
aggregated as importing countries in the ROW have the same sanitary or phytosanitary regime 
for the product in question and, thus, are treated as a single market. 
 
Loppacher et al. (2006) developed a two country model with three trade regions and one 
commodity traded. For each region r, Qr
D
 and Qr
S
 are quantities demanded and supplied, 
respectively. The difference between the quantities supplied and demanded at the world price, 
Po, in the exporting country represents the excess of supply ESif for the not yet infected region 
and ESnif the non-infected region. Where the differences between the quantity demanded and 
supplied in the importing country represent the excess of demand in the ROW, EDrow. Thus, the 
world equilibrium is when the excess supply of the two regions in the export country equals the 
excess demand in the ROW.  
 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑓 + 𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑓 = 𝐸𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑤                                                                                                               (4.1) 
 
By applying the demand and supply functions from each of the markets in equation (4.1) we get: 
 
𝑄𝑖𝑓
𝑆 (𝑃𝑜) − 𝑄𝑖𝑓
𝐷 (𝑃𝑜) + 𝑄𝑛𝑖𝑓
𝑆 (𝑃𝑜) − 𝑄𝑛𝑖𝑓
𝐷 (𝑃𝑜) − 𝑄𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝐷 (𝑃𝑜) + 𝑄𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝑆 (𝑃𝑜) = 0                                 (4.2) 
 
                                                          
 
51
 Such as slaughter facilities in the infected area. 
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4.5.2 International Trade Market Equilibrium After the Disease Outbreak 
In the second scenario, when a disease outbreak has occurred in the “infected region” of the 
exporting country, a trade ban is imposed on that region. However, the non-infected region from 
the exporting country can still export to the ROW. Thus, the world equilibrium will be formed 
based on the non-infected region in the exporting country and the ROW. If the trade ban is 
applied perfectly by the government authorities the world equilibrium will be:  
 
𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑓 = 𝐸𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑤                                                                                                                           (4.3) 
 
Applying the supply and demand functions in equation (4.3) from each market: 
 
𝑄𝑛𝑖𝑓
𝑆 (𝑃1) − 𝑄𝑛𝑖𝑓
𝐷 (𝑃1) − 𝑄𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝐷 (𝑃1) + 𝑄𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝑆 (𝑃1) = 0                                                                  (4.4) 
 
In equation (4.4), P1 represents the new equilibrium world price with the occurrence of disease in 
the infected region, with the assumption that segregation between the infected and the non-
infected region in the exporting country is perfect. Since a trade ban is imposed in the infected 
area, the region will be in autarky and the equilibrium will simply be that infected region supply 
equals infected region demand, or:  
 
𝑄𝑖𝑓
𝑆 (𝑃2) − 𝑄𝑖𝑓
𝐷 (𝑃2) = 0                                                                                                              (4.5) 
 
In equation (4.5), P2 represents the price equilibrium in the infected area with the existence of a 
trade ban. As a result of the trade ban the price in the infected area will fall, whereas the new 
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world price will rise. So, P2 < P1 and P1 >Po, it is this price difference between P2 and P1 in the 
two regions that will create an incentive to smuggle, which is consistent with the conclusions by 
Pitt (1981), Norton (1987), Saba et al., (1995), and Ferrier (2008).  
 
Applying Ferrier (2008) model for smuggling and Loppacher et al. (2006) assumption of zero 
transportation cost between the two regions, firms will smuggle agriculture goods as long as the 
price differences between the two regions is greater than or equal to the smuggling cost (SC): 
 
𝑃1 − 𝑃2 ≥ 𝑆𝐶                                                                                                                              (4.6) 
 
thus, 
∆𝑃𝑤 = 𝑃1 − 𝑃0 ≥ 0  and   ∆𝑃𝑖𝑎 = 𝑃2 − 𝑃0 ≤ 0                                                                         (4.7) 
 
Where ΔPw  represents the change in the world price and ΔPia represents the change in the price 
in the infected area. Smuggling costs can be modeled as a cost function of the quantity smuggled 
SC (q). Yang (2004) illustrates that it becomes increasingly difficult to hide evidence of 
smuggling when the total amount of smuggling is large, therefore ∂SC/∂q > 0. Hence, based on 
the smuggling function and equations (4.6) and (4.7), the condition for smuggling can be 
reiterated as: 
 
∆𝑃𝑤 − ∆𝑃𝑖𝑎 ≥ 𝑆𝐶(𝑞)                                                                                                                  (4.8) 
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4.5.2.1 Incentive for Producer Smuggling 
If we observe the behavioural equation we can say that in order for producers to be in 
equilibrium they need to maximize their aggregate net profit, however, this is not the case with 
producers in the infected area who receive price, P2, for their products. Producers in the infected 
area are able to achieve an improved outcome through smuggling. These producers have two 
options: 1) sell all production in the infected region and receive price P2 with certainty; or 2) 
smuggle a portion of their production where they will receive price P1 minus smuggling cost in 
the non-infected region and price P2 for the remaining production sold in the infected region. The 
producer that decides to sell their production in the domestic market will maximise profit as 
follows: 
 
𝛱(𝑃2) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑄(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓                                                                                                              (4.9) 
 
Where P2Qif  represents the total revenue a producer receives with zero smuggling costs
52
. 
Hence, their profit will be dependent on the market price in the infected region. Producers that 
decide to smuggle incur two types of costs. The first are costs associated with all activities 
associated with the violation of the ban in order to transport the goods from infected region to the 
non-infected region. The magnitude of these costs are represented by the cost function C(Qs) that 
is convex in the value of smuggled goods Qs. The second type of costs a producer incurs is when 
smuggling is detected and the smuggler punished. The magnitude of these costs is measured 
through the fine function F (Qs) that is convex and increasing in the quantity smuggled. If 
                                                          
 
52
 For simplicity, production costs are not considered in this analysis. 
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smuggling were riskless the producer that decides to smuggle a fraction of their production will 
earn a profit of:  
 
𝛱(𝑃1, 𝑃2) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞(1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 + 𝛾(𝑃1)𝑄𝑖𝑓 − 𝑆𝐶(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓), γϵ [0, 1]                                   (4.10) 
 
Where, γ represents the fraction of smuggled goods γ=Qs/Qif and can range from 0 to 1, 0≤γ≤1. 
We assume that the cost of smuggling is always positive SC(γQif)>0, and increasing in the 
fraction of smuggled goods (∂SC/∂γQif)>0. Thus, the producer will maximise their profit from 
the revenue P1Qif received by smuggling a fraction of γ, the revenue P2Qif by selling a fraction of 
(1-γ) on the domestic market minus the smuggling cost. The producer will decide to smuggle as 
long as his utility improves from smuggling. Since his utility depends only on the profit earned 
and there are no risk associated with the decision to smuggle the utility will be improved as long 
as the profit from smuggling is equal to or larger that the profit from selling the product on the 
domestic market. Algebraically this can be shown as follows: 
 
 𝛱(𝑃1, 𝑃2) ≥  𝛱(𝑃2), or 
(1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 + 𝛾(𝑃1)𝑄𝑖𝑓 − 𝑆𝐶(𝑄𝑠) ≥ (𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓                                                                  (4.11) 
 
Taking the derivative of (4.11) with respect to the quantity smuggled Qs
53
: 
 
𝜕𝜋(𝑃1𝑃2)
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑓
≥
𝜕𝜋(𝑃2)
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑓
                                                                                                   (4.12) 
                                                          
 
53
 The smuggling cost in equating (4.11) can be presented as SC(Qs), as Qs=γQif .  
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The result from equation (4.12) yields equation (4.13): 
  
𝑃1 − 𝑃2 ≥ 𝑆𝐶, or 𝑃1 − 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑃2                                                                                               (4.13) 
 
Thus, the decision to smuggle will exist as long as price minus the smuggling costs in the non-
infected area exceeds that of the infected area, therefore the producer is able to achieve higher a 
profit level from smuggling.  
 
When we consider the risk of being caught, producer profit will have two outcomes. The first 
one is when the producer successfully smuggles and the producer incurs only the cost of 
smuggling SC (Qs). The second outcome is when the producer is caught smuggling and, in 
addition to the smuggling cost, has to pay a fine for the illicit activity. Algebraically, this can be 
shown as: 
 
𝛱𝑠(𝑃1, 𝑃2) = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 + 𝛾(𝑃1)𝑄𝑖𝑓 − 𝑆𝐶(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓)                                                           (4.14) 
𝛱𝑛𝑠(𝑃1, 𝑃2) = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 − 𝑆𝐶(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓) − 𝐹(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓)                                                          (4.15) 
 
The profit denoted by Πs and Πns shows when smuggling is and is not successful, respectively. 
The producer will receive revenue of (1-γ)( P2)Qif + γ(P1)Qif if not caught by the authority but 
only (1-γ)( P2)Qif if caught, since the attempted smuggled quantity(γQif ) is confiscated. If caught, 
in addition to the smuggling cost producers are fined in the amount of F(Qs).  We assume that the 
fine is positive F(Qs)>0, and increasing in the fraction of smuggled goods (∂F/∂Qs)>0. 
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Producers are assumed to be risk neutral and make the decision to smuggle based on the 
expected profit state of successful or unsuccessful smuggling. Using equation (4.14) and (4.15) 
the producer expected profit function can be shown as:  
 
Max𝑄𝑠 𝐸(𝛱) = (1 − 𝛼)𝛱𝑠 + 𝛼𝛱𝑛𝑠 , or 
Max𝑄𝑠 𝐸(𝛱) = {(1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 + 𝛾(𝑃1)𝑄𝑖𝑓 − 𝑆𝐶(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓)] + 𝛼[(1 − 𝛾)(𝑃2)𝑄𝑖𝑓 −
𝑆𝐶(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓) − 𝐹(𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑓)]}                                                                                                            (4.16) 
 
With the risk factor considered, again the producer will decide to smuggle as long as his utility 
improves from smuggling. His utility depends on the expected profit state of a successful or non-
successful smuggling. Hence his utility will be improved as long as his expected profit is equal 
to or larger than the certainty profit in the infected region. This condition is shown in equation 
(4.17):  
 
𝐸(𝛱) ≥  𝛱(𝑃2)                                                                                                                         (4.17) 
 Taking the derivative of (4.17) with respect to the quantity smuggled Qs:  
 
𝜕𝐸(𝛱)
𝜕𝑄𝑠
≥
𝜕𝛱(𝑃2)
𝜕𝑄𝑠
 ,                                                                                                                     (4.18) 
     
The result from equation (4.18) yields equation (4.19): 
 
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1 − 𝑃2 ≥ 𝑆𝐶 + 𝛼𝐹                                                                                                     (4.19) 
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Equation (4.19) shows the condition for producer incentive to smuggle when the risk of being 
caught is considered. The condition depends on the probability of being caught α, the higher it is 
the lower the incentive for smuggling will be due to the loss of revenue in the non-infected 
market and the additional cost of being fined. If the probability of being caught is 0, the 
condition becomes the same as in equation (4.13) which means as long as the difference between 
the prices in the two regions is larger than the smuggling costs there will be an incentive to 
smuggle. 
 
To increase the effectiveness of regionalisation as policy under the SPS agreement the incentive 
for smuggling between the infected and the non-infected regions needs to be completely 
eliminated. In equation (4.13) where we did not considered the risk of the decision to smuggle 
we were able to show that the current regionalisation policy creates an incentive for producers to 
smuggle from the infected to the non-infected region through the price differences. However, the 
smuggling and crime literature reveals that there is risk associated with the decision to do crime. 
When we incorporate the risk of being caught and punished for smuggling into the producer’s 
decision we arrive at equation (4.19). In this situation the incentive to smuggle depends on the 
price differential between the regions, the probability of being caught α and the severity of the 
punishment measured through fine F. Thus in order for the regionalisation policy to be effective 
the incentive for smuggling needs to have zero value and that can be achieved either through 
equalization of prices between the infected and non-infected regions or through increasing the 
probability of being caught in conjunction with raising the severity of the punishment. The 
probability of being caught has to be one so that every smuggling incident is caught by the 
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authorities and thus smuggling moves to zero. However, in practice this would require high 
enforcement costs and legislation to enforce in place for severe punishment. 
 
4.5.2.2 Casual smuggling 
The regional price difference may cause individuals from the non-infected region to purchase 
goods in the nearby lower priced infected region. This consumer behaviour, known as “casual 
smuggling”54, is unlike commercial smuggling where the goal is to make profit from the illicit 
action. Rather casual smuggling happens in modest quantities and is mainly for personal 
consumption within the family. Goods like cigarettes, alcohol and gasoline are the most common 
goods examined in the literature for casual smuggling. For example, these goods are subject to 
different taxation across US states, and since border crossing is feasible it is expected that 
consumers will use the opportunity to purchase these goods from the neighboring region for a 
lower price (Beard et al.1997).      
 
Saba et al. (1995) is one of the first to analyze casual smuggling, looking at cigarettes where 
casual smuggling is motivated by the tax difference between various US states. They found that 
the trend of individuals crossing the border in response to the price difference of cigarettes 
affected sales in some US states. Beard et al. (1997) found that casual smuggling of alcohol is 
significant in at least some US states. Lovenheim (2007) examined how the elasticity of demand 
for cigarettes in combination with casual smuggling between borders can contribute to 
government tax policy. He suggested that when demand is inelastic, governments in states with 
                                                          
 
54
 In the literature of smuggling the “casual smuggling” is also referred as “petty smuggling”.   
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large populations near a lower priced border should focus on expanding enforcement to reduce 
casual smuggling or simply decrease taxes to reduce the incentive to smuggle.  
 
There is sparse literature with regards to casual smuggling motivated from the price differences 
in regions where disease outbreaks have occurred. However, there are reports that diseases 
spread to other regions and countries is often result of incidents where individuals have crossed 
borders with disease contaminated product. The framework for casual smuggling in this essay 
was motivated from the application of regionalisation regulation as drawn from the literature on 
casual cigarette and gasoline smuggling (Saba et al., 1995; Kabur and Keen, 1993; Beard et al., 
1997; Lovenheim, 2007; Mlachila et al., 2016).                
 
Therefore, we assumed a representative consumer in the non-infected region will allocate their 
total product consumption between the non-infected market and smuggle from the lower priced 
infected market. Where QT represents the total consumption of the product and β is the share of 
QT allocated to consumption from the infected market can be presented as follows: 
 
𝑄𝑇 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑄 + 𝛽𝑄                                                                                                              (4.20) 
 
We have price P1 in the non-infected region and price P2 in the infected region. Since P2 < P1 the 
consumer’s disposable personal income benefits from purchasing the product at a lower price as 
shown in equation (4.21): 
  
𝑌 = (𝑃1 − 𝑃2)𝛽𝑄                                                                                                                     (4.21) 
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Following this, the consumer in the non-infected region has an option to buy the product locally 
at price P1 or travel a specified distance and buy the same product at price P2 in the infected area. 
Thus traveling to the infected region denotes transportation cost of Sd for the consumer. Where S 
is the cost per km traveled and d is the distance. Considering the transportation cost for travel we 
can modify the price P2 as follows: 
 
𝑃2 = 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑑                                                                                                                             (4.22) 
 
Following Mlachila et al., (2016) we can assume a standard convex cost function for the 
representative consumer equal to: 
 
𝐶 =
1
2𝑘
𝛽2𝑄,   0≤k≤1                                                                                                             (4.23) 
 
Where k is a parameter revealing the easiness to evade authorities when smuggling. The higher 
the parameter reveals the easier it is to avoid authorities and thus lower the smuggling cost.  
Considering the personal cost for a representative consumer, the net benefit from crossing the 
border and purchasing the product in the infected area is: 
 
𝐵 = (𝑃1 − 𝑃2)𝛽𝑄 −
1
2𝑘
𝛽2𝑄                                                                                                     (4.24) 
 
The consumer will choose the level of β that maximise equation (4.24). Thus, by derivation, B 
with respect to β (∂B/∂β=0) and solving for β we get: 
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𝛽 = 𝑘(𝑃1 − 𝑃2) = 𝑘(𝑃1 − 𝑃 + 𝑆𝑑)                                                                                         (4.25) 
 
Equation (4.25) represents the optimal share of consumption by the representative consumer 
from the infected region based on the price disparity. Hence, for the regionalisation policy to be 
effective we need the share of goods consumed from the infected region to be zero, β=0. This 
can be achieved either through price equalization between the infected and the non-infected 
regions, P2 = P1, or have the parameter k=0. In practice for k to be zero authorities need to 
capture each smuggled good, however as explained in the literature on crime enforcement costs 
are very high and unrealistic to apply.  
 
4.6 Policy Implications to Remove the Incentive to Smuggle 
Early disclosure and containment of the disease are big challenges when designing instruments 
for risk mitigation (Graming et al. 2006). One of the major problems is that the individual 
behaviour of the producer needs to be considered. Incorporating the individual producer 
behaviour when designing a policy will increase the likelihood of early disclosure and the 
success of a control and management program. Currently, control and management programs are 
a large part of the costs associated with a disease outbreak because these programs are generally 
not complete and disclosure is happening too late, allowing the outbreak to become larger in 
size. Comprehensive polices directed at individual producer behaviour would motivate early 
disclosure, leading to smaller areas of disease outbreak and costs. For complete policy directed at 
individual producer behaviour, the Incentive for Producer smuggling in section 4.5.2.1 of this 
essay should be considered.  
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In order to reduce the incentive for smuggling there are two categories of policies that can be 
implemented: 
1. Equalizing the prices in the two areas by implementing a price support policy. 
2. Significantly increase the enforcement and severity of the punishment. 
 
4.6.1 Price Support as Policy to Deter the Incentive to Smuggle  
Price equalization between the two regions is considered a very effective policy in eliminating 
the casual and commercial incentive to smuggle. This is based on the fact that calculating 
smuggling costs (SC) and the parameter to evade authorities (k) is very difficult in practice and 
risky to apply since a single smuggling incident can cause a serious trade disruption. Price 
equalization can be implemented through government intervention in the form of a price support 
policy. A price support program allows the government to increase the price in the infected 
region to the level of the price in the non-infected region P1. This policy response is graphically 
presented in Figure 4.1. When government price support in the infected region is at P1, producers 
are willing to produce quantity Q1S and the consumers willing to purchase Q1D. Hence, with this 
policy program there would be an excess supply of (Q1S - Q1D) that the government is required to 
buy in order to maintain the price at level P1. The resulting purchasing cost for the government is 
(Q1S – Q1D) × P1 as shown the shaded area in Figure 4.1. In addition the government has to 
handle the excess supply of potentially infected animals. In conjunction the existing price 
support policy can be applied to the governmental payment amount for animals that are required 
to be destroyed due the outbreak. In addition the payment amount for destroyed animals, the 
costs of cleaning and disinfecting the facilities used while transporting and destroying the 
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infected animals must be considered to ensure proper control of the disease. Thus we can 
formalize government costs in Equation (4.26): 
 
𝐺𝑐 = (𝑄𝑆 − 𝑄𝐷)𝑃𝑠 + 𝐶𝑑                                                                                                           (4.26) 
 
Where, Gc represents the government’s total costs with the price supporting program, Ps is the 
price support and represents the daily market price, and QS is the quantity supplied by the 
producers at Ps price and QD is quantity purchased by consumers at the same price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aspects that should be considered when implementing a price support policy in conjunction with 
government purchase of animals to be destroyed in order to eliminate the incentive for 
smuggling should include:  
 the price differential between the infected and non-infected regions, 
D 
                        Q1D            Q2  Q0    Q1S                                                 Q 
S P 
 
P1 
 
P0 
 
P2 
    
 
 
 
 
 
D+Gov 
Figure 4. 1: Government Intervention with Price Support Policy 
Source: Authors application 
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 the relative geographical size of the infected  area, and 
  the elasticity of either supply or demand.  
 
Price Differential between the Infected and Non-Infected Region 
The price differential between the two regions creates the incentive for smuggling. Hence, if the 
regional price differential is comparably smaller than the incentive to smuggle then smuggling 
will be reduced to the point where smuggling one extra unit of product into the non-infected 
region will cost more than selling the same unit in the infected region. With a smaller price 
differential there will be less excess supply, smaller government purchasing cost (gray area in 
Figure 4.1) and thus less total governmental costs Gc. 
 
Based on Equation (7) we can say that Ps =  ∆Pw + Po, and a smaller change in the world price, 
∆Pw, will move Ps closer to Po, the world price prior to the disease outbreak, thereby decreasing 
total government  cost in equation (26). Hence, if government implements a price support policy 
with purchase of excess output, and it is known by the producer ex ante, then during a disease 
outbreak there will be early disclosure by producers affected by the outbreak. For example, if a 
producer knows that he will be paid a price for diseased animals that is equal to that received in 
the disease free areas following an outbreak, then the producer will disclose the disease case the 
moment he is certain.   
 
Casual smuggling happens when the price differential between the regions is large enough to 
cover the traveling costs and the parameter of avoidance authority is high enough (or the cost to 
avoid the authorities is low) that when the consumer smuggles the product has higher utility. As 
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long as there is a price differential between the regions there will be a marginal consumer that 
will smuggle the product to achieve higher utility. However, with the price support policy the 
prices between the regions is equalized and thus the motivation for casual smuggling is 
eliminated.        
 
With this price support policy the cost will be covered by the exporting country. At the same 
time it will reduce the risk for smuggling between the regions, which is the main concern of an 
importing country when accepting the exporting country’s disease-free status.    
 
Relative geographical size of the infected and the uninfected areas 
The existence of a price support policy that is known to producers prior to a disease outbreak 
provides an incentive for early reporting of the diseased animal. Therefore, the spread of the 
disease can be contained in a small region. With the infected region being geographically small 
compared to the non-infected area, the ΔPw = 0 and the quantity banned for export from the 
infected region is not large enough to cause a change in the world price, thus the world price will 
remain at Po. The price in the infected region will ether stay the same or decrease, but the 
difference between the infected and the non-infected region will be smaller. In this case, a slight 
decrease in price implies the condition for smuggling agriculture goods in equation (4.6) is: 
 
𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃2 ≥ 𝑆𝐶                                                                                                                            (4.27) 
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The purchasing cost of the government will also be smaller (the gray area in Figure 4.1) since the 
price supported will be the old world price Po. In the case where the price does not change in the 
infected area then the government cost will be zero.  
 
Elasticity of supply or demand 
When designing the price support policy for a potential disease outbreak the elasticity of demand 
and supply for the particular agricultural good should be considered. Elasticity can influence the 
price disparity which is influenced by the smuggling incentive and government purchasing cost. 
 
Both regions belong to the same country and have the same elasticities of supply and demand for 
specific agricultural goods. When supply and demand are inelastic, consumers and producers are 
less responsive to a price change. Thus, when there is a trade ban on exports from the infected 
region a small reduction in quantity can cause larger price disparity between regions and thus a 
larger incentive for producers to smuggle into the non-infected region. However, with a price 
support policy, the inelasticity causes a small reduction in the quantity purchased (Q1D) and sold 
(Q1S), thus creating smaller excess of supply and government purchasing costs. The opposite 
happens when demand and supply are elastic. In this case the price disparity is lower for a larger 
reduction in quantity when a trade ban is imposed on the infected region, and in turn excess 
supply and government costs increase as a result of the larger reduction in the quantity demanded 
by consumers (Q1D) and increased quantity supplied by producers (Q1S). 
 
When there are differences in elasticities between supply and demand the following can be 
stated: 
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1. For small values of Ed/Es we have a case where demand is more inelastic and therefore 
the large price difference between the equilibrium price and the supported price means 
that consumers are less responsive to the price increase than producers.  
2. For large values of Ed/Es we have a case where supply is more inelastic, therefore the 
large price difference between the equilibrium price and the supported price means that 
producers are less responsive to the price increase than consumers are.  
 
One important issue that should be considered with a price support policy is that supply and 
demand in long run tends to be more elastic than in the short run. In the short run price support 
as a policy will have a small impact on the government cost but a considerable impact in the long 
run. Hence, price support as a policy is more applicable in the short run where it has small 
impact on government costs but a large impact in eliminating the casual and commercial 
incentive to smuggle, thereby bringing it to zero.  
 
4.6.2. Enforcement and Punishment as a Policy to Deter the Incentive to Smuggle 
Another policy very commonly used to reduce smuggling is to increase enforcement in 
conjunction with significant punishment penalties. The economics behind this policy is to raise 
the risk for the smuggler to a level where it would reduce profit and hence divert them from 
smuggling. This policy is mainly used as tool in fighting crime like smuggling cigarettes, drugs, 
ivory, wild life, illegal immigrants, etc.  
 
The literature on crime focusses mainly on the optimal level of enforcement and punishment that 
will drastically reduce smuggling and minimize government cost. Becker (1974) states that 
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optimal enforcement depends on the cost of catching and convicting a smuggler, the nature of the 
punishment and the response of smugglers to changes in enforcement. Van Walbeek et al. (2013) 
state that when combating cigarette smuggling, a certain optimal level of illicit trade should be 
considered. Thus the optimal level of illicit trade is where it maximises the net benefit of the tax 
policy with some acceptable level of tax evasion (Van Walbeek et al., 2013). Ferrier (2008) 
indicates that smuggling goods decreas as we increase risk aversion among traders, and that can 
be done through redesigning the penalties for smuggling and increasing the probabilities of 
detecting smuggling. However, the literature on crime is not consistent regarding the level of 
penalties and sanctions that deter criminal activities efficiently compared to other measures 
(Ferrier, 2008). Additionally, the optimal level of enforcement does not reduce smuggling to 
zero, rather some level of smuggling is assumed to exist.   
 
In the case where a regionalization policy is in place and where smuggling among zones exists, 
enforcement costs need to be at a level that will bring smuggling to zero. Thus, in terms of crime 
theory, penalties have to be high and the probability of detecting the crime has to be one. 
Applying this in practice indicates that every case of smuggling has to be detected and penalties 
have to be large enough to divert smugglers from participating in illicit trade.  Van Walbeek et 
al. (2013) state that eliminating illicit trade may not be entirely possible and the cost of doing it 
may be too high. One such example is ivory smuggling in China. China has implemented 
legislation where the punishment for smuggling ivory includes life imprisonment, in some 
instances death penalties can be applied in addition to fines similar in value to the smuggled 
goods (EIA, 2004). The harsh penalties and detection of several cases of large smuggled ivory 
shipments have been powerful deterrents and led ivory retailers in China to be more cautious 
 183 
 
(EIA, 2004). However, China retains a high demand and is an attractive market for illicit ivory 
trade.  
 
In summary this policy measure allows the government to direct resources at expanding 
enforcement, which increases the probability of smugglers being detected while also setting 
penalties at high levels. However, with any disease outbreak it only takes a small inflow of 
smuggled goods from the infected region for the non-infected region to lose its status as a disease 
free region and along with its export status (Kerr et al., 2006).  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Disease outbreaks create significant trade disruptions and sizeable international costs. For 
example, Knight-Jonesa and Rushtonb (2013) estimated the cost of FMD at US$20 billion over 
the last 15 years or US$4 billion dollars per year including vaccination costs. Hence, 
regionalisation as a concept under the SPS agreement can bring a significant reduction in 
monetary losses for an exporting country when a disease outbreak occurs. Although most WTO 
members have incorporated regionalisation regulation under their sanitary policies, there is still 
reluctance by importing countries to accept the disease free sub-national zone of an exporting 
country.  
 
This essay offers examples where the regionalisation concept has failed. In all examples the 
importing country has imposed a ban on the entire country or has extended the ban to the 
neighbouring zones of the infected region, even though those zones held disease free status under 
the OIE. When designing policies for a regionalisation concept we should consider that most 
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cases related to the spread of animal disease is caused through the illegal entrance of a diseased 
animal from a neighbouring country or region. Importing countries are aware of this information 
and request strict control and monitoring measures on the borders with the infected zone by the 
exporting country. Hence, they postpone the acceptance of a disease free sub-national region 
through administrative delays, even when required the control measures are in place.  
 
There is valuable literature on smuggling available to analyse the failures of the regionalisation 
concept and the reluctance of the importing countries to accept the disease free statues of a sub-
national region. The economic studies have shown that if there exists an incentive to smuggle, 
then some smuggling will occur even with the presence of strict control points (Saba et al., 
1995). Hence, the importing country is aware that there are risks of the disease spreading even 
with the physical controls in place to restrict animal movement between regions, thus they 
postpone the acceptance of the disease free zone through administrative delays. 
 
This essay also examined in detail the incentive to smuggle animal products between regions. 
Incorporating the presence of the incentive to smuggle is a main factor in solving inefficiencies 
in the regionalisation concept. Incentives to smuggle arise as a result of the price differential 
between the infected and the non-infected regions. Loppacher et al. (2006) graphically illustrated 
that when a disease outbreak occurs, the price differentials arise between the two regions when 
the regionalisation concept is applied. Therefore, as long as the price differential is higher than 
the smuggling costs, there will be an incentive to smuggle. By applying a more formal partial 
equilibrium model we can see that if there is no risk of being caught the incentive to smuggle 
will exist as long as the price minus the smuggling costs in the non-infected area exceeds that of 
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the infected area, therefore the producer is able to achieve a higher profit level from smuggling. 
If we consider the risk of being caught and fined by the governing authorities then the incentive 
to smuggle will depend on the probability of being caught. The higher the probability of being 
caught, the lower the incentive for smuggling will be given the losses in revenue in the non-
infected market and the additional cost of being fined. If the probability of being caught is zero 
then the condition on the incentive is the same as when there is no risk of being caught. This 
condition is important when designing policies to reduce the incentive to smuggle and thus 
improve the regionalisation concept.  
 
Casual smuggling is also important when looking at disease transfer between regions if price 
differentials exist between the regions. It is very common for people to consume products by 
crossing borders in order to get a better deal on price. Casual smuggling depends on the distance 
the consumer has to travel to the low priced region, the cost of transportation and the easiness of 
avoiding authorities.  
 
Price support and enforcement and punishment are the two policies discussed and examined in 
this essay as ways to eliminate the incentive to smuggle between regions. Price supporting 
producers in the infected region at the daily market price of the non-infected region is an 
important economic instrument in eliminating the incentive to smuggle. Increased enforcement 
and punishment as a policy instrument should not be considered as it is hard to estimate the level 
of enforcement and punishment that will bring smuggling to zero and the risk of a single infected 
animal being smuggled is always present. 
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When designing a price support policy the following indicator should be considered to reduce 
governmental costs. One indicators is the price differential between the infected and non-infected 
regions. The smaller the price difference between the regions implied smaller governmental 
costs. Another indicator is the geographical size of the infected region. A large infected region 
creates large price disparities between the regions and thus leads higher government costs. The 
last indicators are the elasticities of supply and demand. Inelastic supply and demand create 
higher price disparity and an incentive to smuggle, however government costs are lower. Elastic 
supply and demand lead to lower price disparity between the regions but higher government 
costs. Over the long run supply and demand are more elastic, thus price support is a suitable 
policy for dealing with a disease outbreak in short run. In the short run a price support policy has 
a small impact on government costs but a large impact on eliminating the incentive to smuggle 
through price equalization between the infected and the non-infected regions.    
 
This research contributes to the literature through the design of a formal partial equilibrium 
framework of the regionalization concept when accounting for the incentive to smuggle. The 
incentive to smuggle considers both the producers and the act of casual smuggling by consumers. 
This research also discusses a policy as a mechanism for the elimination of smuggling 
incentives. Future beneficial research considerations in this area include an empirical analysis on 
the framework of eliminating smuggling to maintain disease-free status under SPS regulation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation covers three topics of importance for international trade. It consists of three 
independent essays in the area of trade in biotechnology and regionalization of a disease 
outbreak. The first essay in chapter 2 provides a global measurement on the effect that the 
expanding GM pipeline has on international trade given the constraint of asynchronous 
regulations for a new GM event among countries. The second essay in chapter 3 develop a 
theoretical model that considers the political risk of the stringent post moratorium regulations 
regarding GMO approval in the EU as imposed on the investing biotechnological firm. Lastly, 
the third essay in chapter 4 analysing the regionalization concept under the WTO accounting for 
the incentive to smuggle and determines the appropriate mode to implement the regionalization 
concept. 
 
The first essay utilizing GTAP measures the effect of the increasing GM global pipeline on 
international trade flows between countries, and the effect on trade flows between countries 
given the unintended presence of GM events in the export of non-GM crops. These 
measurements are achieved through the development of five simulations for the following 
agriculture goods: maize, soybeans, rapeseed, wheat and rice. Scenario 1 describes the global 
trade of maize, soya and rapeseed by considering the efficiency gain that GM technology can 
bring in the absence of technological trade barriers. Scenario 2 looks at the trade flows when the 
technological trade barriers are considered as a result of the asynchronous approval of the 
commercialized GM maize, soya and rapeseed events. Scenario 3 presents the changes in trade 
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flows considering the new GM events in the pipeline for maize, soya and rapeseed. Scenario 4 
builds on scenario 3 but only considers certain trade barriers for the GM events in the pipeline 
for the three crops. Finally scenario 5 examines the trade flow changes for non-GM maize, non-
GM soya, non-GM rapeseed, rice and wheat in the EU28 region when there is co-mingling and 
cross-co-mingling. 
 
Results from the analysis indicate that asynhronized approval does reduce the benefit that 
biotechnology can bring. This is seen in the scenarios 2 and 4 where we imposed barriers for 
certain GM events to depict the asynhronicity. In scenario 2 the reduction in trade flow for the 
three crops, maize, soya and rapeseed, is $US 842 million and for scenario 4 the trade flow 
reduction is $US 2.4 billion. We can also conclude from scenarios 2 and 4 that the larger the 
number of GM events available in the pipeline the larger impact on trade flows. In scenario 2 
there are l3 GM events commercialized and a lower reduction in the absolute value of trade 
compared to scenario 4 where there are 38 GM events available. Conversely, in scenarios 1 and 3 
where the trade barriers are eliminated to depict a synchronised world there is a boost in the 
global trade flow of $US 927 million in scenario 1 with 13 GM events and $US 3.7 billion in 
scenario 3 with 38 GM events. Adding the aggregated losses from the five scenarios the trade 
flow value reaches US$ 3.4 billion. However, conclusively the world would be in a better 
position having more GM events available, even when asynchronicity is present, as the increase 
in trade flows from new GM events is greater than the reduction in the trade flows caused by 
asynchronicity. This conclusion is supported by the comparison of results from scenarios 2 and 
4. Scenario 4 results in a US$1.4 billion increase in trade flows from the base value for the three 
crops due to more GM events on the market, even though asyncronicity between them is greater. 
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By comparison, scenario 2 has reduced asynchronicity but trade flows for the three crops only 
increase US$84 million from the base value due to fewer GM events on the market.    
 
In the second essay the development of a theoretical real options model is used to analyze the 
decision approval process of a GMO event in the EU. Defining how the regulation structure can 
be seen as political risk that can influence the investment decisions of firms that want to bring 
GM products to the EU market is also discussed. The solution from the model is explained 
through critical cash flow threshold influenced by regulatory environment x
* 
and a maximum 
acceptable level of irreversible sunk cost by the investor K
*
. These critical values explain the 
decision of an investor on whether to invest immediately or wait for future time when additional 
regulation information is available. Through differentiating the critical values with respect to the 
regulation uncertainty parameter σx and the uncertainty of each step of the EU decision process 
σR, the behaviour of the investor is explained.  
 
The situation where political factors are driving the decision of the EC, Examination Committee 
and the Appeals Committee regarding whether the GM event will be approved is represented in 
the model through the increase in uncertainty in the legislative approval process or high values of 
σR and σx. This situation results in an increase in the value of the option and thus postpones the 
decision to invest to a future time. It also decreases the acceptable level of irreversible cost for 
the investor. When GM products are developed they have a limited time to achieve their 
maximum economic potential and thus cover the initial investment. However, continually 
postponing the investment into the future can lead to the investment never occurring. The final 
outcome is that the presence of political factors in the decision approval process slows the 
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growth of the biotechnology industry and constrains the accessibility of this technology for 
developing countries.  
 
In the third essay through the application of the partial equilibrium model we determined that 
price disparity exists between the two regions when regionalisation is applied. The price 
disparity leads to an incentive for commercial and casual smuggling between the regions and 
thus the unwillingness of the importing country to accept the disease free sub-national zone of 
the exporting country. Therefore, the concept of regionalisation under the WTO fails to be 
implemented because the incentive to smuggle between regions is not considered. This research, 
through application of a partial equilibrium model, analyses the regionalization concept 
accounting for the incentive for commercial and casual smuggling. The essay evaluates the 
model with the risk of being caught and the risk of not being caught. If there is no risk of being 
caught the incentive to smuggle will exist as long as the price minus the smuggling costs in the 
non-infected area exceeds that of the infected area. If we consider the risk of being caught and 
fined by the governing authorities then the incentive to smuggle will depend on the probability of 
being caught. The higher the probability of being caught the lower the incentive for smuggling 
will be, given the losses in revenue in the non-infected market and the additional cost of being 
fined. These two conditions are important when designing policies to reduce the incentive to 
smuggle and thus improve the regionalisation concept. Casual smuggling is another important 
component when designing policies to improve the regionalisation concept. Casual smuggling 
depends on the distance the consumer has to travel to the low priced region, the cost of 
transportation and the easiness of avoiding the authorities. 
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Two policies were discussed in this essay: price support, and enforcement and punishment when 
commercial smuggling with and without risk, and casual smuggling were considered. Price 
support was evaluated as a more appropriate policy as it is difficult to estimate the appropriate 
level of enforcement and punishment under that type of policy that will bring smuggling to zero. 
While there is always the risk of a single infected animal being smuggled between the regions, 
implementing a price support policy based on the daily market price from the non-infected 
region is key to eliminating the incentive to smuggle.  
 
5.2 Policy Implications  
The findings of this thesis have implications for the global trade system in the area of 
biotechnology and when a disease outbreak occurs. Biotechnology is an important factor in the 
economic growth of agriculture as it increases global food production in environmentally 
sustainable way through reduction of CO2 emissions and preservation of soil quality. The benefit 
that this technology brings to farmers, the environment and consumers results in wide acceptance 
and development of new GM varieties. The development of new GM varieties with suitable 
product characteristics for specific market demands should contribute to the food security 
challenge and doubling of world production by 2050. This research takes into account the 
development of new GM varieties and measures the global trade flow, while also considering the 
biotechnology investment decisions of exporters with respect to the biotechnology challenges 
that have arose in the last decade. The two biotechnology challenges considered in this research 
were asynchronous approval of new GM varieties among countries and the inefficiency of EU 
regulation on agricultural biotechnology.       
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This thesis shows that the EU’s regulation inefficiencies regarding GM event approvals can be 
attributed to the presence of political factors in the decisions of the EC, Examination Committee 
and the Appeals Committee. Regulating biotechnology is an important component in order for 
the government to provide human, animal and plant safety and health. However, political 
interference is putting at risk food safety, creating externalities that an unsafe food product will 
be allowed on the market while a safe GM product will be rejected (Smyth and Phillips, 2014). 
The findings in this thesis indicate that the presence of political factors in the EU decision 
process for approving new GM varieties influences the exporter’s decision to export a safe GM 
product to the EU market. As a result, the exporter postpones their decision to enter the EU 
market into the future and reduces the level of sunk cost they are willing to invest to enter the 
market. Since GM products have a limited time until market maturity, the exporter’s decision to 
enter the EU market is delayed and eventually may not occur. Instead the exporting firm may 
choose to avoid the EU market due to the GM approval process and enter a market where 
efficient GM approval regulations exist, thereby reducing uncertainty for the exporting firm.  
 
The ability of developing countries to access biotechnology is complicated when regulations are 
based on political factors rather than scientific evidence. This is evident for developing countries 
that export to the EU and fear that adoption of biotechnology products will jeopardise EU market 
access for their conventional crops (Kerr, 2014). This fear stems from the point of view that they 
will not be able to segregate their supply chain to a degree that will satisfy the EU policy on 
unintentional comingling of GM and conventional products (Kerr, 2014).   
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The analysis in this thesis indicates that inefficient EU regulations regarding GM approval cause 
the individual firm to postpone their decision on EU market entrance. These inefficiencies also 
cause some developing countries to hesitate on accepting the technology because of the fear of 
losing the EU market. This inefficiency in regulations slows down growth and the contribution 
of the technology to increasing global food security. This creates externalities in the global trade 
system with the EU leading the global trend of asynchronous approval of GM events and 
implementation of a zero policy for unintentional presence of unapproved GM products in the 
shipment of conventional crops.  
 
The findings of this research indicate that the asynchronous approval did impact global trade for 
the three crops in question, maize, soybeans and rapeseed, where agricultural biotechnology is 
extensively applied. The impact is felt through the reduction of benefits that biotechnology can 
bring to the global trade system, more specifically by reducing both the exports of countries 
accepting biotechnology and imports of countries rejecting biotechnology. The loss of trade also 
affects industries where these three crops are crucial inputs, such as meat products and vegetable 
oils, bringing the total loss to US$4.4 billion. However, the findings also indicate that the world 
is better off having more new GM varieties since the benefit of the technology surpasses the cost 
of asynchronous approval on the global supply chain. Knowing these outcomes allows us to 
propose certain policy implications.  
 
First, the growth of biotechnology is limited by the inefficient EU regulations around the GM 
approval process and the asynchronous approval of GM products internationally. The limitation 
of inefficient EU regulation, as indicated in this analysis, is not expected to be changed or eased 
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in the coming years. Rather, the regulations are likely to see more political factor manipulation 
as the MS become more involved in the decision process and science becomes increasingly less 
important. As a result, certain negative externalities will continue to happen while new ones are 
expected to rise in response to the ongoing presence of uncertainty that the agricultural biotech 
industry continues to face in the EU market. Therefore the firms’ decision will be to postpone the 
approval of the GM event in the EU market and redirect their products and R&D capacities to 
markets that employ science based regulation. As a result the number of biotechnology 
companies participating in the EU market is explicably low. For example, BASF’s decision in 
January 2012 to relocate all of its plant biotechnology R&D capacity from Europe to the US was 
the result of lengthy regulatory decisions (Smyth, et al. 2014). Overall, negative externalities are 
expected to rise in the global trade system given international asynchronous approval and as 
more unapproved GM events are found in the shipments of conventional crops and approved GM 
products. As previously stated, the trade flow losses from asynchronous approval are calculated 
to reach US$4.4 billion.  
 
Synchronising the international approval process of GM products using science-based evidence 
as the determining factors in the approval of new GM varieties is the ideal theoretical policy. If 
such a biotechnology policy were in place, it would be a leading factor in reaching the goal of 
doubling world production by 2050 and in solving the food security issue. However, 
synchronicity is currently not a possible option but some improvements can be completed by 
lobbying developing countries to accept biotechnology and implement a science-based approval 
process that would be synchronised with countries that have already adopted the technology.       
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Second, despite the setbacks generated by asynchronicity, the world is better off with more new 
GM varieties on the world market. The findings show that the benefits of biotechnology exceed 
the cost that asynchronous approval has on the global supply chain. As such, international 
organisations, governments and research organisations in developed countries that apply science 
based regulations regarding biotechnology need to encourage and continue to support the 
development of new GM varieties.  
 
Other important implications that can be discussed from the results of this research are 
incorporating the incentive for commercial and casual smuggling into the regionalisation 
concept. Regionalisation as a concept can bring significant economic and trade benefits if 
appropriately implemented, this inference arises from the point that there will be no disruptions 
in the global trade system when disease outbreaks occur. The current policy focus of countries 
when a disease outbreak occurs is to physically constrain the infected zone and invest in strict 
control and monitoring measures to contain the disease. This application allows the non-infected 
region to freely continue exporting. However, the results of this research indicate that the 
incentive to smuggle is present when a disease outbreak occurs and regionalisation is 
implemented. The incentive to smuggle originates from the price disparity that arises between 
the regions. The disease free region is able to export at the resulting higher price while the 
diseased region is in autarky as market supply is greater than demand which results in lower 
prices. The research in this thesis also contributes by showing that strict control and monitoring 
measures are not a suitable policy to bring the incentive to smuggle to a zero level. This research 
also found that zero smuggling is a key component for stopping the spread of disease into the 
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non-infected region, the acceptance of the disease free region by the importing countries and 
making the regionalisation concept more efficient under the SPS regulations.  
 
Recognizing these key pieces of information led to the price support policy proposal as a method 
of improving the regionalisation concept in the international trade system. When the price 
support policy is implemented, the prices in the two regions will be equalised creating a very 
effective policy tool in eliminating casual and commercial smuggling at the same time. Under 
this policy, the government will be required to increase the price in the infected region to the 
level of the non-infected region and buy the excess supply that will arise from this policy 
program. With this policy program the incentives to smuggle are reduced as the price disparity 
between the regions will be smaller, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the size of the 
infected region will grow and lower costs for the government.   
 
The implications from the incentive to smuggle can also be analysed in the biotechnology global 
trade system. In some countries the cultivation of GM products takes place even though the 
cultivation of them is prohibited. This is because the producers are able to achieve an improved 
outcome through illegal cultivation of the technology. Producers are able to achieve a higher 
profit level through reduced production cost if they plant GM seed. This is particularly evident in 
Ukraine where GM cultivation is officially prohibited, however, USDA reports suggest that 
around 80% of Ukraine soya and 10% of the corn planted is genetically modified (USDA, 2016). 
In certain developing countries the technology was used prior to approval by governing 
institutions as producers were able to achieve a higher profit level through illegal cultivation. 
This was the case in Argentina, Brazil and Pakistan. For example, in Pakistan Bt cotton was 
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approved in 2010, however evidence of its cultivation was found in 2002 (Ma et al., 2016). As 
discussed in this research, a policy of prohibiting the technology with strict control and 
monitoring measures will not be able to prevent the illegal cultivation of the technology as long 
as there is an incentive. The way to eliminate the incentives regarding illegal cultivation is 
through approval of the technology on science based evidence. 
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